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ABSTRACT

ON HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTS

By
Karim Barakat
May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Professor Daniel Selcer
My dissertation develops a critique of Rawlsian social contract theory by arguing
that the normative component of democratic practices must be grounded in nonpolitical
reasons. With John Rawls’s rights-based approach, social contract theory has strongly
resurfaced by focusing on consent as the basic condition for the formation of a just state.
The emphasis on agreement leads Rawls to exclude historical, religious, or philosophical
reasons from justifying the ideal conception of justice. Consequently, Rawls completely
separates politics from any nonpolitical grounding. I argue, however that Rawls’s project
cannot account for its normative commitments unless it makes use of a nonpolitical
ground. By invoking Foucault’s historicism and Hobbes’s materialism, I maintain that
one way to justify political practices follows from conceiving the activity of political
power in material terms. This materialism, moreover, makes room for recognizing
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multiple forms of power relations that have developed historically. I contend, therefore,
that a historical material analysis offers a better understanding of how political power
functions, and thus allows us to conduct critique effectively. However, justifying
normative claims cannot follow from such a descriptive view and must appeal to
cultivating virtue in individuals. I argue that recognizing the pervasive operation of
power relations should lead us to cultivate a skeptical attitude with regards to our own
views. This skepticism, moreover, serves the purpose of reducing antagonism between
different views in favor of a more engaged politics that jettisons the divide between
public and private reason.
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Introduction
This dissertation develops a critique of Rawlsian contractarianism by questioning
its basis and arguing for recognizing the role truth claims play in determining political
allegiances. I put forward a Foucaultian-Hobbesian view that begins from an analysis of
the material activity of power while identifying historical conditions that can be the target
of critique. I maintain that we can derive a coherent conception of power from Foucault
and Hobbes as affecting bodies, while disposing of metaphysical dependencies. Despite
not having a metaphysical basis, my view will nonetheless be grounded in a historical
analysis that, on the one hand, pursues an empirical method in identifying shifts, and on
the other hand, maintains that historical constraints determine the boundaries of what we
can think and do. Given that such constraints limit our thought, it would follow that longterm ideals cannot be reliably identified, which is why pursuing short-term normative
dictates is more justified and more effective. One main consequence of my view is to
recognize that commitments to truth, whether historical or metaphysical, contribute
significantly to shaping political subjects. Political pluralism, therefore, cannot be
reduced to mere disagreement over metaphysical commitments. Instead, for political
intervention to be effective, it must act on people’s beliefs, even historical ones, while
dissolving the distinction between private and public reason which shields commitments
to truth from engagement and public criticism. Ultimately, justifying normative content
can neither follow from this historical material account, nor from descriptive claims
generally, but can only follow from appealing to specific virtues that render this engaged
politics possible. I argue that this primarily entails being skeptical of one’s own
commitments to truth.
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Though it is difficult to reduce contractarian views to a shared basis, the common
thread of using the contract as a model for ordering political relations has been
historically subject to criticism. Most prominently, in his 1748 essay “Of the Original
Contract,” David Hume puts forward a critique that unfolds in three main directions.
First, Hume argues that though from a historical point of view some states may have been
founded as an outcome of agreement, the vast majority of states emerged as a result of
conquest and usurpation. Even where agreement did obtain, Hume argues that there is no
justification for why ancient agreements would still be binding for different generations
in the present. Given that actual consent in the present never ensues, it follows that
agreement cannot be the basis for an obligation to obey the laws.1 Hume maintains that to
argue that contract adequately describes political relations is straightforwardly false, as
“[w]e find, every where, princes who claim their subjects as their property, and assert
their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession.”2
Second, Hume contends that the notion of contract fails to account for those who
cannot be reasonably recognized to have a choice. If we accept the contractarian
approach, then obeying the laws must result from the voluntary consent of every
individual. Yet voluntary agreement appears to be seldom present, and arguing for tacit
consent as the basis for legitimacy also fails to take into account cases in which tacit
consent is not a matter of choice. In an often-cited excerpt, Hume asks
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to

1

David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Hume: Political Essays, ed. Knud
Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 189.
2
Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 188.
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day, by the small wages which he acquires. We may as well assert, that a man, by
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he
was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the
moment he leaves her.3
One might consider tacit consent to ground obligation for those who have the opportunity
to leave to a different state. However, allegiance is often not the result of voluntary
agreement, whether tacit or explicit, when it involves those who cannot even entertain the
possibility of pursuing a life elsewhere.
Finally, Hume argues that in the absence of actual consent, one can simply appeal
to utility to justify obeying the laws. It is simply in the interest of society that laws are
formed and followed. On the one hand, an argument for avoiding a state of chaos or war
ultimately appeals to utility in order to mitigate self-interested inclinations. It is because
we recognize that obeying the laws is a prerequisite for having a society, which improves
everyone’s condition, that we limit the passions that promote our own interests. For
Hume, this argument ultimately rests on utility.4 On the other hand, even if we suppose
that such contract is binding, we can only justify abiding by our agreement by appealing
to utilitarian considerations. Arguing for political obligation based on agreement begs the
question of why we have an obligation to maintain our agreement. For Hume, one can
only offer a utilitarian argument based on improving the condition of society generally,
which does not necessarily presuppose any form of voluntary consent.5

3

Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 193.
Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 196.
5
Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 196-97.
4
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Hume’s arguments offer good reasons to reject justifying obligation to the laws by
appealing to actual consent. However, more recent forms of contractarianism have been
concerned with hypothetical consent as a basis for political obligation. The emphasis on a
hypothetical agreement is most clearly exemplified in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice,
which led to the strong re-emergence of contractarianism following its publication in
1971. In Theory, Rawls aims at offering an alternative to utilitarian and intuitionist
approaches of justifying political commitments. (TJ vii-viii) Rawls’s recourse to
contractarianism serves the purpose of introducing a rights-based approach that develops
out of agreement. (TJ 4) Rawls avoids the problems Hume had raised by recognizing that
actual agreement is too strong of a condition, which is why he resorts to maintaining that
this agreement need only be hypothetical. (TJ 12) On the one hand, this renders consent,
whether explicit or tacit, irrelevant. On the other, historical agreements are also not
relevant for determining present obligations. For Rawls, as long as the rightly motivated
individuals would have good reason to agree to the principles of justice – understood in
terms of fairness – then the purported principles can be recognized as legitimate. (TJ 16)
Based on this account of justification, Rawls maintains that theorizing in an ideal manner
must have priority in political philosophy without necessarily disposing of concerns
regarding feasibility. Only after the basic principles of justice have been laid out should
we consider how it is that we can apply them within a community. (TJ 245-47)
However, as Rawls’s work further develops, the initial aim of the project becomes
less ambitious. Rawls’s reliance on a Kantian ethical justification for politics is replaced
with a freestanding politics that is intrinsically moral. If agreement is what matters, then
grounding a political view on Kant’s ethics becomes problematic given the contentious

xiv

nature of any ethical doctrine. Agreement, thus, requires that no comprehensive doctrines
are used in justification. (PL xliv) Moreover, it requires that we set aside our beliefs and
commitments. For Rawls, then, what we take to be true or morally right is irrelevant for a
procedural politics that is concerned with arriving at a stable society beginning from a
reasonably pluralistic community. (PL 36, 42-43)
The focus on agreement, especially in its procedural element, also weakens the
goal of offering an alternative justification to utilitarianism for political legitimacy, and
the question of justification fades into the background. The outcome becomes one of
simply putting forward a coherent account that we would accept as long as we are already
committed to liberalism. Given that our justifications will often conflict, and since what
justifies the principles of justice must be agreed upon, then it is less a matter of what the
content of our justifications is, and more a matter of whether we have similar views. (PL
141) Consequently, Rawls’s later project becomes one that is concerned with putting
forward a consistent and feasible view on the condition that we all already accept the
basic stipulations of liberal democracy.
Rawlsian contractarianism has been subjected to a number of criticisms issuing
from different directions. Whereas Robert Nozick contends that Rawls’s account of
justice is too restrictive and that justice requires the presence of a libertarian minimal
state that only acts to protect the rights of individuals, Michael Walzer argues from a
communitarian perspective that justice must be embedded in the social meaning produced
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by communities.6 Amartya Sen, on the other hand, suggests a conception of justice that
follows from Adam Smith’s sentimentalist approach and thus rejects Rawls’s ideal
conception of justice, replacing it with a comparative one.7 From a different approach,
Habermas focuses on a dialogical requirement for ensuring the presence of a relatively
impartial attitude that precedes any agreement, but dialogue itself must follow from an
analysis of what discourse presupposes.8 Alternatively, in Situating the Self, Seyla
Benhabib targets Rawls’s veil of ignorance through arguing that abstracting from the
particular situation of individuals reduces their otherness to sameness.9 Several objections
have also been raised focusing on Rawls’s inability to resolve issues pertaining to race
and gender. Charles Mills argues that Rawls disregards the requirement of corrective
justice, and thus overlooks the necessity of including remediation in his conception of
justice.10 Alternatively, Carole Pateman, Martha Nussbaum, and Susan Okin put forth
feminist critiques of Rawls focusing on the genderless nature of the original position that
fails to take into account the structure of society that is already shaped by gender

6

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Reprint edition (New York: Basic Books,
2013); Michael Walzer, Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (New
York: Basic Books, 1984).
7
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011).
8
Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: Moral
Conciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 2001).
9
Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992).
10
Charles W. Mills, “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls,” The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 47, no. S1 (March 1, 2009): 161–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.20416962.2009.tb00147.x.
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differences and family, while simultaneously being unable to address the question of
justice in cases involving an imbalance in power.11
Significantly, however, the extent to which Rawls is able to offer justifications for
his normative commitments has been largely overlooked. My focus, therefore, will be on
questioning whether Rawls’s view offers compelling reasons to accept justice as fairness
by examining the objections he raises against Hobbes. In his Lectures on Political
Philosophy, Rawls identifies several shortcomings that plague a Hobbesian approach to
politics. His view promises to offer an alternative that can adequately address these
issues. By arguing for a democratic basis for stability, Rawls maintains that Hobbes fails
to put forward an account of a stable society without appealing to absolute sovereignty, a
concern Rawls attempts to address throughout his hypothetical contract between
reasonable individuals. (LH 85)
But whereas Rawls emphasizes the unacceptable consequences of Hobbes’s view,
a parallel critique of Hobbes focusing on the nature of political power was put forward by
Foucault. Foucault develops a completely different conception of political power by
arguing for the inadequacy of Hobbes’s view. Foucault maintains that Hobbes relies on a
juridical conception of power that grounds it primarily in nonpolitical capacities. Instead,
Foucault promises to offer a material view of how political power operates by referring
throughout his works to a micro-physics of power and to force relations that inherently
involve resistance.

11

Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family
(New York: Basic Books, 1991).
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Yet I argue that Rawls and Foucault maintain mistakenly that Hobbes’s position
neither offers the means to guarantee stability nor is able to account for political power
that functions at the material level. I contend that Hobbes, in fact, introduces a material
view of the passions that not only justifies instituting the state through agreement, but
also provides the means to reinforce the stability resulting from the exercise of absolute
power by the sovereign. An account of stability, therefore, partly unfolds in Hobbes’s
view in terms of the virtues conducive to peace that citizens should acquire. Like
Foucault, then, Hobbes develops a material account of politics recognizing that a
normative view must begin by taking into account how political power functions. I argue
that in contrast to a Rawlsian ideal view, this material conception of politics emphasizes
the need to begin from a description of how subjects are influenced by political power.
Only then can we justify appealing to normative claims in order to justify concerns
arising out of encountering individuals who have different commitments.
However, Hobbes’s position, given its pre-Kantian character, justifies its political
claims by appealing to a metaphysical materialism, one that Foucault cannot endorse.
Reconciling the two positions involves, therefore, showing how the substance
metaphysics to which Hobbes is committed can be transformed into a historical method
akin to the one Foucault endorses. Ultimately, I maintain that normative political
conclusions can arise out of a Hobbesian argument, empirically verified by appealing to
history, that sheds light on the instability resulting from the absence of a state and
virtuous individuals.
My aim throughout this dissertation is to argue for the absence of a ground for
Rawlsian contractarianism. Though Rawls may indeed fail to respond to a number of
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problems that arise out of his commitment to a narrow conception of justice, I maintain
that his view also fails to offer any justification for pursuing the normative goals he
specifies. Alternatively, I argue that the material view of politics I develop out of the
work of Foucault and Hobbes can provide a basis that begins with identifying metapolitical conclusions, from which we can derive short-term normative goals. I, therefore,
argue for privileging a non-ideal approach to politics that recognizes the need to begin by
offering a view of the nature of social relations as contingent on historical material
practices.
In chapter one, I argue that Rawls’s political turn in Political Liberalism fails to
offer justifications for the conclusions he derives. I evaluate Rawls’s view in relation to
three criteria he argues are missing in Hobbes’s position; accounting for reasonableness,
ascribing a social role for politics, and attaining stability independently of invoking
absolute sovereignty. Rawls puts forward a compelling view in Theory by arguing for a
Kantian based view of liberalism. However, in his later work, Rawls recognizes the
inadequacy of the Kantian presupposition given his focus on agreement. Rawls, therefore,
replaces the Kantian basis with moral dictates that are based on an existing overlapping
consensus in the community. I maintain, however, that this move runs into three main
problems. On the one hand, Rawls appears to presuppose a notion of a well-ordered
society that determines who counts as reasonable, and thus who is included in an
agreement that purportedly determines the principles of justice for this society. This leads
to a circularity that Rawls cannot avoid. On the other hand, by appealing to an existing
overlapping consensus, Rawls fails to offer justifications for his view and instead appeals
to values that are merely institutionally instilled. Consequently, in the absence of
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doctrinal commitments that can serve as a basis for the political conclusions, Rawls is
unable to resolve the problems he argues are present in Hobbes’s view.
These problems in the Rawlsian project lead me to explore in chapter two a
different approach that also arises in response to Hobbes, that of Foucault. Whereas
Rawls focuses on a hypothetical agreement and disposes of the material aspect of
Hobbes’s politics, Foucault chooses to retain the material element while arguing for the
redundancy of the notion of contract. Foucault argues for reversing the Hobbesian basis
for rights that he locates in nonpolitical capacities which constitute political subjects upon
instituting sovereignty. Instead, Foucault argues against a view that appeals to the origin
of rights in order to justify political practices. Foucault, therefore, maintains that political
power is often exercised in a manner that is decentralized, unlike power possessed by the
Hobbesian sovereign, and that functions by targeting bodies. The material operation of
power, therefore, cannot be reduced to one that arises out of agreement between
individuals and resulting in a centralized state, but must be recognized as constituting
subjects through micro operations. I maintain that though Foucault develops a view of
power that arises from analyzing the inherent political element in relations of inequality,
this account of power can only be at odds with Hobbes if we reject Hobbesian
materialism.
Chapter three, therefore, takes at its object linking the political conclusions at
which Hobbes arrives to a material basis. I argue that Hobbes’s politics should be
understood as grounded in his material conception of the world that comes to affect and
determine how individuals behave. In order to establish this conclusion, I argue against a
Straussian reading maintaining that Hobbes rejects metaphysical materialism and
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recognizes instead that knowledge is freely constructed in a geometric form. I argue that
the geometric method in Hobbes does not serve the purpose of merely constructing
knowledge, but rather requires that causation is introduced into the method itself. By
including causes in definitions, Hobbes recognizes that we can arrive at knowledge of
causation analytically, which would render a geometric approach based on correct
definitions scientific, and thus certain. Understood in there terms, Hobbes is committed to
a metaphysical materialism that grounds his politics. Ultimately, the role of consent and
contract in Hobbes’s politics is undermined by his rejection of any meaningful sense of
freedom, which renders consent entirely determined by material conditions, and by
maintaining that contract need not be the result of actual free consent but may result from
conquest. I argue, therefore, that the state of nature in Hobbes’s view should be
understood as a historical state, but also as a definition of the state that follows from
invoking a geometric method to politics, which makes use of universal definitions
including that of a state of nature. As I maintain in chapter two, this material basis for
Hobbes’s politics renders his view compatible with that of Foucault.
Chapter four explores the consistency between the views of Hobbes and Foucault
further by arguing that Hobbes recognizes the positive role political power plays in
shaping individuals. By identifying the role of conatus in shaping individuals and
justifying the drive for self-preservation, I contend that the positive role Foucault assigns
to political power is amenable to the account Hobbes develops in influencing the passions
of individuals. The conative structure of the passions provides Hobbes with the means to
argue for arriving at stability at least partially through modifying the objects of the
passions of individuals, and therefore constituting them as virtuous citizens inclined to
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peace. However, maintaining that the two conceptions of political power is consistent
does not render Foucault’s view redundant. Based on Foucault’s insistence that his view
should be understood as Kantian, I argue that Foucault’s genealogies should be
understood as undermining the necessity and universality of conditions that have made
possible specific claims to knowledge. The historical approach reveals their contingency
by showing how they were fabricated in specific moments for specific purposes. By
replacing necessity with contingency, the historical approach provides an answer for what
political analysis is possible in the wake of Kant’s critique of metaphysics. This allows us
to couple Foucault’s view with Hobbes’s argument for the need to cultivate virtues in
citizens, by historicizing the acquisition of virtues that lead to peaceful dispositions.
Finally, having argued for the coherence of a Foucaultian-Hobbesian view,
chapter five engages Rawls again by maintaining that Rawls fails to account for the role
of truth claims in politics. I, first, argue that the descriptive nature of Foucault’s account
renders it difficult to derive normative implications, apart from a negative normative
conception that justifies equality by delegitimizing inequalities. Nonetheless, one key
conclusion I derive from Foucault’s view pertains to the relevance of truth claims in
politics. I show how Rawls retains a minimal role for truth commitments in his political
account and does not allow for critiquing the beliefs of citizens. I argue for arriving at
normative conceptions by appealing to Hobbesian justifications that aim to ward off a
bellicose state of nature. Ultimately, this requires that we cultivate virtues in individuals
that render them inclined to peaceful engagement through encouraging agonistic politics.
Given the emphasis on the role of truth claims, a central virtue will have to be skepticism
or modesty with regards to one’s own views. I argue that rendering this view effective
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will require eliminating the divide between public and private in order to make critique of
beliefs possible.
Putting forward a material conception of power relations offers means by which
we can begin to justify democratic practices by referring to actual social relations. The
rules that govern social relations are not ahistorical and do not rely on a transcendental
basis. They are instead entirely historically contingent, which leads to two main
consequences. On the one hand, recognizing the role of historical formations in
determining social organizations indicates that political problems are themselves formed
by these historical conditions. Examining the historical background, therefore, does not
serve simply to shed light on the problems at hand while offering no insight as to
normative conclusions. Instead, the historical constitution of a problem determines how it
is that we can effectively approach it by gradually transforming elements that are taken to
be fixed and unchanging. Consequently, abstract arguments that have a universal scope
are inadequate to address political problems.
Second, we should understand our own rational capacities as also constrained
historically. This should impel us to endorse a sober skepticism that is weary of positing
long-term ideals or specifying unchanging conditions for political inclusion and
reasonableness. This leads to a political approach that cautiously pursues the aim of
bringing about gradual political transformations. Recognizing our limitations, however,
should also lead us to be weary of simply defending the status quo. Instead, though
normative claims must be recognized as historically limited, they can still be introduced
with some generality. Ultimately, specifying short-term normative dictates avoids
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invoking justifications that retrospectively justify existing social relations and renders
political critique more forceful.

xxiv

Chapter One
The Normative Grounding of Reasonableness
The resurgence of social contract theory following the publication of A Theory of
Justice has led to focusing on hypothetical contracts as a means to justify political
stability. Rawls develops a procedural political account that relies on a hypothetical
agreement in order to arrive at the basic structure of institutions. However, critiques of
the role of political institutions, especially those of Foucault, have led to doubts
concerning the adequacy of such agreements. Foucault develops his genealogical work in
response to a conception of power he finds in Hobbes and social contract theory
generally. Yet, evaluating Foucault’s rejection of contractarian power necessitates
fleshing out Rawls’s contemporary form of contractarianism that claims to discard
Hobbes’s understanding of power in favor of a liberal model.
The implication of Foucault’s critique inevitably leads to questions concerning the
grounds of justification in politics. On the one hand, this casts doubt on the possibility of
justifying normative claims. If political values are historically inculcated by the activity
of power relations, advancing normative content cannot follow from a negative
conception of freedom. Instead, it appears to rely at least partially on the passivity of
individuals. On the other hand, this critique also raises the problem of the function of
publicity in political discourse as Rawls conceives it. The role assigned to publicity since
Kant has been to offer a degree of convergence between different conflicting views in
order to render politics based on agreement possible. The success of this convergence,
however, will not only depend on resolving doctrinal differences, but will have to rest on
the adoption of common historical narratives as well. Ultimately, as I will argue in
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chapter five, political action will attain a certain relationship with truth claims. These
truth claims are not metaphysical, and do not necessarily have to be true. Instead, their
significance lies in the fact that they are taken to be true by citizens. Political action will
have to target the beliefs of citizens and cannot set aside their commitments to historical
narratives in favor of mere doctrinal convergence as Rawls argues. Once this is
recognized, the sought-after convergence over a set of principles becomes more difficult.
Though it is unclear Foucault can provide us with a solution to the first problem of
normativity, his analysis of the transformation of the role of political power offers tools
to rethink politics itself. In other words, at the meta-political level, a precondition for the
success of a political view requires that one is aware of the pervasive role of power
relations. One main challenge to this view can be identified in Rawls’s contractarian
account, which attempts to develop sufficient justifications for normative content
independently of metaphysical or historical claims to truth.
In order to account for political justification, Rawls begins by rejecting a Hobbesian
view that inevitably leads to an absolute sovereign. Rawls takes Hobbes’s view on
contractarianism to be inadequate in terms of its failure to account for stability for the
right reasons, the absence of reasonable incentives, and the lack of a social role of
morality. Instead, Rawls advances a version of the contract that he labels initially as
Kantian. This shift towards Kant introduces a version of the social contract that focuses
on rights, and thus identifies in agreement the precondition for setting basic principles
that serve as the grounds for legitimacy. The justification Rawls offers for his appeal to
contractarianism has two implications. First, Rawls specifies a merely pragmatic reason
for his commitment. For Rawls, while one should not be hopeful to resolve
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disagreements over conceptions of the good, we can still attempt to arrive at an
agreement with respect to basic procedural matters. The challenge that Rawls faces,
however, is how to put forward an understanding of agreement that is not reducible to
mere self-interest and thus lacking stability. In other words, the view Rawls introduces
attempts primarily to respond to the problems he argues are present in Hobbes.
Second, the identification of politics with proceduralism allows Rawls to distance
himself from metaphysics. A political view that endorses agreement as determining
legitimacy must be recognized as constructivist. Consequently, the validity of principles
that follow from this agreement does not arise from a certain relation with truth, or from
an underlying metaphysical reality. Instead, validity depends on the mere fact that
individuals agree on these terms and act out of that agreement. As such, one main
advantage of conceiving of politics on the model of the social contract is rendering
metaphysics irrelevant at the meta-political level. Yet, Rawls’s view wavers on what kind
of justification or ground one can offer for politics. At first, Rawls chooses to develop a
Kantian account that grounds politics morally. This emphasizes the notion of moral
persons with powers that are capable of acquiring principles of justice due to a learning
process. Rawls, however, soon realizes that this view entails exclusionary commitments
that render his account inconsistent. Consequently, he chooses to abandon this approach
in favor of a freestanding political view. In order to be able to include under his political
view various forms of liberalism, Rawls shifts the grounds of politics from one dependent
on a number of Kantian moral notions to a view that is self-sufficient.
This chapter will, therefore, focus on the extent to which Rawls is able to ground his
political account following the problems he identifies with Hobbes. I begin with the
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reading Rawls offers of Hobbes and focus on these objections as motivating his general
account. I, first, examine Rawls’s Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, in
order to identify three shortcomings that Rawls finds in the Hobbesian characterization of
practical reason and the state of nature. I refer to Rawls’s Kantian move in order to show
how he attempts to resolve these problems while shedding light on the dependence of this
view on moral conceptions that are not reducible to politics. I argue that the Kantian
view, however, is susceptible to the problem of feasibility Sen puts forward. I, then, shed
light on the amendments Rawls introduces in order to develop a freestanding political
account that manages to partially respond to doubts concerning feasibility. Rawls
attempts to offer a stable view of society by appealing to the sense of fairness of citizens
along with an existing overlapping consensus. But whereas the Kantian view is able to
account for stability, reasonableness, and the social role of morality, Rawls’s freestanding
view escapes the charge of feasibility, but fails to successfully avoid the problems he
locates in Hobbes. I argue, therefore, that Rawls’s view fails in three respects. First,
Rawls’s inability to offer a standard for determining the reasonableness of citizens and
doctrines leads to one of two conclusions. Either his view is not to be regarded as one
claiming universal validity, or it will necessarily be exclusionary to other liberal views.
Both conclusions are not ones Rawls would be willing to accept. Second, the view of
moral psychology introduced cannot be understood as belonging to an independent
sphere, but must be justified by appealing to a comprehensive doctrine. Finally, I argue
that Rawls overlooks the problematic role institutions play, by his own lights, in
inculcating liberal ideals in individuals and thus violates his commitment to the
“freedom” of citizens in the original position. Ultimately, developing a freestanding
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politics appears to be inadequate to account for the problems Rawls locates in Hobbes’s
view.
Rawls’s Reading of Hobbes
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls identifies his account as contractarian, one that finds
affinities with the views of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, while distancing itself from
Hobbes. Rawls states,
I shall regard Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Rousseau’s The Social
Contract, and Kant’s ethical works beginning with The Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals as definitive of the contract tradition. For all of its greatness,
Hobbes’s Leviathan raises special problems. (TJ 11n)
These “special problems” Rawls identifies with Leviathan lead him towards articulating
an account that promises to avoid introducing an absolute sovereign as a necessary
condition for the success of a political view. Accordingly, Rawls follows a liberal
democratic approach that we don’t find articulated in Leviathan, which draws a wedge
between Rawls’s position and that of Hobbes. Consequently, the soundness of Rawls’s
position can be partly determined by how well he manages to resolve these problems he
identifies with Hobbes.
In his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Rawls introduces an interesting
reconstruction of Hobbes’s account that, on the one hand, sheds elements he deems
unnecessary for Hobbes’s argument, and on the other hand, offers strictly political
justifications for some of Hobbes’s commitments. To begin with, Rawls disposes of
Hobbes’s materialism while focusing on his political view as an independent edifice,
arguing that materialism plays little to no role in influencing the political conclusions of
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Leviathan. While setting aside any metaphysical basis for Hobbes’s politics, Rawls
maintains that Hobbes’s psychological account follows directly from “common sense
observation” along with the influence left by Thucydides, Aristotle and Plato.12 (LH 29)
But regardless of whether the political account is to be understood on the basis of
Hobbes’s materialism, the question that Rawls chooses to focus on first is how we are to
interpret the state of nature along with the social contract. Rawls maintains that the state
of nature in Hobbes’s view should be understood primarily in terms of how “civil society
could have been generated - not how it was actually generated.” (LH 31) Rawls, thus,
rejects a historical reading of the state of nature in favor of a hypothetical one.13 Of
course, Hobbes doesn’t appear to straightforwardly endorse this claim, but Rawls argues
this is the conclusion Hobbes is warranted in drawing. Given the hypothetical threat of
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This view is compatible with one we find in Strauss, who contends that Hobbes relies
on his view of the passions primarily on Thucydides’s work. Jean Hampton, alternatively,
maintains that Hobbes’s materialism comes to explain the “radical individualism” we
find in the state of nature. Moreover, Philip Pettit argues that materialism plays a
significant role in Hobbes’s justification. For Hobbes, what is shared between individuals
is their materiality, which allows him to develop a general psychology that eventually
develops into an argument for absolutism. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of
Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University Of
Chicago Press, 1963), 110. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11. Philip Pettit, Made with Words:
Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008),
141.
13
Rawls treats the state of nature in Hobbes as entirely hypothetical. Yet, as Hampton
maintains, Hobbes seems to recognize that states have in fact been formed by the people.
The state of nature does not strictly serve a hypothetical normative role for justifying the
existence of the state, but further offers an explanation for why it was rational historically
to form a state, regardless why it was actually formed. Alternatively, Pettit offers a
different interpretation arguing that the primary function of the state of nature along with
the contract that follows from it is to offer a view on the “true nature” of the state and the
“characteristics” that any state must have. I will return to the question of how to interpret
the state of nature in Chapter three. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition,
273. Pettit, Made with Words, 118.
6

the state of war in the absence of a sovereign, rational individuals have an interest in
arriving at an agreement to be guaranteed by the sovereign. (LH 14)
But if we regard the state of nature on hypothetical grounds, the question that follows
is why we should conceive of it as a state of war. While rejecting the classical
psychological egoist reading of Hobbes, Rawls maintains that Hobbes allows for
benevolent activity from human beings.14 Yet, Rawls also contends that the account of
conflict that Hobbes stresses does not arise out of those benevolent passions, but rather is
based on desires that seek to preserve oneself, leading to competition, diffidence, and
eventually war.15 In order to resolve this apparent inconsistency in Hobbes between
ascribing benevolent desires on the one hand while emphasizing self-centeredness on the
other, Rawls maintains that Hobbes focuses on the relevant traits for politics in the state
of nature. It follows, then, that though Hobbes recognizes our capacity for altruistic
behavior, his view develops out of emphasizing certain features of human psychology.
These features are self-interested, prone to conflict, and thus constitute the grounds for
transitioning towards a unified society. This focus, then, leads Hobbes to identify the
purpose of the state in terms of allowing us to preserve our own lives. (LH 46, 51) But
more importantly, Rawls takes Hobbes to also shed light on the shared nature of those
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Hampton, for instance, is committed to reading Hobbes as a psychological egoist.
Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 22.
15
This can be contrasted with the position Hampton introduces. Hampton argues that the
cause of conflict in the state of nature cannot be reduced to the passions, for vainglory,
being one of the passions most prone for conflict, can only strongly develop within a
community where reputation has significance. For Hampton, the individualistic state of
nature Hobbes introduces cannot make room for such social passions. Moreover, locating
conflict in the passions minimizes the role for self-preservation in war. Hampton, thus,
argues that shortsightedness through not realizing the benefits of cooperation is best
suited to account for conflict in the state of nature for Hobbes. Hampton, 73-74, 81–83..
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traits, for we share “fundamental interests” as human beings, including those of desiring a
commodious living and self-preservation. Emphasizing what we share constitutes the
basis for moving towards an agreement that produces the state, for independently of those
shared passions, there is no basis upon which individuals can agree.16 (LH 48)
The significance of focusing on this understanding of war in the state of nature is that
it presents human beings as relatively stable and unaffected by social institutions. Though
Rawls recognizes that Hobbes puts forward an account of how education, culture, and
laws can transform us to some degree, he still maintains that essential features of human
beings remain the same all throughout. These are the basic interests in “self-preservation,
in conjugal affections, and in the means for commodious living.” (LH 42) But these
features go beyond our basic needs and also include traits we find in society today. Rawls
takes Hobbes to argue that if we examine the way human beings act in society, we would
be able to understand how they would act in the state of nature. While referring to
Hobbes’s argument from experience in the state of nature, Rawls contends that basic selfinterested desires not only remain active but also are not susceptible to transformation in
the presence of social institutions. Consequently, the basic traits leading to conflict we
find in the state of nature are essential characteristics of human beings. (LH 41-42) This
leads us to the first main problem Rawls locates in Hobbes’s view. Rawls argues that we
do not find in Hobbes’s contract an account of how politics, or morality for that matter,
plays a role in shaping individuals.
Having specified basic unchanging human desires as the focus of Hobbes’s argument,
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We’ll see in the next section that Rawls adopts this procedure of beginning with shared
notions.
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Rawls raises the question of motivation and practical reason in Hobbes. Hobbes’s laws of
nature involve demands of reciprocity that guarantee social cooperation. (LH 61)
However, Hobbes justifies those principles by entirely appealing to individual selfpreservation. Abiding by the laws of nature follows from being concerned with our own
interests. Yet, for Rawls, this omits a capacity for reasonableness that is needed to arrive
at social cooperation without coercion. Rawls begins by distinguishing the rational from
the reasonable, a distinction he argues is not present in Hobbes. Whereas rationality is
defined in terms of satisfying one’s own interests, reasonableness involves “fair terms of
cooperation.” (LH 54) Cooperation, however, develops out of working for the rational
advantage of one’s self, and in this sense reasonableness always presupposes
rationality.17 Yet, Rawls maintains that reasonableness requires an additional component,
that of justice arising out of reciprocal relations. Reciprocity would impose constraints on
what each individual can do for the sake of furthering her advantage, and thus
cooperation presupposes the capacity to honor the terms of these reciprocal relations. (LH
56-57) Accordingly, Rawls argues that Hobbes problematically justifies the reasonable
content of the laws of nature in terms of “collective” rationality.18 (LH 55, 66)
This leads Rawls to introduce a major argument against Hobbes, that of lacking
grounds for moral obligations and political rights. (LH 66) For Rawls, such rights should
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Rawls argues that these distinctions are not present in Hobbes and derives them from
the account he introduces as I will show in the next section.
18
Rawls limits the function of reason in Hobbes to an instrumental role. This view,
however, has been challenged by several commentators. Bernard Gert, for instance,
argues that Hobbes makes use of a more “basic” sense of reason, what he refers to as
“natural reason.” This use of reason is not instrumental in the sense that it does not
simply serve the passions, but sets rational ends for improving the conditions of human
beings. Bernard Gert, “Hobbes on Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82, no. 3–4
(September 1, 2001): 248, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00127.
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be grounded on something other than the rational, a view that Hobbes cannot incorporate.
Rawls finds in Hobbes a conception of obligation that is strictly rational in order to
account for his constructivist view of politics.19 Yet, for Rawls, Hobbes still fails to offer
grounds for reasonableness independently of self-interest. The relevant question Rawls
attempts to tackle, then, is how to provide a constructivist account that would
simultaneously be able to offer reasonable grounds for obligation. If Rawls is right in
specifying one of the roles of political philosophy in terms of negotiating an ideal of
justice with the practically possible, and thus providing a view of a “reasonably just,
though not perfect” political order, then offering a justification of social coordination
must follow from different grounds than the ones we find in Hobbes. (LH 11) This
constitutes the second problem Rawls locates in Hobbes’s position.
The criticism of the grounds of reasonableness paves the way for an additional
problem Rawls raises against Hobbes’s view, that of developing stability. As is explicit in
Hobbes’s account, the sovereign plays the role of “stabiliz[ing]” the contract. Rawls
appeals to the prisoner’s dilemma situation to argue that agreeing to the terms of the
contract, though conducive for the well-being of both prisoners, is unstable due to the
mutual mistrust between the parties.20 What guarantees that we eventually arrive at
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Generally, Rawls will refer to his account as constructivist in terms of appealing to
agreement rather than attaining moral truth. I will return to the notion of constructivism
for Rawls in the next section, but at this point, David Gauthier’s Hobbesian view can be
regarded as constructivist. David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
20
Rawls follows David Gauthier in depicting conflict in the state of nature in terms of the
prisoner’s dilemma. But Pettit rightly argues that the prisoner’s dilemma is not an
adequate representation of Hobbes’s state of nature. The dilemma suggests that my
defection from the agreement results in the best outcome for myself. Yet, Hobbes
maintains that only the “fool” would not follow the laws of nature. This does not mean
10

stability in Hobbes’s situation, where covenants can be relied upon and agreements hold,
is an absolute ruler. In the absence of a sovereign, the contract will not be observed, and
we return to the state of nature. (LH 77-78)
The sovereign, therefore, changes what Rawls refers to as the “background
conditions” to which individuals refer in their rational decisions. Rather than changing
the psychological traits that lead to conflict, the presence of a sovereign ensures that it
becomes rational to obey the laws of nature. Therefore, the sovereign simply adds
another condition that will be taken into consideration out of self-interest. (LH 78) What
guarantees this stability, for Hobbes, is authorizing the sovereign absolutely, and
consequently, disobeying laws can never be rationally justified. Therefore, the laws of the
sovereign are just by default, though not necessarily conducive for rational interests of
individuals in a community, or “good” as Hobbes uses the term prior to any agreement in
reference to one’s appetite. (LH 83)
Whereas Hobbes considers the condition of absolute sovereignty to be necessary for

that stability will automatically follow, but that rationally, such an agreement is even
better than being a lone defector. Alternatively, Jean Hampton does not draw a link
between the stability of the scheme and the sovereign. For Hampton, following the laws
of nature is rational simply because it is conducive to our preservation. Laws of nature
are, thus, “hypothetical imperatives,” which once obeyed provide us with a better chance
of survival. Hampton maintains that the “regress argument” in Hobbes is what justifies
unlimited power for the sovereign, for imposing limits on power requires a greater power,
which eventually requires positing a sovereign with unlimited power. For Hampton, the
sovereign is needed given the inability of human beings to agree on laws, and thus the
need arises for a single arbitrator. Both Pettit and Hampton are partly correct in their
characterization. Yet, it is clear that Hobbes also invokes the sovereign with absolute
power to stabilize society, not because we would otherwise pursue our interest of not
abiding by the laws of nature as Rawls maintains, but because we simply do not often act
rationally. This requires according to Hobbes invoking fear in subjects as the reliable
passion for stability. Gauthier, Logic of Leviathan (Oxford : New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 79; Pettit, Made with Words, 112–13; Hampton, Hobbes and the
Social Contract Tradition, 90–92, 98-104.
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moving towards a stable community, Rawls rightly argues that this claim can be disputed
on mere historical grounds. As Rawls maintains, “we know, I think, that Hobbes’s
substantive theory can’t be, in general, correct; since constitutional democratic
institutions that violate his conditions for the Sovereign have actually existed and have
not been noticeably less stable and orderly regimes than the kind of absolutism that
Hobbes favored.” (LH 85) Accordingly, stability under the constitutional system Rawls
espouses must exist alongside a democratic procedure rather than being guaranteed by
absolute power. This explains why Rawls considers it necessary to justify reasonable
commitments independently of rational self-interested motives. For Rawls, “institutional
cooperation” under Hobbes’s view is precluded due to the absence of the notion of
“reasonable self-restraint in the sense of a willingness to forgo permanent and long-term
benefits as judged by one’s own rational self-interest,” and the lack of a “sense of
fairness, as illustrated by his having no account of fair background conditions of binding
covenants.” (LH 87)
Rawls maintains that reasonable self-restraint and fairness are essential to social
cooperation, which involves reciprocity and willingness to abide by one’s obligations on
the condition that others do so too. As Rawls argues, for Hobbes, this willingness will
always be bound by one’s self-interest and cannot be justified on the basis of social
relations. Hobbes accepts that it is rational for each person to reciprocate, but he supposes
that we do not act on the basis of self-restraint for its own sake. For Rawls, “[t]hese
reasonable desires … have no part in [Hobbes’s] account of human psychology, at least
insofar as political questions are concerned.” (LH 88) Even if such desires exist in
Hobbes’s scheme, they are simply ineffective and unreliable. Accordingly, Rawls
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presents his project as attempting to “recast [the Social Contract view] so as to
provide…a framework within which the content of the notions essential to social
cooperation - reasonable self-restraint and fairness - can be defined or outlined.” (LH 88)
Though Rawls finds that these conditions are partially satisfied in Locke’s view, it is
ultimately in Kant and the concept of a moral person that his account begins to address
these problems before finally developing an independent political view.
From Kantian Constructivism to Freestanding Politics
The previous section presented three problems Rawls identifies with Hobbes’s
position and suggested that one way to determine the viability of his view is in terms of
how successfully he responds to these problems. Disentangling politics from metaphysics
leads Rawls to locate a moral ground for his political philosophy. Prior to shifting to the
“freestanding” politics introduced in Political Liberalism, Rawls conceives of solutions
for the three problems he identifies in Hobbes with reference to a Kantian position. This
Kantian view appears to be able to justify normativity by appealing to the notion of a
“moral person” possessing moral capacities including reasonableness. Offering Kantian
moral grounds for normativity allows Rawls to provide justifications for conceiving of
society as stable for the right reasons and account for the social role of politics. This
section will first be concerned with shedding light on the moral justifications of Rawls’s
Kantian position while introducing the problem of feasibility Sen introduces. I argue
afterwards that the Kantian view is susceptible to the charge Sen puts forward. However,
the question of whether Rawls is able to avoid the feasibility problem with his
freestanding account, while simultaneously responding to the problems he locates in
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Hobbes, depends on fleshing out the political notions of publicity along with the
overlapping consensus to which I move in the next section.
Rawls contends in the preface to A Theory of Justice that the theory he develops is
“highly Kantian in nature.” He later emphasizes the Kantian undertones of his view in
several essays following the publication of Theory. (TJ viii) In “A Kantian Conception of
Equality” and “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Rawls outlines the procedural
starting points of his view, while shedding light on the relation between equality and
Kantian freedom. Rawls specifies two main ideals with which we procedurally begin, that
of the well-ordered society, along with the second ideal of free and equal moral persons.
For Rawls, since political theory is primarily concerned with constructing the bases for
resolving a moral question, it requires providing an account of moral persons that have
specific formal qualities. The ideal of a well-ordered society, on the other hand, is to be
understood as one whose members accept and know the public conception of justice,
whose social institutions express the principles of justice, and finally where this
conception is founded on methods of inquiry that have been agreed upon. Beginning from
this liberal democratic ideal, stability will ensue as a result of perpetuating the principles
of justice through public expression. This in turn allows for reaffirming the commitment
of citizens to this specific understanding of justice. (KCE 255-56)
Yet, to see how this view responds to the problems Rawls locates in Hobbes, it is
essential to develop further his Kantian account. Central to his thesis is the application of
Kantian ethics to the social sphere, which brings to the forefront a number of key formal

14

concepts.21 These notions allow Rawls to specify the basic conditions relevant for the
question of justice. Rawls conceives the fundamental political question as one arising out
of a philosophical incompatibility between freedom and equality. The former is
conceived on the Lockean liberal model that emphasizes freedom of conscience, while
the latter follows from the priority Rousseau assigns to the equality of political liberties.
(KCMT 307) The question that follows is how to develop a political view that maintains
both freedom and equality which Rawls contends are necessary for a well-ordered
society. Consequently, Rawls introduces a hypothetical original position, in which
conflict arises from different conceptions of the good. Resolving the problem of
difference requires an agreement on the basic principles of justice. Hypothetical
agreement, thus, serves as the basis for constructing the principles of justice under
conditions that render personal preferences opaque. Kantian constructivism, then,
emphasizes the role of agreement, and “holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in
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To present this view as Kantian raises the problem of compatibility between justice as
fairness and Kant’s politics. But Rawls recognizes this departure, and he is quick to note
that his view is not identical to Kant’s. To label it as Kantian “expresses analogy and not
identity,” being a “doctrine [that] sufficiently resembles Kant’s in enough fundamental
respects so that it is far closer to his view than to the other traditional moral conceptions.”
(KCMT 304-05) In fact, justice as fairness uses certain Kantian notions to develop a
political account, while disposing of the overarching framework we find in Kant’s
politics. The extent to which Rawls’s view can be considered Kantian has been subject to
criticism by a number of commentators such as Onora O’Neill and Larry Krasnoff.
Alternatively, in “Rawls and Kantian Constructivism,” Kaufman highlights several
overlaps between the view that Rawls introduces and that of Kant. I will be less
concerned with the actual overlap between the two and more with introducing Rawls’s
position coherently. It is noteworthy, as this section will point out, that Rawls steps away
from Kant in his later work to develop a strictly political position. Onora O’Neill,
“Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed.
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
351; Alexander Kaufman, “Rawls and Kantian Constructivism,” Kantian Review 17, no.
2 (June 2012): 229–35, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000040; Larry Krasnoff,
“How Kantian Is Constructivism?,” Kant-Studien 90, no. 4 (1999): 385–409.
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terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept.” (KCMT 307)
The fact that principles of justice are constructed for Rawls sheds light on a main
Kantian feature, namely setting aside the question of truth in favor of merely practical
considerations. Objectivity in politics, under Rawls’s account, must be severed from
questions of truth and emphasize agreement instead. The practical nature of the political
problem requires that we introduce a procedure that allows us to arrive at the most
reasonable understanding of justice that all reasonable groups accept. The question is not
one of attaining moral truth, but of determining principles of justice which persons find
amenable to their conceptions of themselves in relation to society. As such, Rawls begins
with the view that participants have of themselves, and from there, attempts to introduce
some agreement through emphasizing shared aspects. Whereas this position is not
grounded metaphysically, Rawls chooses a moral ground for developing his politics.
Under his Kantian view, the formal conceptions of moral persons as free and equal
hypothetically set aside their different conceptions of the good in order to shed light on
shared principles.
Having started with basic commonsensical conceptions, or “model concepts,” of ideal
social relations (well-ordered society) and moral persons, we are able to identify features
that delineate the relation between individuals and society under conditions of freedom
and equality. Moreover, moral persons are to choose ideal principles of justice to
construct their well-ordered society independently of arbitrary distribution of wealth and
power, or under a veil of ignorance. Specifying an understanding of a moral person
becomes essential for Rawls’s project. In a Kantian vein, such persons must first be
rationally autonomous agents taken in abstract from their daily civil roles. (KCMT 307-
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08) What makes these persons moral is, first, their “capacity to form, to revise, and
rationally pursue a conception of the good,” or what Rawls refers to as rationality, and
second, recognizing that others are moved by similar motives of realizing their respective
conceptions of the good. (KCMT 312) Consequently, Rawls embeds the notion of
reasonableness he had argued was missing in Hobbes in the concept of a moral person.
Therefore, moral personality also requires that persons have a “sense of justice,” and are
able to act out of the principles of justice, or reasonableness.22 In fact, Rawls maintains
that acting out of a sense of justice is a necessary requirement to arrive at stability.23
Though moral persons, as rational beings, are motivated to realize their conceptions
of the good, these conceptions are unknown to them under the veil of ignorance. The
motivation itself, however, is a necessary condition for the success of a political
procedure. Independently of conceptions of the good that formally move persons in the
original position, fair terms of cooperation would not be possible. In the absence of
conceptions of the good along with desires to fulfill them, the political problem of
pluralism disappears. But reasonableness simultaneously sets limits on rationality since it
determines the boundaries for pursuing one’s conception of the good in relation to other
members of the community. This limiting function of reasonableness emphasizes a key
feature of Rawls’s Kantianism, for “[t]he priority of the right over the good is
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The Kantian argument should be clear here, for merely acting in accordance with the
principles of justice does not constitute moral persons that are able to constitute and agree
to just principles.
23
This partly addresses the problem Rawls locates in Hobbes, but fully accounting for
stability will require discussing Rawls’s notion of an overlapping consensus, which I will
return to in the next section.
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characteristic of Kantian constructivism.”24 (KCMT 319) The Kantian view Rawls
endorses, therefore, departs from his picture of Hobbes’s position by maintaining that
reasonableness is justified on its own grounds, through appealing to a moral capacity that
is not reducible to calculative reason or self-interest.25
Understanding moral persons engaged in a political agreement as reasonable provides
the grounds for accounting for the other two problems Rawls argues are present in
Hobbes. In order to arrive at stability, Rawls invokes the concept of “moral learning”
which guarantees that persons “develop a desire to act” following the principles of
justice. The idea of moral learning stresses the social role of political institutions.
Furthermore, it depends on a psychological understanding of human nature in order to
determine whether we can expect citizens to learn to act out of a set of principles.
Ultimately, this rests on publicly recognizing the basic principles of justice, which for
Rawls leads citizens to act out of these principles. (TJ 138, 145, 177) Consequently,
given the specific conception of moral persons, Rawls’s view accounts for the
reasonableness of individuals, the social role of political institutions, and finally ensuring
that society will be stable as a result of this social role.
Nevertheless, grounding politics on moral presuppositions raises questions
concerning the feasibility of Rawls’s view. In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen contends
that Rawls offers no guarantee that an agreement will be reached upon a unique set of
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This view is also expressed in Political Liberalism. (PL 52)
Rawls’s account of the reasonable varies throughout his work. As Onora O’Neill
argues, there are at last two different conceptions of reasonableness that we find
articulated in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. O’Neill also shows that
Rawls’s understanding of “Kantian Constructivism” also varies between A Theory of
Justice, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, and Political Liberalism. O’Neill,
“Constructivism in Rawls and Kant.”
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principles of justice. Sen distinguishes between what he takes to be Rawls’s contractarian
“transcendental institutionalism” on the one hand, and his “realization-focused
comparison” on the other.26 The former is the result of defining a perfect sense of justice
that is to be realized institutionally, one that does not begin with the question of the social
realization of this ideal.27
According to Sen, this raises concerns regarding the feasibility of transcendental
institutionalist views, as it is unclear whether an agreement on the basic principles of
justice would in fact ensue. Sen argues that even reasonable persons might not agree on a
single set of impartial principles of justice. A political theory must, therefore, be able to
incorporate several, possibly incompatible, conceptions of justice. Furthermore, Sen
maintains that the transcendental solution is redundant. Given its ideality, it does not
render superfluous the need for selecting a feasible solution among different applicable
alternatives.28 The problem of the social realization of a conception of justice hinges on a
distinction between agreement and actual realization. Sen maintains that the attainment of
justice must be the product of a “gradual formation of behavior patterns” among citizens,
which do not appear immediately upon agreement.29
Sen takes his critique to apply to Rawls’s work generally. However, he refers
primarily to Theory and appears to overlook for the most part the freestanding position
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Sen also offers another argument, namely that Rawls limits his political view to the
question of just institutions and disregards the role of non-institutional factors in social
interactions. This is certainly an important objection, but it will outside the scope of this
chapter. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011), 6–7.
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Sen includes Hobbes here, while interpreting Hobbes to be advancing an ideal
conception of institutions that is not concerned with their realization. In Chapter three, I
will be arguing against such a reading of Hobbesian contractarianism. Sen, 6–7.
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Sen, 9, 98–100.
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Rawls adopts in Political Liberalism. A freestanding political conception, according to
Rawls, is not derived from a comprehensive doctrine, and though it is moral, it “must
contain its own intrinsic normative and moral ideal.”30 The view that Rawls introduces in
Theory is significantly modified in his later political turn. In Political Liberalism, Rawls
maintains the notions of rationality and reasonableness, while severing the connection
with a Kantian conception of moral persons. (PL xlv) As I will argue, shifting the
grounds of justification from a moral comprehensive doctrine to a merely political one
that entails its own moral ideals renders Rawls’s view more feasible. Yet, the absence of
a nonpolitical ground raises again the question of how political constructivism can still
take into consideration the three problems in Hobbes. Rawls modifies his position to
begin with the strictly political notion of free and equal citizens as opposed to moral
persons.31 As such, we arrive at reasonable and rational citizens that take part in the
original position in order to put forward a view of the basic structure of society. (PL 380)
Given the independence of the political sphere from philosophical doctrines, however,
rationality is linked with a capacity to hold comprehensive doctrines, whereas
reasonableness is still grounded in a capacity to have a sense of justice.32 (PL 52) Rawls
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Intrinsically entailing a moral ideal means this political conception is moral, but in the
absence of a comprehensive doctrine, rather than basing politics on morality, this
suggests that the moral conception is itself justified politically. As I argue later in this
chapter, the moral conception must follow from Rawls’s political notions of a wellordered society or from overlapping consensus. (PL xliv)
31
Rawls provides an account for arriving at this conception of citizens through relating
their wellbeing to primary goods. Going into the specifics of Rawls’s argument is
certainly relevant to put forward a view of the basis upon which he develops his position,
but it is beyond the scope of this chapter. (PL 187-90).
32
In the Introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls recognizes that the view he advances
in Theory counts as a comprehensive doctrine itself, which is why he moves away from a
Kantian view towards a political one. (PL xviii)
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does not explicitly specify how he arrives at this conception of an ideal conception of
citizens apart from simply sticking to a liberal framework. In the absence of an
independent moral ground developed out of a comprehensive doctrine, I suggest that one
way to justify this notion of citizens is by beginning with the idea of an ideal society and
working backwards to reach the citizens constituting a well-ordered society. The
conception of an ideal citizen, thus, would follow analytically from the notion of a wellordered society. Furthermore, this conception is supported empirically by the existence of
communities that are “stable for the right reasons,” rather than being a mere modus
vivendi that is the result of a contingent balance of forces.33 (PL 392)
By appealing to a freestanding political view, Rawls is able to partially respond to the
objections Sen raises once the moral ground has been discarded. In his “Political
Liberalism: Reply to Habermas,” Rawls argues that unlike Habermas who is concerned
with identifying the basic conditions of communication, Rawls introduces the minimal
basic requirements for a democratic procedure. Rawls maintains that the view he
advances in Political Liberalism, like Habermas, does not presuppose a Platonic or
Kantian reason, but rather a freestanding notion. Rawls adds “[n]o sensible view can
possibly get by without the reasonable and rational as I use them.” (PL 380) Following
the reading I have suggested, Rawls would argue that these two features of citizens
constitute necessary conditions that make it possible to have a liberal democracy. As
such, the basic question that concerns both Rawls and Habermas pertains to the
conditions that make a democratic procedure possible. For Habermas, these conditions
are those of communicative reason, which is manifested in communicative action,
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This reading will be further motivated later in the paper.
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whereas Rawls locates them in rational and reasonable citizens. (PL 381-82) Under this
reading, justice as fairness becomes at least partially feasible, given that we only need to
accept that liberal democracy is possible for the view to obtain. Once this is granted,
Rawls’s view unfolds as an analysis of such necessary conditions. The question that
follows, however, is whether we need some minimal agreement to begin with for a
democratic procedure to be possible.34
Nonetheless, by setting aside the notion of moral persons, Rawls’s account
appears to fail to respond to at least one problem he identifies with Hobbes’s view, that of
realizing the conception of justice socially. In fact, though Rawls invokes a “theory of
moral learning” in Theory, his later Political Liberalism does not make use of such a
notion at all. (TJ 430) The Law of Peoples, alternatively, appeals to moral learning
cursorily as a needed process for the realization of an agreement on international
principles of justice, or among nonliberal but somewhat reasonable societies. (LP 66, 71)
Liberal societies, alternatively, already “must have political and social institutions that
effectively lead its citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of justice as they grow up and
take part in society.” (TJ 430) In fact, one main reason for not introducing moral learning
in Political Liberalism can be explained by Rawls’s claim that liberal democracies
already have an overlapping consensus over the values that must be learned. Rawls’s
allusion to overlapping consensus as already existing in society minimizes the role of the
process of moral learning in the political sphere. This leaves open the question of how
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Rawls can put forward a view of the social role of his political conception of justice if he
disposes of such a psychological process, a problem I will return to in the next section.
But there is another reason for not appealing to moral learning in Political
Liberalism. In Theory, Rawls maintains that moral learning “depends upon an account of
the nature of morality and its various forms.” (TJ 430) Rawls’s earlier view on moral
learning, thus, can only be part of a comprehensive doctrine, which he comes to realize is
inadmissible into a strictly political account.35 Rawls still provides a political view on
moral psychology, arguing that citizens are amenable to the view of liberalism he
suggests, but the political moral psychology he puts forth requires a modified political
view on moral learning to complement it.
Yet, the freestanding view that Rawls advances, one that does not presupposes a
Platonic or Kantian view of reason, may lead to another problem, one that may arise out
of his constructivism. One way to interpret Rawls’s political constructivism follows from
a rejection of moral truths. Under Habermas’s reading, the constructivist aspect of
Rawls’s view follows partly from a rejection of a moral realism that entails an
independent standard for right, and partly from the recognition that agreement on any
independent standard is far-fetched.36 For Habermas, what follows from rejecting moral
realism is identifying political philosophy with finding the correct procedure. Habermas
characterizes both his work along with that of Rawls as postmetaphysical. This feature of
political thought follows from the absence of a Platonic truth one can lean on, or an
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Of course, Rawls can develop a view of moral learning that is merely political, which
is something he makes note of in The Law of Peoples, but this is somewhat superfluous in
Political Liberalism as I will argue in the next section. (LP 15)
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Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran P.
Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, Reprint edition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 79.
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absence of grounding in metaphysics. For Habermas, this leaves us in a state of “vertigo,”
which ultimately results in conceiving of politics solely in terms of democratic
proceduralism.37
But whereas this reading may be amenable to the position Rawls endorses in Theory,
the political constructivism developed in Political Liberalism cannot follow from such a
rejection. Rawls maintains that the view he expounds is consistent with all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or philosophical in nature. If, as Habermas
maintains, this view only follows from the rejection of moral realism, then it would be
excluding a significant segment of reasonable doctrines. This means Rawls’s own view
would follow from a philosophical comprehensive doctrine, as opposed to being political
in nature. Consequently, the constructivist aspect of Rawls’s account does not stem from
the rejection of metaphysical or moral truths, but rather from what is taken to be a
requirement of liberalism, that the freedom and equality of reasonable and rational
citizens comes to materialize in a well-ordered society as a product of a hypothetical
agreement, or as a product of an actual consensus. Whether there are moral truths or not
is irrelevant for Rawls, for given his practical concern, the relevant question cannot be
whether there will be agreement on specific moral truths.38 Rawls recognizes the
unlikelihood of that outcome, which is why he resorts to setting aside the question of
truth entirely.
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The disagreement between the two pertains to the kind of proceduralism to which each
subscribes. I will be not concerned with expounding Habermas’s view. Instead, I will
focus on the criticism Habermas raises against Rawls.
38
Though Rawls’s political conception is a moral one, it is severed from the question of
truth. Objectivity in politics, under Rawls’s account, must be severed from questions of
truth and emphasize agreement instead. I will return to the question of the relevance of
truth in politics in chapter five. (PL 94)
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This clarification of Rawls’s position provides further means to respond to the
problem of feasibility Sen raises. Sen had expressed his skepticism with regards to the
arrival at a consistent set of principles of justice under the veil of ignorance. Sen later
makes a reference to The Law of Peoples, where Rawls appears to mitigate the
requirement of a basic agreement between citizens. This weaker form of agreement
appears as a “family of reasonable political conceptions,” as opposed to a single political
conception.39 Sen, however, rightly points out the tension between this view endorsed in
The Law of Peoples, and the one already presented in Theory. The inconsistency between
the two views Rawls advances, however, should be explained by the shift away from
Kantianism that Rawls undergoes in his later works. In Political Liberalism, Rawls
explicitly distances the view he presents from the one he had introduced in Theory, where
he had explicitly endorsed a comprehensive doctrine. Rawls maintains that the goals of
Theory were too ambitious, and though its conclusions constitute a legitimate liberal
view, it is only one among many. (PL xviii; LP 141) In Political Liberalism, Rawls aims
at uncovering an already-existing agreement with regard to the basic structure of
institutions. Rawls is, thus, committed to a minimal requirement for agreement in
Political Liberalism, one that he maintains follows immediately from reasonableness and
rationality taken as moral regulative ideas.40 This minimal requirement arises from
Rawls’s commitment to the reasonable fact of pluralism along with irresolvable causes of
difference, or what Rawls refers to as the “burdens of judgment.” (PL 54-55) The fact
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Sen, The Idea of Justice, 11.
Rawls considers that the view he introduces in Theory requires that all citizens have the
same Kantian comprehensive doctrine. In Political Liberalism, he distances himself from
this claim. This suggests that the agreement under a freestanding political view must be
far more minimal than the one he had argued for in Theory. (PL xlii)
40
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that agreement over the basic structure of social institutions is already present renders
Rawls’s view more flexible. Challenging this claim requires showing that even such a
minimal agreement is not available or possible, an argument that Sen does not put
forward.
Under this reading, the question of the redundancy of “transcendental
institutionalism” introduced by Sen will depend on the relation between institutions and
society Rawls puts forward for realizing his conception of justice. It is noteworthy,
however, that if we accept Sen’s argument that Rawls’s position is not feasible due to its
ideality, then at worst, Rawls appears to offer the normative grounds for selecting
between different options based on a political ideal.41 Rawls, however, maintains that this
ideal can be realized at least to some degree. Nonetheless, though I have argued that
Rawls’s account is more feasible than Sen suggests, it is still unclear how the social role
of such a political account can be achieved in order to realize the conception of justice.
Moreover, in the absence of a comprehensive doctrine to support moral presuppositions,
the normative content of his view will need a different kind of justification. Responding
to these issues requires exploring Rawls’s view of publicity and stability through
shedding light on the idea of an overlapping consensus as I will proceed to argue in the
next section.
The Inadequacy of the Political
The previous section introduced questions concerning the feasibility of Rawls’s
Kantian account while emphasizing the modifications following the shift from a Kantian
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The normative basis is indeed a problem, one that I will return to shortly. Sen,
however, does not dispute the normative nature of Rawls’s view. Instead he focuses on
ideality as problematic.
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conception of justice to a freestanding one. Rawls’s attempt to render his view feasible
involves specifying social conditions that are required for the realization of justice as
fairness. I have argued that responding to the problems Sen raises requires shedding light
on the account of the process required to instill the principles of justice in citizens.
Though this requirement is present in Theory, Rawls does not make a reference to such a
process in Political Liberalism. In order to provide a more complete response to the
problem Sen raises, this section focuses on the other two shortcomings Rawls identifies
in Hobbes’s account, namely stability and the social role of institutions. Rawls attempts
to account for such phenomena by presenting a freestanding political view in order to
render his account consistent with various reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This
requires treating politics as entirely separate from non-political grounds including
material ones having to do with how the social role is manifested. Yet, whether this
freestanding view works rests on being able to introduce a sufficient justification for the
stability of the political scheme.
Rawls introduces different views on how stability is achieved between Theory and
Political Liberalism. In the former, stability appears to result from the process of moral
learning Rawls specifies, which is justified by the moral conception of individuals. Moral
learning occurs due to the satisfaction of the publicity requirement Rawls introduces. In
contrast, in Political Liberalism, Rawls retains the public function of justification but
appeals primarily to the political idea of an overlapping consensus in order to account for
the acquisition of liberal democratic values by citizens. In relation to Rawls’s reading of
Hobbes, these arguments allow him to provide a social role for his political conception
and maintain stability for the right reasons. This section will first consider Rawls’s
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conception of a freestanding political view then proceed to introduce the role of publicity.
I will finally put forward three arguments against Rawls’s account pertaining to the
criteria for determining reasonableness, his view on moral psychology, and finally the
role of institutions in instilling ideals.
Clarifying how stability is attained and what social role political institutions can
perform requires first fleshing out Rawls’s separation of politics from metaphysics,
especially when it comes to the capacities of citizens. In both, Kantian Constructivism
and Political Constructivism, Rawls appears to presuppose a capacity to specify binding
procedures of politics which would make it possible to construct principles of justice.
Rawls distinguishes between three different perspectives when it comes to evaluating his
political account; the perspective of individuals in the original position, the perspective of
free and equal individuals under the veil of ignorance, and finally his perspective and that
of the reader who are involved in developing a political theory. (KCMT 324; PL 70)
Nonetheless, the extent to which this third point of view can be reducible to a moral or
political capacity is questionable and casts doubt on the independence of Rawls’s
political account, or even the sufficiency of a moral ground. The activity of an individual
in the act of construction suggests a need to posit a metaphysical subject on which such a
political view depends. The question that follows is whether Rawls is able to contain his
political view within freestanding politics or requires positing metaphysical entities for a
coherent view.
Looking at the parallel with Kant renders this problem clearer. As Rawls notes, for
Kant, our autonomy as rational beings follows from the fact of reason. (KCMT 340) But
this is primarily the product of regarding the transcendental subject as capable of setting
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rules freely and acting out of a will determined by those rules. Ultimately, this rests on a
metaphysical conception of subjectivity, which Kant retains.42 Rawls attempts to sidestep
this problem by maintaining that autonomy does not follow merely from the fact that we
are rational, nor from the liberty of conscience guaranteed by the fact of pluralism, but
instead is realized only in the presence of social institutions that educate us to our
autonomy.43 Full Autonomy is, thus, only achieved in a well-ordered society as a result of
social cooperation under fair terms. But this does not justify shedding metaphysical
commitments altogether. For autonomy to be socially realized under Rawls’s view, we
must be the kinds of beings who can be influenced and shaped by social institutions in
order to achieve our potential as moral beings. Again, this raises the question of requiring
a metaphysical subject.
Rawls, nonetheless, could respond to this objection by appealing to the rejection of
hierarchies when it comes to resolving philosophical questions. In his 1975 essay titled
“The Independence of Moral Theory,” Rawls had already argued against a hierarchical
dependency of moral theory on metaphysics or epistemology.44 Rejecting the hierarchy
between different philosophical fields entails a refusal to acknowledge the primacy of a
theory of the subject over moral theory, and thus does not require putting forward a view
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Whether this is a correct reading of Kant or not is irrelevant, it merely illustrates the
dependence of the conception of the person on the metaphysical subject.
43
Rawls refers to the fact of pluralism as the condition for rendering a well-ordered
society “suitably realistic.” Given pluralism, the question is how to arrive at an “effective
public conception of justice.” (PL 66)
44
This independence, rather than signifying the complete severing of philosophical fields
from one another, is meant to specify that moral theory deals with problems of its own.
Relations of mutual dependence between the different philosophical fields certainly do
hold, but Rawls rejects views that consider such dependence to be hierarchical,
methodologically privileging one set of questions over others. (IMT 300)
29

of subjectivity in order to render political theory possible. Rawls’s argument would,
therefore, be an example of how political philosophy could help us develop a clearer
understanding of subjectivity beginning from a political view.45 Rawls, then, would
maintain that the implications with respect to subjectivity further corroborate his view
rather than weaken it.
Furthermore, Rawls would argue against any metaphysical dependencies by referring
to his freestanding political account of moral psychology. For Rawls, political persons are
ready to suggest and bind themselves to specific principles due to their desire to be part
of a well-ordered society. As Rawls notes, this account is political, neither philosophical
nor psychological, as it is “drawn from the political conception of justice as fairness” and
“express[es] a certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship.” (PL
86-87) As I have argued in the previous section, the absence of a moral comprehensive
doctrine serving as a basis raises the question of how we arrive at this notion of citizens.
One way to justify this specific ideal of citizens along with the moral psychology Rawls
assigns to them is through reversing the procedure, beginning from a well-ordered society
in order to derive a concept of an ideal citizen. Consequently, from a political point of
view, these are the conditions necessary for a well-ordered society to be realized.
But whether these commitments acquire a universal status or not in Rawls remains
unclear. In the absence of a metaphysical ground, and given Rawls’s explicit claim that
his model concepts only follow in a liberal democratic state, one can argue that Rawls’s
conclusions end up being limited in scope, and do not even acquire universal validity.
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(KCMT 307) This is further emphasized with his political turn. In fact, in The Law of
Peoples, Rawls considers these ideals to be consistent with his specific conception of
reasonableness. The degree to which a community (and this applies to individuals as
well) is reasonable determines the degree to which those ideals apply.46 Under this
reading, Rawls’s argument requires first that one begin with the liberal democratic model.
But as O’Neill argues, Rawls comes to assume the legitimacy of liberal democracy and
does not argue for it.47 Rawls, thus, seems to dispose of universality in exchange for
limiting his view within the confines of a political tradition. The problem, however, as
Robert Taylor contends, is that this “turn[s] justification into a heteronomous enterprise,
one that depends in a profoundly un-Kantian manner on historical contingency.”48
Taylor raises another problem for the justice as fairness account, arguing that the
limits Rawls imposes on his view entails a “pessimism about the width of reflective
equilibrium,” given that our conclusions are determined by the traditions from which we
begin.49 If the procedure we prescribe will heavily depend on adopting a liberal
democratic view, it is not clear how Rawls can still maintain that wide reflective
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This is presented most clearly in the case of relatively reasonable peoples, or “decent
peoples” as Rawls refers to such groups in The Law of Peoples. These groups’ limited
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O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” 353.
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Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as
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Rawls contends that arriving at a reasonable resolution to the problem arising from a
plurality of conflicting views requires engaging in the process of reflective equilibrium.
Reflective equilibrium involves revising our “considered judgments” in order to arrive at
a coherent set of moral judgments. But the “wide” reflective equilibrium that Rawls
requires doesn’t only stop at one’s own judgments, but also requires developing a
coherent view as a result of considering publicly shared moral conceptions as well. (IMT
289-90)
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equilibrium, or arriving at a coherent view as a result of consulting the conceptions of
others, is possible. As Taylor argues, “[s]trong path dependence in reflection turns all
reflective equilibria into narrow ones [italics in original removed].”50
It is not entirely clear, however, why this constitutes a problem for Rawls’s position.
Rawls can simply reply by arguing that reflective equilibrium, especially wide reflective
equilibrium, will only be properly effective when conditions of publicity are met.
Moreover, these conditions are in fact satisfied in a liberal tradition. In the absence of
publicity, one simply cannot negotiate one’s own views with those of others, which
renders reflective equilibrium only possible in a narrow sense. In a liberal society, in
contrast, the fact of reasonable pluralism guarantees that reflective equilibrium will not
be merely narrow. Despite the existing overlapping consensus on basic matters, several
reasonable comprehensive doctrines will still function as sources for a plurality of
possible worldviews.
Arguing that liberalism is a precondition for the success of the procedures of justice
as fairness provides Rawls with another way to respond to the question of universal
validity. As I have suggested in the previous section, Rawls resorts to an actual
overlapping consensus instead of moral learning in Political Liberalism since the
problem of actually constituting subjects who are acting out of a sense of justice becomes
less acute if we begin with individuals with reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a
liberal democratic society. Consequently, Rawls appeals to the notion of an “overlapping
consensus” to justify the ideals with which he begins. By making use of the overlapping
consensus existing between the different publicly available reasonable comprehensive
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doctrines, we can begin with the already agreed upon conception of a well-ordered
society and accordingly procedurally construct the principles of justice. The notion of a
well-ordered society invoked will be based on the overlap between different
comprehensive doctrines. Justifying the procedure, under this argument, is not simply
based on following an ideal liberal tradition, but on the actual existence of a consensus
from which we can begin. There is certainly some incompleteness in Rawls’s view with
respect to arguing for the universal validity of liberalism, but his view does not amount to
a rejection of such universal validity.51 In fact, one could argue that the superiority of
Rawls’s view over others would be established if we accept his claim that the fact of
pluralism requires that we find basic points of agreement. While emphasizing the
procedural nature of the political in attempting to resolve the practical problem of
difference, Rawls could maintain his position offers a way to do that based on agreement
on basic principles of justice. But Rawls never develops an explicit argument for the
advantage of a position based on agreement over others, which renders his position
incomplete. However, this does not necessarily indicate that his view is dependent on
non-political notions or historically contingent traditions.
This reading, however, has one serious implication; liberal views that do not
subscribe to Rawls’s account of a well-ordered society are rendered automatically
unreasonable. To see how this follows, it is first imperative to look at one problem raised
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by Habermas, who argues that Rawls equivocates on the conditions that determine
reasonableness. Whereas reasonableness is presupposed for any agreement, the relevant
criteria for determining reasonable doctrines can either be through appealing to an
already existing overlapping consensus, or it can be justified by the comprehensive
doctrines of individuals. Clearly, Rawls would want to avoid committing to the latter
claim given that it cannot provide an independent standard for excluding unreasonable
comprehensive doctrine, and thus reasonableness will have to be justified on the basis of
an existing overlapping consensus. The problem, however, is that the considered overlap
must be only between individuals with reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The overlap
itself, therefore, cannot be the basis to determine reasonableness, as it already
presupposes a conception of the reasonable in order to determine whose goals and aims
count to begin with.52
Of course, Rawls might appeal to the reading I have suggested, by arguing that
reasonableness can be derived from the ideal of a well-ordered society presented and not
from the existing overlap. Moreover, Rawls maintains that his notion of reasonableness is
a straightforward one that no theory can do without. Two problems follow from this. As I
have suggested earlier, Rawls can avoid the charge of having a heteronomous view that
merely follows once we accept liberalism if he maintains that the idea of a well-ordered
society arises out of the overlapping consensus and not as an ideal of liberalism. If that is
the case, then reasonableness cannot be based on the notion of a well-ordered society
given that an overlapping consensus already presupposes a criterion for reasonableness.
Instead, reasonableness must already be determined to justify a specific notion of an ideal
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society. Second, even if we derive the idea of the reasonable from the notion of a wellordered society, this notion of reasonableness becomes compelling only if we accept
Rawls’s view of an ideal society. If we link the idea of reasonableness with the notion of
a well-ordered society analytically, it follows that anyone not committed to the same idea
of a well-ordered society (which cannot be derived from an overlapping consensus), or to
the view of stability as Rawls presents it, will have a different conception of
reasonableness. Different conceptions of reasonableness will, thus, be excluded from
Rawls’s reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls introduces his political liberalism as
a view that is able to incorporate under it many different reasonable views as candidates
for determining principles of justice. But, at the meta-level, Rawls will either recognize
his view as involving a local argument, or will continue to maintain universality while
implicitly excluding any view that is not committed to the same conception of an ideal
society.
The problem that arises with the justification of reasonableness leads to a second but
similar problem with the moral psychology Rawls suggests. To account for stability in a
well-ordered society, Rawls relies on overlapping consensus along with the moral
psychology he develops.53 Yet, the question that follows is what moral psychology we
should accept in the general view endorsed in Political Liberalism. Rawls considers that
his specific political moral psychology is conducive for constructing the kind of society
he identifies as well-ordered. This also involves rejecting accounts that do not quite fit
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with his preconceptions. In fact, Rawls explicitly presents his view as non-Humean,
which, on the one hand, excludes any moral psychology that follows a Humean approach,
and on the other, renders Rawls’s moral psychology the product of a comprehensive
doctrine and not strictly political as he maintains. (PL 84) Moreover, given that a moral
psychology cannot follow from Hume’s view, Rawls’s moral psychology cannot be itself
the product of an overlapping consensus.
The discussion of the conditions of stability leads us back to the problem pointed out
by Sen. Sen had argued that Rawls’s view is lacking when it comes to accounting for the
social realization of the ideal of justice. This ties directly to the notions of an overlapping
consensus along with the condition of publicity. In Theory, Rawls had argued that
publicity follows immediately from recognizing moral principles in terms of rational
choices that govern one’s conduct in an “ethical community” or “kingdom of ends.” (TJ
251-52) This provides him with an objective criterion for determining reasonableness,
albeit one that follows from a Kantian comprehensive doctrine. But in Political
Liberalism, Rawls specifies publicity as strictly political, where the goal of Political
Constructivism is identified in terms of offering an account of the “public basis of
justification… given the fact of reasonable pluralism.” (PL 100-01) Rawls argues that
citizens’ commitment to principles of justice, general beliefs about human nature and the
role of institutions, along with a complete justification for the principles of justice should
be public. (PL 67) Rawls recognizes that it would be too demanding to expect everyone
to be familiar with full justifications for the principles of justice; however, he contends
that they must still be publicly available. Significantly, full publicity constitutes a
precondition for freedom as only upon being familiar with justifications can citizens in
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fact act out of principles of justice. Full publicity allows for adjudicating between
conflicting conceptions of freedom and equality, and since principles of justice provide
the bases for institutions that shape individuals and thus have long-term effects, publicity
allows for scrutiny of legal practices when necessary. As such, “free and equal persons
are in a position to know and accept the background social influences that shape their
conception of themselves as persons, as well as their character and conception of their
good.” (KCMT 326)
The notion of publicity is, therefore, linked to the kind of justification that is given in
support of one’s commitments. Rather than relying on comprehensive doctrines, publicity
requires that political reasons are provided for views that are endorsed publicly. This
condition allows Rawls to assign a significant social role to his political account, one that
he considers to be lacking in Hobbes. Rawls had argued that Hobbes assigns to
individuals in the state of nature essential traits that make war inevitable. Under Rawls’s
reading, Hobbes minimizes the role of institutions in shaping individuals since these
traits, along with the threat of war, are simply outweighed by fear of the sovereign with
the transition to society. By relying on the condition of publicity, however, Rawls can
account for the social role of political institutions. First, justifying the rights of citizens
institutionally will directly appeal to the political publicly available conceptions of
citizens. Second, through recognizing their rights as the result of their moral powers,
citizens will be “educated” to understand themselves as autonomous individuals and
develop the desire to be that kind of person. Rawls considers that, in a liberal democratic
society, such desires would have already been at least partially nurtured, which justifies
the existence of an overlapping consensus. (PL 85-86) Importantly, then, citizens can
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recognize themselves as autonomous legislators only when this role of institutions has
been properly fulfilled. (KCMT 340)
A well-ordered society would, therefore, be founded on principles of justice
which everyone accepts, and which have been constituted out of the reasonable beliefs of
free and equal citizens. Such a society would also be stable, for moral persons that act out
of a sense of justice, and where social institutions perpetuate such principles of justice,
would “generate their own support” as long as these principles are “publicly realized.”
(IMT 294)
The influence allotted to institutions in shaping the overlapping consensus leads to a
third problem in Rawls’s position. Rawls recognizes that the influence of political
institutions is “pervasive” and “long-term.” (PL 68) These institutions have the effect of
instilling the right kind of motivations in citizens in order to act out a sense of justice.
Though, in a liberal democratic society, Rawls claims that such motivations would have
already been nurtured, he still provides a historical account of how such an overlapping
consensus with regards to the principles of justice may arise. Taking the example of the
development of consensus in the United States, Rawls shows how constitutional
consensus eventually develops into a consensus over the actual principles of justice. (PL
158-60) A precondition for this overlapping consensus, thus, is the role institutions play
in order to bring into being citizens who want to take part in a liberal democratic ideal.
This points to another equivocation in Rawls’s view concerning the legitimacy of the
principles of justice he provides. Rawls maintains that the overlap is present among
different comprehensive doctrines, and the role institutions play concerns changing the
kind of justification given from one relying on comprehensive doctrines to political. But
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Rawls simultaneously recognizes that the content of the overlap should be instilled by
institutions. This does not simply apply to the kind of justification employed, i.e. political
as opposed to comprehensive, but also to the principles themselves. For instance, Rawls
shows how “constitutional principles such as liberty of conscience were adopted only
with great reluctance as part of a modus vivendi,” before developing into an overlapping
consensus. (PL lviii ) Yet, the transition from constitutional consensus to an actual
overlapping consensus occurs as a result of propagating these principles through political
institutions. If the political view Rawls espouses is primarily based on an actual
overlapping consensus, this consensus is primarily due to the role institutions play in
shaping individuals to accept such principles and ideals.
Rawls could again argue that the justification for these ideals follows from the
original position given free and equal citizens and a specific conception of a well-ordered
society. But as I have argued, either the notion of a well-ordered society is completely
ungrounded and exclusionary of other views of an ideal society, or it is based on the
actual overlapping consensus, since it is presupposed for the original position. If it is the
latter, then the justification for the idea of an ideal society, ideal citizens, and the
principles follows from an overlapping consensus that has been instilled institutionally.
This problem is rendered more significant given that Rawls maintains that the condition
of publicity is supposed to render citizens wary of the effects of political institutions. But
this undermines Rawls’s entire account as the specific normative ideals that publicity is
designed to protect have been instilled by institutions to begin with. Rawls’s argument for
the specific procedure he specifies is, thus, imbued with a circularity that threatens not
only the normativity of his view, but also the very basic notion of negative freedom to
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which he is committed.
Conclusions
We can now return to the three problems Rawls identifies in his reading of Hobbes.
To begin with, I have argued that though Rawls does introduce reasonableness as
independent of instrumental reason, the criteria for distinguishing between the reasonable
and the unreasonable do not seem to be adequately specified. Whereas Kantian
constructivism can refer to an independent nonpolitical moral basis in order to determine
what is reasonable and what is not, this advantage is lost by attempting to offer a
freestanding political justification for reasonableness. Consequently, Rawls will have to
appeal to some nonpolitical grounding in order to justify his conception of
reasonableness. Moreover, Rawls specifies two main requirements for stability, an
overlapping consensus and a political moral psychology. As I have argued, Rawls’s
moral psychology cannot be understood as being strictly political and follows from
commitments that cannot be justified by simply appealing to a well-ordered society.
Attempting to limit his account to the political sphere results in circularity. Alternatively,
Rawls would have to exclude from the outset views that do not share with him the same
conception of an ideal society and rely on a different moral psychology.
The notion of an overlapping consensus leads to the final problem, namely the social
role of the political that Rawls finds lacking in Hobbes. Rawls, however, appears to be
oblivious to the role he assigns to institutions in instilling liberal ideals and thus
constituting an overlapping consensus. The problem of the role of institutions motivates
referring to the historical role of institutions in manufacturing ideals. The next chapter
will, thus, turn to Foucault, beginning with the problems he raises against Hobbes in
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order to develop his view of power relations. Foucault rejects a contractarian view that
relies on juridical power and argues for a positive understanding of force relations.
Rendering his argument clearer will depend on determining a material basis for
Foucault’s conception of power relations. Finally, I argue that this makes his view
compatible with the contractarianism Hobbes presents.
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Chapter Two
Foucault’s Non-Contractarian Power
In the previous chapter, I have evaluated Rawls’s view in terms of his success in
accounting for the problems he argues exist in Hobbesian politics, namely arriving at
stability for the right reasons, accounting for the reasonableness of moral persons, and
attributing a social role for politics. I have suggested that though his initial Kantian view
manages to circumvent these problems, the freestanding account he develops lacks
grounding and justification and falls into circularity. Rawls, therefore, can only justify
normative content by appealing to an overlapping consensus produced by institutions that
instill these values in citizens in an ideal liberal society. The focus on institutional
inculcation as a justification for a political view, however, fails to be normatively
compelling. Moreover, given the significant institutional role in shaping citizens, it is
requisite to consider a critique of the social function of constituting citizens with specific
ideals. Consequently, this chapter turns to Foucault in order to offer such a reading.
Whereas Rawls rejected appealing to non-political justifications, Foucault attempts to
ground politics in the material activity of power relations. Yet, the theoretical tools he
uses also emerge as a response to the view he ascribes to Hobbes. Foucault repeatedly
emphasizes the opposition between his view of power relations and the understanding of
power in terms of contract throughout his genealogical work.54 By reducing
contractarianism to juridical power, Foucault appears to identify the problem of
sovereignty with that of consent along with an outdated conception of power that
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functions from above. Yet, though there has been some discussion of how the conception
of force relations overturns juridical power, little attention has been given to Foucault’s
references to social contract theory, which I will turn to in the next section. This chapter
will examine the opposition Foucault draws between his view and Hobbesian social
contract theory. Since this opposition develops during Foucault’s genealogical turn, my
focus will primarily be on his mid-seventies works. My aim is to, first, expose the
problematic identification of contract, law, and sovereignty we find in Foucault through
shedding light on the disagreement in the literature. I argue that the most straightforward
way to understand Foucault’s rejection of contractarianism is by exploring the reversals
he introduces, primarily concerning the emergence of political power and the
development of subjectivity. I show afterwards that Foucault’s view of force relations
rests on their material activity. Ascribing material underpinnings to the activity of power
requires that we reconsider the opposition Foucault introduces between his view and that
of Hobbes. Consequently, I argue that the activity of power in Foucault’s account can be
understood as complementary to the one Hobbes develops. This will ultimately depend
on offering an interpretation of Hobbes that focuses on the material basis for his political
view.
Against Juridical Power
In the 1975-1976 lecture series Society Must Be Defended, Foucault institutes a
reversal of the account of power that he takes to have been dominant in Early Modern
philosophy and is still active in political thought. Foucault contends that the theory of
sovereignty he opposes entails three main elements. First, it begins with a conception of
the individual as possessing certain capacities and capabilities. This initial subject is then
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transformed into a political subject, one that is subjected to political power, upon
instituting the state. Second, a theory of sovereignty aims at deriving a unified account of
power, embodied in the sovereign or state, from a non-political conception of power as a
capacity. Finally, these subjects also retain natural rights, which justify the constitution of
the law that imparts legitimacy on the state. A theory of sovereignty thus relies on a more
“basic legitimacy” that grounds the authority of the state. (SMD 43-44)
For Foucault, this juridical understanding conceives of power as a right that can be
possessed, transferred, and exchanged. It is an understanding of power that follows the
juridical model of contract, where transgression manifested in terms of the violation of
agreement results in oppression. (SMD 13, 17) In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault
maintains that this representation of power remains within the confines of a monarchical
view, where power is always exercised through the law. (WK 88)
Foucault, in contrast, attempts to provide an account of political power that releases
political analysis from such assumptions. Instead, Foucault aims at accounting for
underlying tactics and battlefields that provide a fuller conception of politics. (SMD 45,
47, 50-51, 79) Consequently, a proper analysis of political power will shed light on how
subjects are constituted as a product of power relations. Second, Foucault attempts to step
away from an analysis that focuses on power as possessed and stemming from above, or
from a unified state. (SMD 44, 46) In Discipline and Punish, Foucault had already
contrasted his view of power to that of sovereignty. Foucault argued that understanding
disciplinary mechanisms requires altering the account of power we hold, where power
relations should be understood on the model of battle. Power, thus, is not to be reduced to
a relation between the state and already-constituted subjects, but rather fabricates
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individuals, infiltrates the bodies on which it is exercised, and is finally transmitted
through them. (DP 26) Accordingly, Foucault introduces another shift away from the
theory of sovereignty, one that does not provide a view of power as unified and possessed
by the state. Instead, power relations are to be understood in their capillary functioning
and specificity. (DP 45)
Nonetheless, several problems emerge with Foucault’s rejection of the juridical form
of power. First, Foucault equivocates on his references to social contract theories, at
times reducing them to a uniform and specific understanding of power and at other times
arguing that different contractarian theories have fulfilled different functions in political
history. For instance, in his February 1 lecture from the 1977-1978 lectures Security,
Territory, Population, which was published later as “Governmentality,” Foucault argues
that we find in both Hobbes and Rousseau attempts to reconcile sovereignty with the
emerging art of government. (STP 139, 142) Yet, in his 1978-1979 lectures, The Birth of
Biopolitics, Foucault locates Hobbes in the intersection between sovereignty and reason
of the state while limiting the social bond to the juridical sphere and maintaining a theory
of the state. Under Foucault’s reading, however, Rousseau appears to be working with a
different problem, that of identifying the limits of sovereignty in relation to the art of
government. (BB 39, 91, 308) Whereas Foucault maintains that both belong to the
juridical model, the historical role they play varies significantly. Furthermore, several of
the arguments Foucault introduces concerning the function of war under the juridical
model are specific to Hobbes. This emphasis on Hobbes in rejecting the juridical
conception of power renders an engagement with Hobbes significant to fully understand
Foucault’s reversal. The distance Foucault draws between his work and that of Hobbes
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raises the question of whether we can derive radically different conceptions of politics
from the two views. As I shall argue, Foucault is mistaken in highlighting the rift given
the commitment we find in both to material politics. For this purpose, this chapter will be
limited to discussing Foucault’s work in relation to his reading of Hobbes’s version of the
contract. Whereas Rawls attempts to introduce a freestanding politics, both Foucault and
Hobbes offer a material basis for political analysis. I shall argue in later chapters that this
material basis renders a political analysis more effective and makes critique possible.
Though Foucault uses the notions of jurdicality, law, contract, and sovereignty as if
they can be ascribed to a single model of power, their unity is far less clear than Foucault
makes it appear. In response, Hunt and Wickham argue that law in Foucault’s work is
displaced and superseded with disciplinary power and governmental techniques which
give rise to more efficient discourses. Foucault’s “expulsion of law” follows from
attributing to law a uniform function in terms of prohibition.55 Under this reading,
Foucault argues that an accurate analysis of power should be entirely concerned with
disciplinary practices that replace the negative function of law with the productive
understanding of power relations. Hunt and Wickham take this conclusion to be the
product of a misconception of the heterogeneous element we find in legal theory that
Foucault appears to overlook.56
Tadros, on the other hand, argues against views that reduce law to juridical power.
The contrast between juridical and disciplinary power identified in Foucault’s work
should open up the space for reconsidering the function of law in society. Consequently,

55

Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as
Governance (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 55–56.
56
Hunt and Wickham, 69.
46

law operates between the disciplinary and the juridical. Whereas juridical power takes
law to merely function through prohibition, law instead is exercised on the lives of
individuals and results in the construction of subjects.57 Accordingly, Foucault replaces
the juridical understanding of power relations with disciplinary techniques and
governance of populations, where both come to establish power over the lives of
individuals, or biopower.58 (WK 139-40) Therefore, Foucault does not offer a theory of
law, but rather provides a historical analysis for the different modes of law.59 For Tadros,
Foucault uses the term “juridical” with reference to power in relation to two different
phenomena. First, it is with reference to the “network” of power relations operating in the
Middle Ages, i.e. pre-modern forms of power. Second, it is the way power presents itself
even today. Consequently, Tadros argues that what Foucault primarily intends to reverse
is the way that law is presented or “coded”, namely juridically.60 This view is further
supported by Biebricher, who shows that there are textual difficulties with claiming that
the function of law is reducible to that of prohibition in Foucault’s work. As Biebricher
argues, Foucault often invokes an understanding of law that is not merely prohibitive, but
rather functions contractually and involves an element of reciprocity.61
The contentious element in the relation between the juridical conception of power and
the function of law is accompanied by disagreement in the critical literature over the
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relation between juridical power and the political power modeled on war: the latter idea
(the preeminence of the politics-war dyad) is the core thesis of the 75-76 lecture course,
which also serve as the first formal exploration of the former notion (disciplinary as
succeeding juridical models for power) beyond the pages of Discipline and Punish. The
question ceaselessly debated in the literature is whether Foucault is arguing for a
complete dismissal of juridical power or simply for taking it to offer a too-limited
perspective of the political dynamic. For instance, Mariana Valverde places historical
analysis in opposition to the universal juridical thought we find in Hobbes and social
contract theory in general. Consequently, Valverde argues that using war as a model for
historical analysis is on a completely different plane from juridical power. The two
approaches offer two different perspectives and both are of value rather than being
mutually exclusive.62 Colin Gordon puts forward a different interpretation and suggests
that theories that seek to derive political legitimacy can only serve the function of
political force.63 The normativity entailed in each of these accounts precludes deriving
objective conclusions on the actual functioning of power and only has value in supporting
or harming historical forces.
In contrast, Lawrence Hass argues that juridical power constitutes only a “subset” of
Foucault’s model of power. Foucault’s account, therefore, has an explanatory advantage
by virtue of being able to address the functioning of discipline and biopower. Just as
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power relations can be productive, they can also be repressive, and it is only the latter that
juridical power stresses.64
Finally, several authors have argued that Foucault abandons his understanding of
power on the model of war shortly after he introduces it. Andrew Neal, for instance,
offers an entirely different approach to Society Must be Defended and argues that while
Foucault initially explores modeling politics on war, it would be mistaken to understand
that as an alternative to juridical power. Neal argues that the historical reading Foucault
offers shows how the discourse of politics as war was appropriated and incorporated into
the nation-state politics. Thus, for Neal, Foucault does not maintain the politics-as-war
hypothesis and has already rejected it in Society Must be Defended itself.65 In addition,
Johanna Oksala maintains that Foucault exposes how social contract theories merely
concealed the violent origins of the state. Oksala takes Foucault to have abandoned the
understanding of politics on war, while maintaining a strategic and agonistic view of
political relations.66 Similarly, Thomas Lemke contends that merely reversing the
juridical understanding of power keeps Foucault within its confines. Therefore,
governmentality comes to replace the model of war as a way to cut off the king’s head in
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political analysis through understanding it primarily as conduct.67
One could see why these readings of Foucault may cast doubt on the coherence of his
view, and legitimately raise the question of whether we can maintain Foucault’s position
to be opposed to that of contractarianism. Foucault himself is unclear on the matter and
appears to waiver as to whether his position entails a rejection of juridical thought or is
only a perspective among many. Foucault’s arguments in The History of Sexuality Vol. I
for “cut[ting] off the head of the king” given the juridical view’s inability to “code”
power appears to be an instance of his endorsement of a complete rejection of the
juridical form as an outmoded form of power. Alternatively, in “The Subject and Power,”
Foucault maintains that power as a “capacity,” which he often attributes to the juridical
form, continues to operate alongside other forms and takes part in the constitution of
disciplinary “blocks.” (WK 89; SP 338) In order to derive the implications of Foucault’s
understanding of power in relation to Hobbes’s contractarianism, I will examine in detail
Foucault’s argument in the next section before returning to argue against the strict
opposition maintained between these two views.
Non-contractarian Power
Foucault’s rejection of the contractarian view of power appears as early as Discipline
and Punish while accounting for the mechanisms that produce docile bodies. Foucault
develops a micro-physics of power that is “concerned with the ‘body politic,’ as a set of
material elements and techniques.” (DP 28) Disciplinary power mechanisms, therefore,
act on the body in order to fabricate the “modern soul,” a subjectivity that Foucault insists
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came to “imprison the body.” (DP 28-29) For Foucault, this means power relations must
be anonymous, for in contrast to juridical power linked to the exercised power of the
sovereign, disciplinary power mechanisms objectify and emphasize the bodies on which
they are applied.
We thus find two main arguments against the social contract model pertaining to the
operation of power relations. On the one hand, power can neither be possessed by
individuals, nor by the state as an institution, and is rather exercised. In contrast,
contractarian theories focus on the exercise of power by the state, or by a sovereign,
resulting from the consent of individuals.68 On the other hand, to maintain that power
fabricates subjects is to also contend that power cannot be understood as negative, for the
body is gradually molded through being invested by power relations. Through locating
the exercise of power in the operation of law, the social contract model emphasizes the
prohibitory function of law. Though power may initially derive from a more positive
conception of right, as in Hobbes, it still culminates in the constitution of the state that
sets limits to such positive capacities. For Foucault, however, the activity of power
relations is not limited to prohibition, as they constitute the subject while being
transmitted through the body of the individual. In other words, Foucault endorses a
positive view of power as productive, a theme he retains as his account of power relations
develops.
Therefore, Foucault does not intend to begin with physical non-political powers that
come to found a unified political structure. Instead, he introduces a methodological shift
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away from the theory of sovereignty by arguing that power relations must be understood
in their specificity. An analysis of power relations requires recognizing them as multiple,
heterogeneous, and agonistic. Such an “effective” analysis can only result from
conceiving of power relations from the standpoint of local tactics that come to contribute
in “global strategies” instead of reducing them to an overarching, unified, and coherent
conception. (SMD 45)
Foucault’s departure from a contractarian juridical model of power becomes clearer if
we consider the question of rights. Foucault maintains that contractarian views begin with
the assumption of basic rights that provide the source of legitimacy for juridical power.69
Hobbes, for instance, begins with a right to everything that persons have under the natural
condition in the absence of natural laws that set limits. Establishing a unified arbitrator
can only follow from transferring such rights. (L 119) But to understand relations of
power on the micro-physical model suggests that the disciplinary mode of power cannot
be reduced to the language of rights and laws. Disciplinary power, instead, precedes
subjects and cannot be reduced to a capacity of subjects that serves as a basis for
legitimacy.70 For Foucault, the juridical-philosophical contractarian model is thus blind to
the disciplinary mechanisms that act on bodies to produce obedience, and instead limits
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the question of power to that of legitimacy.71 Rather than conceiving of power relations
that act on the social body as following from agreement, Foucault suggests we consider
processes that shape subjects, ones for which a contractarian approach cannot adequately
account. (DP 169) Consequently, whether contract establishes a disciplinary relation or
not is irrelevant, for disciplinary mechanisms are not bound by contractual prohibitions.
As Foucault argues, discipline functions as a counter-law, for it produces asymmetries
that preclude reciprocal social relations. (DP 222-23)
Recognizing that the subject is produced by mechanisms requires that we institute
another methodological reversal that does not begin with legitimate natural rights
possessed by individuals.72 As Foucault argues in Society Must be Defended, rather than
tracing the origins of relations of power, Foucault’s account requires that we “identify the
technical instruments that guarantee that they function.” (DP 46) Consequently, the
strategic understanding of power introduces a turn towards an analysis of techniques,
instead of attempting to discover the origins of the state in contract and consent.73 Such
an analysis would put forward a conception of political power based on the model of war,
a basic war that continuously and permanently permeates the state and all its apparatuses.
Thus, Foucault institutes a reversal of Clausewitz principle, a reversal that he locates in
the history of political struggle. Rather than viewing war to be an extension of politics by
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other means, politics is to be understood as war that is conducted by other means. (DP
48) The critique of appealing to origins is one that Foucault had already emphasized in
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” yet these lectures come to complete the genealogical
turn through deriving political implications from eliminating the question of origins.
Accordingly, Foucault can argue for the advantage of his view over that of contract
through invoking an empirical argument. Foucault manages to account for disciplinary
mechanisms, ones that cannot be explained through the social contract, and thus shows
that power relations cannot be simply reduced to a juridical understanding. This
argument, however, does not clearly establish Foucault’s position as a superior
alternative to the juridical model, as it can be recognized as merely complementary. In
fact, the conflict between the two conceptions of power can be incorporated into
Foucault’s view, especially with his insistence that we need not offer a universal
understanding of the operation of power relations.74
Foucault and Hobbes
If opposing a contractarian view leads to a micro-physics of power in Discipline and
Punish, Foucault fleshes out the theoretical elements of his account further in his 19751976 lectures Society Must be Defended. Foucault retains his commitment to an
understanding of power as productive of subjectivity and as exercised as opposed to a
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possessed capacity. Yet, one significant feature of power relations that is developed in
these lectures is that of inequality. Foucault explicitly invokes Hobbes, characterized as a
proponent of juridical power, and argues that the model of Leviathan must be abandoned.
As he did in Discipline and Punish, Foucault maintains that power must not be
understood as limited to the institutions of the state, but must be recognized as acting on
the very subjects that are taken by the juridical model to be preconditions for the
constitution of the state. (SMD 34)
Consequently, the anti-Hobbesian position materializes more clearly through the
reading Foucault puts forward of Hobbes’s state of nature. In fact, in Society Must be
Defended, Foucault’s claims depend on arguing that the discourse of war he attempts to
uncover cannot be reduced to that of Hobbes. For Hobbes, it is the condition of war we
find in the state of nature that justifies transferring natural rights belonging to natural
persons in order to bring into being the politically unified commonwealth. (L 116) But
whereas Hobbes appears to put forward an account that takes war to be “both the basis of
power relations and the principle that explains them,” Foucault argues that Hobbes is
committed to a merely juridical view of power. (SMD 89; L 85-86, 128-29) Moreover,
Hobbes appears to argue for an account of the origin of the state based on a conception of
the natural human being who possesses power as a capacity from which we derive unitary
political power. (L 116) Consequently, Foucault maintains that an analysis of power
cannot be limited to the model of contract from which a state is constituted. (SMD 34)
Moreover, in these lectures, Foucault introduces a further argument against Hobbes
pertaining to the condition of war that characterizes the state of nature. Foucault traces
the development of the notion of politics on the model of war to the appearance of a race
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war discourse near the end of the sixteenth century. Under this reading, the state is
“nothing more than the way that the war between the two groups in question continues to
be waged in apparently peaceful forms.” (SMD 88) This raises an interesting question in
relation to Hobbesian contractarianism, namely that of the transition towards the state as
a result of a war that threatens all our lives. Yet, this war for Hobbes “consisteth not in
actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no
assurance to the contrary.” (L 113)
For Foucault, however, the fundamental mistake we find in Hobbes’s work concerns
the state of war he designates along with its preconditions. Foucault argues that by
focusing on such a general conception of war that follows from equality, Hobbes comes
to exclude the discourse of war that follows from unequal relations rather than develop
legitimacy out of it. As Foucault states, for Hobbes, the war that leads to the birth of the
state is the “most general of all wars, and it goes on at all times and in every dimension.”
(SMD 89) This war persists after the constitution of the state, as we can see in the two
types of sovereignty Hobbes provides, that of sovereignty by institution and sovereignty
by acquisition following conquest. In both cases, the state is an outcome of a war that is
found under the conditions of physical and mental equality of which we are conscious.
But for Foucault, what marks the Hobbesian view of the state of nature is the absence of
actual battles. Instead, equality ensures that all we need in order to arrive at the covenant
is a threat of war, coupled with “calculated presentations” and tactics designed to
intimidate and show that every person is willing to engage in battle. Such a threat,
therefore, offers the sufficient conditions to transition towards the state. What brings the
state into existence, according to Foucault’s reading of Hobbes, is not real war, but
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merely the fear of death. As Foucault notes,
There are no battles in Hobbes’s primitive war, there is no blood and there are no
corpses. There are presentations, manifestations, signs, emphatic expressions, wiles,
and deceitful expressions…we are in a theater where presentations are exchanged, in
a relationship of fear… we are not really involved in war. (SMD 92)
Foucault argues that it is always fear of death that leads to instituting the sovereign as
representative of the social body, and never war itself. Accordingly, under the model of
contract, war becomes irrelevant for the constitution of sovereignty. Hobbes, therefore, is
not to be viewed as establishing the relation between war and political power, but rather
as excluding war and battle from political analysis.75 Consequently, an alternative
analysis of power relations must function historically to shed light on actual historical
battles rather than hypothetical ones. It must begin with identifying instances of
inequality that are the product of war and violence as opposed to locating a permanent
“state of war” in equality. (SMD 156)
The view introduced in Society Must be Defended is further supported with an
“analytics of power” Foucault introduces in The Will to Knowledge, the first volume of
The History of Sexuality which was published the year Foucault concluded his 1975-1976
lectures. This analytics of power recognizes that resistance is immanent to any power
relation. Whereas Foucault’s engagement with Hobbes in this work is limited to claiming
that the power over life and death is not a matter of the transfer of natural right, it is clear
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that he retains several arguments he had already presented concerning inequality and war.
(WK 135) The contrast with Hobbes appears most clearly in Foucault’s argument that
inequality serves as a necessary condition for power relations. Inequality, moreover, is
due to the inherent instability of force relations, a stipulation that serves as an explanatory
grid for social interactions.76 The instability of forces leads to the production of new
forces, which in turn generates power everywhere.
Yet, whereas power relations are to be understood in terms of war in Society Must
be Defended, Foucault recognizes that war is only one form a power relation can be
discursively “coded” as, while politics is another. Instead of reducing politics to agonistic
relations of war, Foucault thus maintains that both warlike relations and political relations
are reducible to forces. Rather than transitioning from warlike forces to juridical power,
Foucault attempts to identify a unified grid for both modes of power, while arguing that
the distinction between the two is merely a discursive one. Therefore, Foucault maintains
that “it is one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force relationships which
for a long time had found expression in war…gradually became invested in the order of
political power.” (WK 102) We find, consequently, a claim to a strictly discursive
distinction between warlike relations and political ones, while linking both to an
underlying dynamic explained through the movements of forces. Accordingly, power is
not to be understood today simply by means of law. Instead, what must replace the
violence of war is a strategic conception of politics.
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Nonetheless, Foucault is also committed to a degree of nominalism, as he recognizes
that power as a general term is nothing but a “name that one attributes to a complex
strategic situation in a particular society.”77 (WK 92) In other words, Power does not
exist, what exists are particular force relations strategically directed. Power as the
multiplicity of force relations is immanent in the domain they constitute, and this
constitution is nothing but a particular organization of forces. Power does not become a
unity that is materialized in a sovereign, but is rather present everywhere due to its selfreproductive activity understood in terms of the instability of force relations that leads to
the production of new forces in turn. To be a nominalist about power, thus, is to claim
there is no Power but only particular strategic manifestations. Yet, the difference between
power as political and power as warlike is a difference in presentation. Beneath
strategies, we must posit force relations that determine effectiveness and explain the
shifting balance of power. Foucault’s “analytics of power” recognizes that strategies are
immanent in force relations, which in turn could constitute and partake in an overall
strategy. (WK 99) This is why Foucault contends that instead of power, what we find is
the “moving substrate of force relations” that inherently determines strategies, and by
virtue of this complex network of force relations a domain is introduced. (WK 93) This
understanding of power relations becomes thornier with a third shift Foucault introduces,
that of the constitution of subjectivity. The next section will therefore attempt to
introduce a coherent view of the resistance of bodies in relation to the exercise of power.
Subjects and Material Bodies
If the rejection of a unified view of power leads to a disjointed understanding of force
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relations that come to constitute subjects, the obvious question that follows for Foucault
is that of the object of the exercise of power. In both, Discipline and Punish and The Will
to Knowledge, Foucault repeatedly maintains that power invests material bodies,
subjugating them through rigorous training and through transforming them into objects of
knowledge. (DP 152, 217; WK 152) This assertion requires that we rethink our
understanding of the subject. Whereas in social contract theory, the subject is primary
and plays a foundational role in the forming the state, Foucault reverses the relation
between subject and state, where subjects, being produced by power relations, cannot
“possess” power and can only serve as vehicles of power. Consequently, Foucault
specifies another reversal in relation to the contractarian project, and rather than
identifying the conditions that lead subjects to produce a state, he attempts to identify
material processes, some of which are state-related, that produce subjects. These subjects,
for Foucault, must be understood as “peripheral bodies” that are subjectified through
power relations. They are bodies that the model of contract is unable to incorporate.
(SMD 28-29) Consequently, whereas a theory of sovereignty begins with a conception of
the individual that possesses capacities and is then transformed into a political subject,
Foucault intends to put forward an analysis that accounts for the constitution of subjects
at the “limits” as effects of power relations.
Nonetheless, whether we find a coherent account of the material body in Foucault’s
different works remains a disputed matter. In fact, as several commentators have already
argued, Foucault’s presentation of the docile and passive material body in Discipline and
Punish does not seem to fit well with his later characterizations that find in the body a
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capacity for free action.78
As Foucault maintains, “discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’
bodies,” in order to render them both docile and capable simultaneously. (DP 138) The
example of handwriting is useful to examine here. As Foucault shows, “good handwriting
… presupposes a gymnastics – a whole routine whose rigorous code invests the body in
its entirety.” (DP 152) By quoting La Salle, Foucault shows how students are expected to
hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left side, slightly inclined, so
that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested upon the hand, unless
this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat more forward
under the table than the right. A distance of two fingers must be left between the body
and the table; for not only does one write with more alertness, but nothing is more
harmful to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one’s stomach against the
table; the part of the left arm from the elbow to the hand must be placed on the table.
(DP 152)
This meticulous partitioning of the body while assigning movement to every part shows
how bodies are disciplined in order to render them efficient. Passivity, therefore, results
from emphasizing specific forces in the body and training it to perform specific motions
and not others. Ultimately, as Foucault emphasizes, the body becomes imprisoned by the
subject constituted out of these practices.
This understanding of the body as possibly docile, however, raises problems for
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Foucault’s view. Through attempting to uncover conditions that make modern subjects
possible and dispelling the notion of the individual as an atom that constitutes the state as
a result of an agreement, Foucault appears to reduce subjects to effects of power relations
that seem to lack a capacity for overturning the activity of those relations. But even if we
set the question of freedom aside, this characterization still closes up the possibility of
resistance that Foucault insists on attributing to the body beginning with Society Must be
Defended. (SMD 280)
To examine this problem further, it may be useful to look at Foucault’s clearest
discussion of materiality in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In this essay, Foucault
argues that genealogy is concerned with descent, as a material search that identifies
“inscriptions” on the body, which in turn is understood as the “surface of the inscription
of events”. This historical inscription on the body gives rise to a “chimera of a substantial
unity,” but it must be recognized as dissociated and multiple. (NGH 375) The body is an
aggregate of historical marks left behind by inconsistent regimes that have shaped it,
endowed it with resistances, and constituted it as a network of forces. (NGH 387)
Yet, Foucault only becomes clear on how this “inscription” occurs in Discipline and
Punish, where the body is identified as the target of disciplinary mechanisms.
Interestingly, discipline takes the body as its target to achieve incorporeal effects.
Whereas sovereign power acts straightforwardly on the body for the purpose of inflicting
pain, the disciplined body is no longer the target, but only an intermediary. Power is
exercised on the body, thus producing effects in the subject. (DP 11) The shift in the
activity of power is primarily in objective, which leads to maximizing the efficiency of
punishment. It is now a matter of “defining” the individual, rendering her capable of
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functioning within the confines of the law. Disciplinary mechanisms, thus, function
through two stages. First, the body is rendered docile through a meticulous supervision of
activity, precise imperatives that specify every movement, and strict spatial divisions.
Second, the subjected body is transformed into a functional body by virtue of
reconceiving it as a “bearer of forces and the seat of duration.” (DP 155) It is no longer a
mechanistic body, but an organism, one that is capable of activity and can be trained
through a temporal elaboration of movement bringing about the desired behavior. (DP
155-56, 159)
In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault maintains his claim that the target of relations of
force is still the body. In fact, the distribution of power relations is “directly connected to
the body,” and thus Foucault describes his project as an attempt to write a “history of
bodies … [where] what is most material and most vital in them has been invested.” (WK
152) Yet, whereas in Discipline and Punish the main focus of the activity of power is the
subjection of bodies, rendering them pliant, and extracting forces out of them, Foucault’s
introduction of resistance as an inherent part of every power relation casts doubt on the
possibility of a coherent view of the body.
In order to account for this problem, I argue that we should recognize that bodies are
not ontologically distinct, but should rather be conceived as forces situated within a larger
field of forces. The problem of the status of the body has already been pointed out in the
literature. Judith Butler, for instance, argues that Foucault appears to presuppose a
prediscursive body on which regimes of discourse are inscribed. This must be a
“universal” body, one that is prior to any discursive construction and is a “dynamic locus
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of resistance.”79 Accordingly, the inscription must be external to the body, and acts upon
the body, which for Butler requires an ontological distinction between the two. Butler
argues, therefore, that this prediscursive body is imbued with drives and is the source of
resistance immanent to any power relation. Yet, to conceive of the body as resisting
external force relations restores a juridical understanding of power that Foucault claims to
purge. Under this view, resistance is due to a body that is outside a relation of power, and
thus freeing it would simply require eliminating the power relation. Reinstating juridical
power would commit Foucault to the “promise of liberation” we find in psychoanalysis
of which he is critical in The Will to Knowledge.80
Taking a different approach, Paul Patton argues that Foucault presupposes a certain
conception of the human being, namely as a body that has capacities and is “composed of
forces.”81 But whereas Butler takes this prediscursive body to be a problem in Foucault’s
account, Patton suggests that this view allows for opening up the possibility of resistance,
and thus rebuffs the charge of Foucault being a philosopher of domination. For Patton, in
both Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, Foucault maintains that the body
is the target of power relations, in both of its forms, that of the micro-physics of power
and that of force relations. This body must have specific capacities, capable of pleasure
for instance, and is a site of force activity while being subjected to the inscription of force
relations. The body is, furthermore, the site of resistance to the activity of forces in any
power relation. This provides Foucault with the means to argue that resistance will be

79

Judith Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” The Journal of
Philosophy 86, no. 11 (1989): 602.
80
Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” 606.
81
Paul Patton, “Foucault’s Subject of Power,” Political Theory Newsletter 6, no. 1 (May
1994): 61.
64

present in every power relation, but it would not justify normative views favoring
resistance as opposed to domination.
For Patton, resistance, therefore, springs from a “minimal concept of persons,” an
active body that is subjected to training but is also capable of turning forces onto itself in
order to govern itself. In a Nietzschean sense, turning forces inwards allows for deriving
ethical codes while simultaneously providing grounds for normative claims.82
Consequently, Foucault is able to distinguish between different operations of power,
between domination and resistance, but is unable to provide the criterion for determining
which power relations are preferred.83 Instead, Foucault’s view for Patton “exposes the
limitations of the demand for such criteria,” for Foucault gives an answer to the question
of why resistance occurs.84 Rather than asking the question of whether we should
advocate resistance or not, we should recognize that resistance is the inevitable outcome
of the exercise of force on a body, which itself unsettles asymmetric power relations, and
thus opens up the field of possibilities. This is primarily the role of genealogy, to uncover
elements that we can dispose through shedding light on their contingency. For Patton,
genealogy does not offer a priori transcendental conditions, but rather historical
conditions, for what is taken to be necessary today might be viewed as contingent
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tomorrow. Genealogy, thus, provides a historical analysis of the “contemporary limits of
the necessary.”85
Patton allows for an understanding of the body capable of resistance given that it is
constituted out of force relations. Several problems, however, remain unresolved with
Patton’s view. First, Patton is unclear on the ontological status of the presupposed notion
of a human being of which Foucault makes use. This leaves his view open to the charge
Butler raises of slipping into a juridical view of power. Moreover, Patton maintains that
the best way to understand power in Foucault’s work is as capacity, a view Foucault
clearly steps away from as I’ve argued earlier in the chapter.86 The main problem that
arises is how we can conceive of a “thin subject of power” as a dispersed body composed
of multiple forces and yet having a capacity for exercising power. It would seem this
capacity would have to be reduced to the actual activity of forces that constitute the body,
and is thus no longer the body’s capacity in any meaningful sense. Foucault’s arguments
show that what Patton identifies as the body’s “capacities” are effects of power relations,
which precludes identifying the human being as the source of resistance.
Alternatively, in order to break away from a body that is external to power, Oksala
argues that attributing to the body the capacity of resistance requires relinquishing certain
elements that we find in Discipline and Punish. As Oksala points out, we find a different
view of the body in The Will to Knowledge, and thus we should abandon viewing the
body as a strictly material object, for that passive conception of the body allows us to
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explain discipline but not resistance.87 Oksala suggests that we instead conceive of the
body as capable of experience, which provides us with the means to recognize that the
body is a site of resistance. Given Foucault’s commitments, experience is only rendered
intelligible through discourse, but the body is also capable of unintelligible experiences.88
Oksala argues that whether the body is constituted in its entirety discursively or not is
irrelevant, for Foucault’s ontology does not depend on bodies. It is experience, on the
other hand, that can fall within the confines of discursive limits, or outside those limits. In
other words, experiences can be of the normalized subject, but the ones Foucault is more
interested in are limit experiences that fall outside the discursively defined subject. These
experiences are certainly unintelligible, yet they allow for “wrenching the subject from
itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its
annihilation or its dissolution.”89
Oksala, therefore, reads Foucault as thinking of limits and transgression as
reciprocally dependent. Consequently, discourses along with the transgression of their
limits are both constituted by discursive practices, which are preconditions for
intelligibility. Yet, limit experiences cast doubt on the understanding of subjectivity and
disrupt normalizing frameworks. Therefore, through such peripheral experiences, bodies
dissolve subjectivity by resisting normalizing forms of power.90 This is why Oksala
argues that what has primacy in Foucault’s work, is not the ontology of the body, but the
ontology of the event. There is no prediscurisve body that is ontologically distinct, for
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there is a body that is always contested at the limits. Oksala offers an example of trauma,
where sometimes the subject recounts the experience from a third-person perspective, and
thus recognizes it as an event outside the subject. These limit experiences lead to
contesting one’s conception of the body as a result of the collapse of frameworks of
intelligibility.91
But whereas Oksala’s view disposes of the problem of the externality of the body
altogether, it still falls into the problem that Patton had aimed to resolve. Patton had
argued that Foucault can make room for resistance through introducing a theory of the
Nietzschean subject. Under Oksala’s view, it is not only the subject that is dislodged and
rendered alterable due to the activity of forces, but also the body. Under this reading, the
body is transformed by limit experiences that bring about the breakdown of discursive
intelligibility. But this also implies that there is no meaningful sense of understanding
resistance in terms of force relations between the body and the surrounding. Reading
Foucault as introducing an ontology of the event relegates the status of the material body
to secondary and locates resistance only in the experiential body. This renders resistance
possible only when experience becomes unintelligible and discursivity collapses.
Nonetheless, limiting resistance to such experiences appears to be at odds with Foucault’s
repeated insistence that every power relation inherently involves resistance.
Consequently, Foucault’s view requires that we maintain a conception of bodies as
material and as primarily composed of forces, and it is this composition that renders
resistance immanent. Ultimately, a coherent understanding of the relation between bodies
and forces in Foucault will have to reject an ontological distinction between the body and
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the forces acting on it, while not reducing resistance to a capacity we attribute to the
body. In order to also account for Foucault’s insistence that every power relation
necessarily involves resistance, I argue in the next section that Foucault’s account of
power relations that invest bodies should be understood in terms of an underlying field of
forces.
Materiality and Contractarianism
Overcoming the problems with Foucault’s view of a body endowed with resistance
requires that two issues be addressed. First, we must introduce a reading that rejects an
ontological distinction between the body and the functioning of power in order to avoid
Butler’s charge. Second, a body that is actively resisting must be “composed of forces” as
Patton argues, however, without sliding back into a view of power as capacity. This
restores to the body a strictly material presence and allows for maintaining Foucault’s
insistence that inscription is always of a material nature. Significantly, this means that
understanding the body as the material site of the constitution of subjectivity is a
precondition for Foucault’s view of power and offers a material ground for his politics.
I suggest, therefore, that we interpret power relations as being the product of a field of
forces that dissolves any ontological distinction between subjects taking part in social
interactions and between power mechanisms. Foucault’s corpus is replete with the
rejection of unities in favor of an analysis of local, historical, and contingent conditions
that render discourses possible. This also applies straightforwardly to the subject that is
constituted through and affected by multiple force relations. Force relations are,
therefore, rendered intelligible by being linked to specific discourses that are
agonistically related to other discourses. Moreover, Foucault’s assertion in The History
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Will to Knowledge that we never find power, but only the “moving substrate of force
relations” entails a rejection of substantial metaphysical unities. Accordingly, there is no
“mysterious substance” identified as power, instead we find what can be best understood
as a field of forces that, under specific configurations, come to constitute subjects,
processes, as well as historical narratives once a particular discursive grid of
intelligibility is applied. These forces do not individually have an independent existence,
but only exist in relation to other forces. Moreover, the interactions between different
configurations of forces produce power relations, and since each configuration in fact
comprises of force relations, resistance is bound to be present. In contrast to force
relations which operate on material bodies and constitute the basis upon which social
interaction occurs, power relations require a different level of description and pertain to
the discourse of subjects and events. Foucault’s politics, thus, develops out of his
subscription to a material view of the activity of forces.92
Is Foucault’s work to be understood metaphysically then? Foucault’s appeal to
forces seems problematic especially in the absence of a metaphysical basis that animates
the activity of forces such as Spinoza’s conatus. Consequently, Foucault’s insistence that
force is not a substance may not suffice to avoid slipping into a pre-Kantian dogmatism.
Yet, we can understand Foucault’s analysis of force relations as an outcome of an
empirical approach that derives conclusions from an analysis of historical social
phenomena. This understanding of forces is an outcome of recognizing the shift in the
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activity of juridical power as exemplified historically. Consequently, if we read Foucault
as introducing a framework that is justified by an empirical account, we can understand
forces as playing a primarily explanatory role of phenomena we find in the social sphere,
such as discipline.93 Foucault thus intends to work backwards beginning with our present
experience to provide a framework that would account adequately for its historical
development, and thus offers a “history of the present.” (DP 31) This explanatory
framework primarily involves a rethinking of the traditional conception of the operation
of power.
Rejecting a metaphysical understanding ultimately requires turning to Foucault’s
Nietzschean side. Indeed, Foucault had already provided an argument against a
metaphysical reading in his 1973 lectures Truth and Juridical Forms. In those lectures,
Foucault accepts Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge is invented, and thus is not a direct
consequence of human nature.94 This leads to a gap not only between our knowledge and
the world as in Kant, but it also dislodges what Kant took to be fixed a priori conditions
for experience. Under Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche, this shows that forms of
knowledge are historical; they transform given our role in inventing them. The absence of
universal conditions for knowledge implies that knowledge cannot be objective and is
always situated within power relations, for we merely have conditional historical
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knowledge that is always “aimed, maliciously, insidiously, and aggressively, at
individuals, things, situations.”95 (TJF 14)
Let us return to the key reversals Foucault introduces against social contract
theory. If I am right that Foucault’s conception of power rests on the contention that the
activity of force relations must be material, this casts the question of the compatibility
between Foucault’s relational view of forces and contractarianism in a different light.
Foucault’s argument that his analysis of power relations involve reversing a contractarian
understanding of power hinges on how we understand politics to be grounded.
Essentially, for Foucault, politics must be based on a material analysis, which in his view
is manifested in terms of force relations that invest bodies and constitute subjects.
Therefore, Foucault appears to expand the political field, in contrast to Rawls, as he does
not limit the political question to the kinds of institutions that must be introduced.
Foucault, therefore, does not begin with non-political power in the form of a
capacity, but rather argues that social relations are political through and through.
Moreover, Foucault seeks to avoid appealing to some fundamental right on which politics
can be grounded, for politics must be understood in terms of the tactical and strategic
arrangement of forces.96 As I shall maintain in chapter five, this conception of politics
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For my purposes, however, I want to suggest that understanding forces in terms of a field
clarifies Foucault’s understanding of power relations with respect to the notion of power
assumed in social contract theory. This opens up the space for difficult metaphysical
questions, but dealing with them is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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cannot offer any normative content. This suggests that the Hobbesian project of deriving
normativity from contract is not necessarily superfluous as Foucault maintains.
Consequently, if politics goes beyond the operation of law as prohibition, a political view
must account for how particular subjects are constituted through material processes.
Foucault’s attempt to offer such an explanation is through understanding the social sphere
in terms of a field of agonistic forces. This carries with it a significant implication with
respect to the compatibility between Foucault’s view and social contract theory.
Ultimately, whether the two are compatible depends on whether contractarianism offers a
material constitution of subjectivity. Though this is entirely absent in Rawls, I shall argue
in the next chapter that Hobbes puts forward such a view before returning to a fuller
discussion of this in chapter five.
As for the problem of subjectivity, in his later work “The Subject and Power,”
Foucault identifies his main concern in terms of the question of subjectivity. (SP 326-27)
Accordingly, Foucault recognizes that a political view cannot overlook the material
mechanisms that shape and transform subjects. Ultimately, Foucault’s arguments rest on
the contention that the political conclusions of the proponents of social contract theory
are not grounded in any politically relevant material processes, and thus fail to account
for the functioning of power from below. The extent to which Foucault’s reversals apply
to Hobbes, then, will depend on whether Hobbes indeed does limit the political field to
the operation of law that emerges out of contract. Yet, if Hobbes’s politics entails an
account of how political subjects are physically constituted and continue to be shaped by

aims at concealing a political historicism that was developing in seventeenth century
England centered on the problem of the conquest. (SMD 110-11)
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sovereign activity, it would seem Hobbes’s version of the social contract can offer insight
if understood alongside that of Foucault.97 In other words, my argument amounts to
claiming that a careful reading of Hobbes results in rejecting the opposition between
Foucault’s power relations and a specific version of social contract theory that maintains
that subjects are constituted through material process, whether natural or through staterelated tactics.98 The next chapter will make this link between Hobbes and Foucault
clearer by arguing that Hobbes’s politics emerge out of a metaphysically material
understanding of human beings. Consequently, Hobbes takes political reasons and state
tactics to depend on the physical constitution of subjects.
The final reversal that Foucault introduces is that of inequality. Foucault is
certainly right in arguing that beginning with the presupposition of inequality inherent in
force relations will lead to uncovering a domain of force activity that we do not identify if
we begin with equality. The difference between Foucault’s view and that of Hobbes
become clearest at this point, through locating the tactical and strategic activity of forces
in relations of inequality.99 Yet, this difference only establishes a complementary relation
between the reading Foucault introduces and Hobbes’s contractual view. The two views
do not have to be understood as developed out of different grids, for though there are
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significant differences, the overlap still allows for putting forward a consistent position
out of them.
One problem that arises out of arguing that Foucault’s position is compatible with
some version of social contract theory is that of consistency with his later political work,
primarily that of the ethics of the care of the self. Once Foucault provides the underlying
historical conditions of possibility for the current practices of government, he moves
towards introducing an ethics that denounces normalization, and thus implies an ethical
imperative of “not being governed so much.” (WC 265) This has led some to raise the
contentious charge of libertarianism, for Foucault appears to advocate autonomy in
opposition to state-related processes.100
Charging Foucault with developing a libertarian politics, nevertheless, seems to
involve an unjustified leap. Foucault introduces the conditions that make present day
government possible, yet he only provides the normative basis for transforming them in
his ethical work. However, I take Foucault’s imperatives in his ethics of the care of the
self to be primarily concerned with the problem of sexuality from which they emerge.
Foucault’s intent was to make room for the heterogeneous and diverse forces that have
been stifled through practices of government that take people’s lives as their target and
impose rigid classifications. Being true to Foucault’s insistence that analysis must be
local, however, suggests we should avoid taking such an ethics to hold the same
normative force when it comes to other ethical and political questions. Accordingly,
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when asking the question of the emergence of the state, we need not arrive at the same
conclusions. Instead, Foucault’s work in Society Must be Defended offers an alternative
path that deals precisely with the problem of a political discourse that is not reducible to
an art of government.
Conclusions
To sum up, my argument in this chapter involved linking Foucault’s reversal of the
operation of power in social contract theory to the underlying view of the activity of force
relations. I have argued that the shifts Foucault introduces against juridical power can be
understood primarily in terms of how material conditions understood in terms of forces
come to constitute political subjects. Understood in these terms, however, we can cast
doubt on the extent to which Foucault’s view is in fact opposed to Hobbes’s political
account. The two positions can be regarded as complimentary on the condition that we
locate in Hobbes a grounding of politics on materiality that allows for the transformation
of subjects. In order to establish this relation between Hobbes and Foucault, the next
chapter will argue that Hobbes’s politics develops out of his metaphysical materialism,
and thus political action entails, among other things, influencing subjects physically
through targeting their passions.
Understanding politics through focusing on material processes reinforces my
argument against Rawls. If ideals are to be inculcated by institutions primarily, then we
should be cautious of the means by which this process occurs. Whereas Rawls fails to
justify the normativity of his position in the absence of anything but a vague moral
ground for his politics, beginning with a material analysis warns against simply appealing
to intuition for political arguments and offers insight into how political subjects are
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formed. However, as Patton maintains, such an analysis cannot offer any normative
content on its own. This emphasizes the significance of the complementary relation
between Foucault and Hobbes, where the two views differ primarily in beginning the
analysis from identifying conditions of equality or inequality. Hobbes, however, seems to
have the means to offer normative content beginning from analyzing material conditions,
to which I will return more fully in chapter five.
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Chapter Three
Method and Contract in Hobbes
In the previous chapter, I highlighted Foucault’s argument against Hobbes and
introduced Foucault’s understanding of political power in terms of the material
investment of bodies. I also argued that though Foucault attempts to reverse contractarian
presuppositions, including those of Hobbes, by uncovering a more pervasive operation of
power beneath contract, the conclusion Foucault is warranted in drawing is weaker than
the one he puts forward. I have maintained that given Foucault’s emphasis on the
materiality of the operation of power, his view can be understood as consistent with the
one Hobbes introduces, as long as we understand Hobbes to ground politics materially.
This does not mean the two views overlap entirely, for as I have maintained, we arrive at
a different analysis of political power depending on whether we start with the condition
of equality, as Hobbes does, or inequality inherent in social relations, which is Foucault’s
position.
The force of a material basis for political power can be realized in relation to the
argument I presented in chapter one. I have argued that Rawls cannot justify his
normative content as long as he is committed to a freestanding view that sets aside all
non-political justifications that follow from adopting a comprehensive doctrine. The
Foucaultian-Hobbesian view I introduce offers an alternative by beginning from a
material analysis. As I show in chapter five, it is possible to derive some normative
dictates from such an analysis, though this normative view remains less ambitious and
more limited in scope than the one Rawls presents.
In this chapter, I argue that we can ground Hobbes’s politics materially, which
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renders his position compatible with the one Foucault introduces. This material
grounding would attribute to Hobbes a naturalism that begins with an understanding of
how we are metaphysically affected by the world, rather than conceiving his position as a
self-sufficient view that arrives at normative conclusions without requiring a scientific
understanding of human nature. I begin by several interpretive positions that frame
Hobbes as a skeptic and subsequently question his naturalistic commitments.101
According to these readings, Hobbes acknowledged a human inability to access natural
things, and thus was more concerned with introducing a view of nature that justifies his
political conclusions. I argue that though Hobbes was aware of the difficulties of
understanding the world, he was committed to the position that a properly scientific
method would allow us to overcome the problems presented by skepticism.
Consequently, for Hobbes, the commitment to a specific method would allow us to make
metaphysical claims about the world that we can deem scientific, where ‘science’ is
understood by Hobbes as “knowledge of consequences.”102 This leads me to raise
questions about how we should understand Hobbes’s notions of the state of nature and
the social contract. In the last section of the chapter, I offer an interpretation of these
concepts through the lens of Hobbes’s geometric method.
Skepticism and Experience
Several arguments can be introduced to shed light on the skeptical side of Hobbes.
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One significant line can be traced back to Hobbes’s commitment to a distinction between
the perceived properties of objects and reality, or what Locke later refers to as secondary
and primary qualities. The skeptical conclusion isn’t straightforward here, but, as I will
argue, it arises out of a tension between Hobbes’s empiricism on the one hand and his
confidence in reason’s ability to produce scientific knowledge, or sapience, as an
outcome of operating on universals on the other.
Hobbes allots to reason the role of developing scientific knowledge, but our
rational faculty is not something given. Rather, it develops out of speech. Only upon
developing the capacity for speech are we able to articulate knowledge claims in terms of
universal names and independently of particular instances. In the absence of speech,
moreover, one may be able to arrive at particular conclusions, yet these conclusions fall
short from the certainty of universals. Hobbes offers the example of a triangle,
maintaining that without the use of speech, one may be able to conclude that the sum of
angles of a particular triangle is equal to two particular right angles. But arriving at the
general conclusion requires the use of words, for it entails reasoning through universal
terms and deriving pertinent conclusions that apply to the universal term triangle. (L 2122)
Our discursive ability, however, primarily depends on sensory perception, as we
begin by introducing marks to refer to particular perceptions allowing for “transfer[ing]
our mental discourse into verbal.” (L 19) But whereas the particularistic nature of
perception enables us to form fallible predictions about the future by using the faculty of
prudence, the use of marks as general terms that refer to universals provides us with the
means to make use of a more reliable faculty, that of reason, thus moving towards
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science. (L 14-15, 37) It is here that the problem emerges. Hobbes offers a mechanistic
understanding of perception, thus reducing the causes of perception to motions in the
body. (L 1-2) Moreover, his commitment to understanding reality strictly in terms of
matter and motion entails a recognition that properties arising in perception do not belong
to the objects themselves. However, perceptions of these properties are retained in the
imagination, which Hobbes identifies as “decaying sense.” (L 4) These decayed
impressions develop into a train of thought, or a mental discourse that ultimately is
transformed into verbal discourse with the acquisition of speech. (L 13-14, 19-20)
Accordingly, by treating the residue of perceptions as referents, we posit universals that
are then employed by rational syllogisms. Yet, as a nominalist, Hobbes considers
universals to be nothing but “one name to many things” and is committed to their mere
linguistic role while recognizing the metaphysical existence of their particular referents
only. (EL 22) Reasoning about the properties of objects thus becomes illusory. How? On
the one hand, Hobbes’s nominalism precludes the metaphysical existence of universals
pertaining to those properties. On the other hand, these properties are also not instantiated
in nature, since they are only phenomenal, or “phantasms”, and do not belong to material
objects. The question that follows concerns how reasoning in terms of universals is able
to unpack representational content in order to arrive at knowledge of the world
metaphysically. If reasoning depends on notions derived merely from phenomenal
properties, then knowledge appears to be limited to our phenomenal experience.
Hobbes’s commitment, however, to the claim that the real world consists of matter in
motion raises the question of how we arrive at such speculative conclusions beginning
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from our own experience.103
If this first argument casts doubt on the notion that Hobbes is committed to the
idea that we have a capacity to produce an accurate representation of the world, an even
more palpable problem can be identified with a main tool of speech, according to
Hobbes: definitions. In Leviathan, Hobbes repeatedly emphasizes the need for having
precise definitions that constitute a sound basis for our conclusions. (L 23-24, 33) Yet,
Hobbes still maintains terms are arbitrarily assigned. This is why Nicholas Dungey
argues that Hobbes is “skeptical of the traditional claim that reason provides access to …
reality”.104 Given that words are fixed conventionally and do not necessarily reflect the
world, Hobbes appears to be committed to a skeptical position as opposed to a
metaphysical view. In fact, this charge had already been raised by Leibniz, who accuses
Hobbes of being a “super-nominalist”, since for him “truth allegedly depends on the
definitions of terms, and definitions depend on the human will.”105 In addition, Hobbes
maintains that truth and falsity only pertain to speech and its rules, suggesting that truth
depends on our definitions of terms as opposed to the relation of judgments to the real
world. (L 23) This has led Michael Oakeshott to argue that Hobbes is committed to a
skeptical doctrine, where knowledge in Hobbes’s view does not refer to the world.106
The problem is further complicated once we examine Hobbes’s conception of
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adequate definitions. If Dungey and Oakeshott are right in maintaining that definitions
follow from common notions and thus remain a problem for any reading of Hobbes as a
metaphysical realist, this raises the question of identifying a precise starting point, or the
simplest definitions. While dealing with this issue, Hobbes maintains that he does not
need to, and in principle cannot, provide a justification for recognizing motion to be the
highest universal. In fact, Hobbes argues that treating motion as the basic universal
cannot be disputed and should be regarded as self-evident as definitions “are known by
nature… [and] need no demonstration.” (DCo 80-81) In De Corpore Hobbes states
…it is not necessary to dispute whether definitions are to be admitted or no. For
when a master is instructing his scholar, if the scholar understand all the parts of
the thing defined, which are resolved in the definitions, and yet will not admit of
the definition, there needs no further controversy betwixt them, it being all one as
if he refused to be taught. But if he understand nothing, then certainly the
definition is faulty. (DCo 84)
In other words, a definition of a universal name is adequate as long as its components are
unequivocal and thus sufficiently clear. But apart from this, Hobbes does not provide the
means to distinguish good from bad definitions, or why we should accept one set of
definitions over another. Looking at Hobbes’s dispute with Descartes over the nature of
substance may be helpful here. Hobbes and Descartes, though in agreement when it
comes to the basic constituents of the physical world, were led to different conclusions as
to the nature of substance. Hobbes treats substance as synonymous with body, while
Descartes argues for the existence of incorporeal substances. (L 27) In the Third Set of
Objections to the Meditations, Hobbes argues that we can only understand an entity
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performing an act, even that of thinking, if it is a body.107 Yet, this argument is only valid
if we already presuppose that substances must be bodies. Consequently, Hobbes doesn’t
give an explicit argument against Descartes’s position without presupposing the truth of
his conception of substance, though he leaves some room for speculation.108 At best, the
argument that Hobbes can give against Descartes is one that argues that his model is able
to explain mental properties materially. If Hobbes intended to use such a line of
argument, he may have been right about his conclusions, but his argument is certainly
flawed, as numerous difficulties afflict his account. Of course, explanatory power need
not necessarily convince the Cartesian, who may still take issue with presupposing the
existence of one type of substance. As such, the disagreement boils down to the
definitions at hand, and although Hobbes claims that definitions need no demonstration
and follow common notions, he still seems to conveniently define terms in a manner that
would lead to the conclusions he intended to defend. As Pettit notes, however, Hobbes
often redefined terms under the pretext of correcting earlier authors. This, however, has
led several of Hobbes’s contemporaries to complain that such definitions become foreign,
therefore violating the claim to commonality.109
Finally, a skeptical reading of Hobbes is rendered even more complete with
another argument pertaining to the nature of causal knowledge. An account of causation
for Hobbes only gives us hypothetical knowledge and does not introduce certainty. (L 71)
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In fact, knowledge of causes is always of the form “if X occurs, then Y.” But whether X
occurs or not remains questionable. Now Hobbes supplements this position with the
claim that sensory experience provides us with certainty. Accordingly, the natural science
we develop (science understood in the Hobbesian sense as the “knowledge of
consequences”), is transformed into actual certainty with the addition of sense perception
confirming the occurrence of particular events. (L 35) But given the phenomenal nature
of sensory perception, since the contents of experience do not provide us with direct
knowledge of the world, it remains unclear how we can arrive at certainty through causal
knowledge by reasoning about strictly phenomenal properties.
This line of argument is supplemented by a Straussian reading arguing that
Hobbes eventually yields to being a “methodical materialist” as opposed to a
“metaphysical materialist”.110 For Strauss, Hobbes is committed to the view that all
knowledge we have of the world is constructed conventionally. In order to circumvent
endorsing a non-teleological view of the world that collapses into arbitrariness, geometry
for Hobbes plays the role of introducing order into physics, without assuming the
existence of final causes. For Strauss, this move serves the purpose of avoiding the
arbitrary ancient atomist model that precludes physics, but it also provides us with
knowledge we construct, for that is the only kind of knowledge of which we can be
certain.111 Two implications follow. On the one hand, the world remains unintelligible,
and apart from geometry or politics, which are constructed by us, any science we develop
can be hypothetical at best. Hypothetical knowledge, however, is insufficient to ground
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the science of politics that Hobbes intends to put forward. On the other hand, the
conventionality of our scientific understanding of the world has the advantage of bringing
it closer to mathematics. Knowledge of the world then becomes constructed by us, and
consequently open to certainty.112
Strauss complements this argument for Hobbes’s methodological materialism by
replacing the metaphysical basis of Hobbes’s view with a moral one. In The Political
Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss argues that an adequate reading of Hobbes’s views cannot
be limited to the account he expounds in Leviathan. Strauss contends that a careful
reading of the Elements of Law and De Homine uncovers a debt to Artistotleanism that
Hobbes comes to uproot from the foundations of his later works.113 With the aim of
diminishing the role of the geometric method in Hobbes, Strauss introduces a reading that
focuses on the influence of Aristotle and Thucydides as opposed to Galileo and Euclid.
Strauss claims that method not only had a minimal role in the political conclusions at
which Hobbes arrives, but is also at odds with them. In effect, the clearly laid out
geometric approach Hobbes comes to adopt in Leviathan is relegated to a secondary
role.114 As such, Hobbes’s new political science should be understood to be grounded
morally as opposed to naturally, for only on such a basis can Hobbes’s view become
normatively pertinent.115
Such normative content cannot arise from a materialist-naturalistic description of
human nature, but requires that Hobbes already recognizes some passions as conducive
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for the well-being of human beings, while seeing others as destructive and sources of
conflict. For Strauss, Hobbes was aware that the right social order cannot be realized
unless we can scientifically identify it along with the conditions for bringing it about. But
a non-teleological natural law is not committed to the natural end of humans as rational
and social, and thus must be deduced from realism instead, from how we actually lead
our lives. But what is common to humans cannot be reason, but is rather passions, and it
is from there that we must derive natural laws. For Strauss then, the fear of violent death
at the hands of others is the most powerful passion which is linked to the most natural
desire, that of self-preservation.116 Consequently, the Straussian reading locates the moral
basis in a normative evaluation of the passions. The fear of violent death is the passion to
be reckoned upon to arrive at peace with the aid of reason, whereas vainglory produces
conflict. Through introducing an analysis of the passions, Hobbes thus is able to make
explicit the end of the state, not through a teleological natural understanding, but by
introducing an artificial science that finds its ends in a traditional moral understanding.
One consequence of this reading of Hobbes is that it overturns the order of
dependence between Hobbes’s metaphysical materialism and his political philosophy.
Instead of conceiving of politics as grounded in an understanding of nature, Strauss
argues that Hobbes is only warranted to contend that knowledge of the world serves the
purpose of corroborating the conclusions Hobbes derives politically. On the one hand,
supposing that the world consists of matter in motion is a move that reduces nature to
mathematical principles, and thus provides us with a hypothetical framework. But this
simultaneously opens up the space for freely constructing our understanding of nature
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artificially without being limited by a metaphysically real view of nature. Consequently,
the control of nature stems precisely from its unintelligibility. Knowledge, artificially
constructed, becomes unlimited.117
Definitions and Method
Responding to these arguments for reading Hobbes as a skeptic necessitates
engaging with Hobbes’s method when it comes to introducing definitions. Hobbes seems
to anchor knowledge in speech, which is itself based on phenomenal experience. In
addition, Hobbes’s claim that definitions are based on agreement and are adequate as
long as they are unequivocal and clear suggests that definitions elude rigorous
examination as they are the product of mere convention. At the same time, Hobbes
maintains that it is necessary to correct the inadequate definitions of earlier authors, and
thus implicitly endorses a criterion by which one may judge some definitions to be
adequate, while taking others to lead to “false and senseless tenets”. (L 24)
How are we then to understand definitions for Hobbes, and why are we to accept
their indisputable nature? In De Corpore, Hobbes identifies the cause of all universal
things as motion, while arguing that the highest universals cannot be demonstrated. (DCo
69-70) Interestingly, Hobbes makes this reference while putting forward his view of
definitions. In fact, a definition for Hobbes must include the causes of the notion in
question, which can be identified according to his method of composition and resolution.
(DCo 82) As such, we begin by “resolving” a particular name into its universal parts, thus
abstracting from sensory experience in order to arrive at its basic constituents. (DCo 83)
Reason plays a crucial role in such a method as it serves to either derive causes from
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effects or effects from causes, while functioning as the faculty of “reckoning” for the
purpose of constituting analytic and synthetic knowledge.
On the one hand, abstracting from particulars of experience to universals involves
analysis, or what Hobbes calls alternatively “resolution” into the basic terms and
components. This resolutive aspect can be applied to arrive at the most basic universal
unit, that of motions. Through analysis, we are able to recognize that motion is at the
heart of all material phenomena. The other function reason attains is synthetic, as it
serves to “add” and “subtract” motions in order to derive the respective effects that
follow from each combination. Accordingly, reason now plays a synthetic role, or fulfills
a “compositive” function that leads it to form conclusions about the effects of specific
combinations of motions. Whereas analysis serves the purpose of deriving causes from
effects, synthesis, through a clear application of reason’s function as reckoning,
introduces the effects that follow from causes. A clear example of this method is the
synthetic account of the passions Hobbes invokes, as it seeks to identify effects following
from different combinations of passions, each of which can be reduced to motions.
Furthermore, definitions under Hobbes’s view also entail a strictly corporeal
understanding of reality. In contrast to traditional Euclidean geometry, Douglas Jesseph
argues convincingly that Hobbes’s method aimed at producing a geometry that
introduced corporeality and causality into its basic components. Jesseph points this out
through tracing how Hobbes redefines geometric notions such as point, line, and circle to
include both their causes and their material manifestation.118 To recognize this as a mark
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of a legitimate definition already has several implications.
First, under this view, Hobbes offered a standard for determining the legitimacy
of definitions. Definitions that do not fully entail the basic universal constituents remain
lacking, and cannot properly ground knowledge. This clarifies why Hobbes argues that
definitions cannot be disputed. To say a definition is self-evident and not subject to
dispute must follow from resolving the term into its universal components through an
analytic operation. This analytic process remains immune to criticism as it follows
straightforwardly from the terms being examined. Importantly, however, without relying
on such a rigorous method, Hobbes cannot maintain the superiority of his position over
others. It is noteworthy that including motion as a universal term in the definition for
Hobbes also entails including causes. For instance, in De Corpore, Hobbes contends that
a line should be understood as the “motion of a point” and a surface as the “motion of a
line.” (DCo 70-71)
Second, recognizing the causal nature of definitions helps clarify in what sense
truth and falsity belong to speech. In Leviathan, Hobbes contends that “[n]atural sense
and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound
in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.” (L
25) Hobbes follows Descartes’s position that sensory experience, or the seeming of
perception, is incorrigible. Thus, our experience of the world cannot itself be subject to
truth and falsity. Yet, as Hobbes clearly states in Leviathan, discursive judgments are
corrigible and error could result out of a number of matters. (L 33-35) The first cause of
absurdity pertains to definitions, requiring that words be consistently fixed to their
referents. Consequently, violating the conditions of proper definitions also involves
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relying on ones that are not causal in nature and do not follow Hobbes’s method.
Although this criterion allows us to distinguish good definitions from bad ones, it
still does not entirely permit Hobbes to avoid the arbitrariness charge raised by Leibniz.
In his objections to Descartes’s Meditations, Hobbes states
Now, what shall we say if it turns out that reasoning is simply the joining together
and linking of names or labels by means of the verb ‘is’? It would follow that the
inferences in our reasoning tell us nothing at all about the nature of things, but merely
tell us about the labels applied to them; that is, all we can infer is whether or not we
are combining the names of things in accordance with the arbitrary conventions
which we have laid down in respect of their meaning. If this is so, as may well be the
case, reasoning will depend on names, names will depend on the imagination, and
imagination will depend (as I believe it does) merely on the motions of our bodily
organs; and so the mind will be nothing more than motion occurring in various parts
of an organic body.119
This passage appears to entail a commitment to two contradictory views. On the one
hand, Hobbes seems to reject the Cartesian faith in reason’s capacity to unlock our
representations of the world, and thus have an understanding of reality. However, the
conclusion that Hobbes derives from this passage is not a skepticism that treats the world
as inaccessible, but rather the position that the faculties of our mind are arbitrary effects
of motions within the body. Accordingly, Hobbes derives a metaphysical conclusion
about reality as an outcome of rejecting the Cartesian position. This suggests that Hobbes
is not arguing against Descartes’s view that we can know reality per se, but rather what
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Hobbes does not accept here is the idea of an immaterial Cartesian subject that possesses
a pre-discursive rational capacity. Reason, instead, is merely the “linking of names … by
means of the word ‘is’,” or to invoke a term Hobbes uses in Leviathan, reason is
reckoning. Consequently, our arguments inform us about the universal terms we use and
not about the world, which means the operations of reason depend on speech, which for
Hobbes is a capacity that can be traced back to the imagination and perception
understood in terms of motions in the body, and ultimately to the motions in the world
that cause them.
This does not mean that Hobbes renders knowledge about the world impossible.
For if reason is in fact about words, then the correspondence between science and the
world will be less the product of rational thought, and more the outcome of correct
designations of terms. Only once we have correct definitions can we put forward a
science that unfolds synthetically. Of course, as Hobbes maintains, causal knowledge is
only hypothetical, which is why unlike geometry, physics is an a posteriori science
where causes must be corroborated through sensory experience.120
Third, instituting a geometric method that is grounded on the knowledge of
causes, which in turn is based on the resolution of particulars into their basic universals,
enables us to more clearly grasp Hobbes’s commitment to metaphysical materialism.
Hobbes introduced a materialistic geometry with the aim of fusing together the rigor of
geometry along with a causal and material understanding of reality. As such, his method
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As I maintain in the next section, Hobbes’s claim that politics, alongside geometry, is
an a priori science should be understood in terms of pursuing a clear geometric method
that relies on definitions. For Hobbes, like geometry, politics is a science that is
completely constructed by us, though it depends primarily on the kind of beings we are,
i.e. susceptible to being affected by the world.
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attempts to structure our experience of the world geometrically, but primarily through
introducing the causal nature of the world of experience into the neat demonstrative
structure of geometry. In De Corpore, Hobbes argues that definitions must include causes
because, “the end of science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of things;
which if they be not in the definitions, they cannot be found in the conclusion of the first
syllogism.” (DCo 82) Thus, Hobbes attempts to apply what he takes to be the only
science, that of geometry, to the world. But in order to do this, our experience of the
world must also be brought into geometry. Accordingly, since science is the “knowledge
of consequences”, geometry itself must be transformed. As Jesseph maintains, Hobbes’s
commitment to materialism leads him to redefine geometric terms to be corporeal, as that
transforms geometry more clearly into a corporeal science where definitions express
“causes by which geometric objects are generated.”121
Whether Hobbes is correct in considering that his view will lead to uncovering the
geometric understanding of the world is not at issue here. What emerges out of this
picture is that Hobbes truly considered that such a view would lead to putting forward a
metaphysically accurate account of nature. Of course, it would be anachronistic to ascribe
to Hobbes the strict division between knowledge gained by reason and that of experience
(or relations of ideas and matters of fact as Hume terms them).122 Similarly, in a preKantian era, it would be reasonable to ascribe to Hobbes the view that we could unravel
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the mysteries of the world through a rigorous methodical structuring of knowledge.
This understanding of Hobbes also allows us to revisit and respond to some of the
skeptical readings introduced in the first part of the chapter. To begin with, Hobbes
indeed does take the terms developed through speech to follow from phenomenal
properties. However, Hobbes still recognizes that it is our task to restructure the tools of
speech in a manner that would make possible the building of a well-grounded edifice of
knowledge. This restructuring occurs by introducing definitions that adequately account
for the causes of things derived analytically. Consequently, science for Hobbes involves
primarily a refinement of language to adequately mirror causal relations.
It follows from this that although these definitions initially emerge from common
notions based on shared sensory experiences, this does not entail their straightforward
soundness. Instead, they should be constantly subject to revision if a science of nature is
to emerge. The conventionality of meaning, therefore, does not preclude its development
into a precise language that directly mirrors phenomenal properties and indirectly their
presumed physical counterparts. As Pettit notes, the connection between words for
Hobbes has to make sense in the world, otherwise, we are merely left with incoherent
notions.123 In order to guarantee that sentences are relevant to our world of experience,
Hobbes’s solution is to ensure that definitions already entail in them the causal structure
we find in the material world.
Reading Hobbes as a metaphysical materialist also provides a further advantage
over the Straussian reading. Strauss argued that Hobbes took his materialism to be a
freely constructed edifice that orders our knowledge derived from a world that remains
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inaccessible. For Strauss, Hobbes’s materialism serves the purpose of verifying the
political conclusions he reaches from a normative analysis of the passions. But this also
provides the means for arriving at certain knowledge, as long as knowledge is limited to
coherence. Yet, if this is indeed Hobbes’s view, it becomes difficult to argue for the
legitimacy of his position over others. In other words, if Hobbes is merely concerned with
coherence as a product of the definitions with which he begins, Hobbes can no longer
reject other definitions and the respective views that emerge based on them. Hobbes’s
understanding of the world becomes as good as any other, and is thus less the product of
a rigorous approach, and more the product of deciding what to begin with as definitions.
The alternative I suggest is to recognize Hobbes truly as a metaphysical materialist who
opted to erect his political philosophy on an analysis of how our bodies are affected by
the world and what impact this leaves on our natural faculties and passions. Such a body
of knowledge could only be constituted once a method has been applied, and upon
linking the abstract geometric method to a concrete corporeal world governed by the laws
of causality.124 But if we are to accept this reading, the question emerges as to how we
are to understand Hobbes’s use of the state of nature and the contract that initiates the
transition towards the civil state. In the next section, I turn to this problem.
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For Hobbes, linking the phenomenal properties we experience and the corporeal world
involves recognizing that phenomenal properties are reducible to motions in the body.
This follows the Galilean argument for understanding phenomenal properties in terms of
the motions that cause them. Making the argument more cogent requires clarifying the
role of conatus in such motions for Hobbes, which I will be discussing in the next
chapter. But if we accept that phenomenal properties are reducible to motion, we can
introduce those motions as the causes of such phenomenal properties in the definitions,
which allows us to analytically arrive at matter in motion as basic universals.
95

State of Nature as Universal Condition
In the previous section, I argued that Hobbes’s metaphysical view is grounded
primarily in his method. This grounding occurs on two levels: first in introducing
material definitions that have causal significance, and second in arriving at causes
analytically. The question that follows is how we are to understand Hobbes’s civil
philosophy in relation to his metaphysics, and what status we should attribute to the state
of nature and contract under this reading of Hobbes.
One problem that can be pointed out immediately if we focus on method is that
Hobbes initially appears to recognize the possibility of developing a political position
based on experience without recourse to rational argumentation. While justifying the
publication of De Cive before its prerequisites De Corpore and De Homine, Hobbes
states, “[t]herefore it happens, that what was last in order, is yet come forth first in time.
And the rather, because I saw that, grounded on its own principles sufficiently known by
experience, it would not stand in need of the former sections.” (DC xx) The adequacy of
experience to put forward an account of civil philosophy is reiterated in De Corpore.
Whereas geometry and physics require that we proceed from analyzing sensory
experience into its basic universals, and then synthetically composing through definitions
the terms of the two sciences, Hobbes contends, “Civil and moral philosophy do not so
adhere to one another, but that they may be severed.” (DCo 73) He then delineates two
ways to arrive at the principles of politics. The first proceeds synthetically starting from
the conclusions established in physics. We can then develop a view of the passions as
motions in order to arrive at a geometric understanding of the development of the
commonwealth. The second begins with reflecting on one’s own experience of the
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passions. While we do not have direct access to the world, and thus are only able to form
an understanding beginning from sensory experience, we can directly reflect on our
passions. This introspection allows us to recognize that those passions are shared by
others, and through analytically resolving the passions and political concepts, we can
arrive at the conclusion “that the appetites of men and the passions of their minds are
such, that, unless they be restrained by some power, they will always be making war
upon one another.” (DCo 74)
The role Hobbes attributes to experience, however, seems to waver between one
that is reliable and another that is not. In De Cive, for instance, Hobbes trusts that
experience can reliably lead to the same conclusions as reason, but this view changes in
Leviathan. In De Cive, Hobbes does not invoke the distinction between reason and
prudence, one that unfolds later in the account of human nature he puts forward in the
first part of Leviathan. The view he introduces in De Cive, consequently, omits any
discussion of the role of prudence in the condition of war we find in the state of nature.
War erupts as a result of a natural equality of power on the one hand, and a “willingness
to hurt” on the other. (DC 6) This equality of power indicates that there can be no winner
in this war, and therefore, it will be perpetual unless an agreement is reached. (DC 12)
The account of war we find in Leviathan is marked by several significant
differences. First, though Hobbes maintains the condition of equality of physical strength,
equality is also manifested in prudence and in our equal hope in attaining the objects of
desire. This triggers the appearance of the causes of war, primarily competition,
diffidence, and glory. The role of prudence, however, is essential to understand how
conflict arises, for it is our confidence in our own prudential capacities that allows us to
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have hope. For Hobbes, whereas science develops out of reason, prudence is the outcome
of experience and is to be understood as foresight in predicting consequences. Prudence
on its own, however, cannot lead us away from the state of war towards a stable society.
Instead, prudence appears to contribute to the intensification of the passions of glory and
vainglory.125 Hobbes’s account of the passions clearly shows this connection. Both glory
and vainglory are defined in relation to joy, which itself is the product of the
“expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequences of things,” a
foresight that is developed through experience and thus identified with prudence. (L 43)
Consequently, a prudential consideration of our condition in the state of nature cannot
lead to arriving at an agreement, but appears to maintain a condition of war.
This difference in position has led to one crucial change in the arguments offered
concerning the state of nature. Whereas in De Cive, the argument for the condition of war
is based on experience as Hobbes professes in the Preface, we find two arguments in
Leviathan running in parallel. Hobbes begins with an argument from inference, where he
arrives at conclusions based on the definitions he initially puts forward in his account of
the human passions, which are thus grounded in the commitment to the geometric form.
Hobbes, then, supplements his position with the same conclusion “confirmed by
experience” through offering several examples indicating that a state of war would ensue
in the absence of a civil state. (L 113-14) Given Hobbes’s claims about prudence, an
argument from experience is not treated as sufficient and should be understood to serve
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as additional corroboration to the main argument arising out of a rational demonstration
proceeding from the geometric method.126
Now, if we are to attribute to Hobbes a consistent view, then we must recognize
that experience cannot be fully relied upon. In fact, Hobbes argues that even the most
experienced will not be able to predict the future with sufficient certainty, and prudence
will often be a “fallacious” faculty. (L 15) Prudence is a capacity we share with animals
and will only provide us with limited foresight. In contrast, reason allows us to discern
the correct conclusions with certainty, for it is “the pace, increase of science, the way;
and the benefit of mankind; the end.” (L 36-37) This reading of Hobbes, moreover, need
not conflict with his argument in De Corpore. For while experience may provide us with
some insight concerning how we are to proceed in building a commonwealth, it still falls
short from the certainty of reasoning through universals.127
If experience cannot offer sufficient grounds for the political position Hobbes
wants to put forward, and if the state of nature is not to be understood as a generalization
based on experience, how should we understand it then? As we saw in chapter one,
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Rawls rejects a historical reading in favor of a hypothetical one.128 The straightforward
dominant readings of the state of nature have attributed to it either a historical status or a
hypothetical one. Whereas the historical reading has been widely discredited, most
clearly with Hume’s critique of the “original contract”, the hypothetical interpretation
still acquires some force. Under this view, Hobbes’s state of nature is a hypothetical state,
or a thought experiment, that helps us recognize the kind of state and laws we would
agree upon in order to end the condition of hypothetical war. Importantly, this reading
does not suggest Hobbes is concerned with an ideal political theory, for he still bases his
position on a realist understanding of humans, namely as beings disposed to war due to
the operation of a complex network of passions. The non-ideality of Hobbes’s position
constitutes a convergence with the view Foucault introduces as I will argue in chapter
five.
Though there seems to be textual evidence for the hypothetical reading, Hobbes
also wavers on the status of the state of nature between De Cive and the Latin and
English editions of Leviathan. In De Cive, Hobbes offers examples to clarify his notion of
the state of nature suggesting that it has been historically overcome by a number of states
while others remain in a state of perpetual war. This gives credence to a problematic
historical reading of the state of nature. (DC 12) On the other hand, the view espoused in
Leviathan appears to be different and inconsistent between the two editions. The English
edition of Leviathan published in 1651 suggests that the described state of war never
existed, though we do have some examples that come close, while states contemporary to
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Hobbes’s time are always disposed to war. The Latin edition, on the other hand, responds
to the question of the existence of the state of nature by putting forth the example of Cain
and Abel as a clear ‘historical’ instance. This last example should strike the reader as
strange, as it doesn’t clearly show Hobbes’s intent behind introducing a state of war. Yet,
Helen Thornton provides an interesting reading and argues convincingly that the example
of the state of nature Hobbes employs in the Latin edition has a rhetorical aim of
convincing readers that fear of God on its own is insufficient for maintaining peace, and
thus fear of a sovereign is also a requirement.129 This seems likely given the development
of Hobbes’s gradual conviction in the significance and necessity of making use of
rhetorical methods.130
But even if we take Hobbes’s view in the English edition of Leviathan to be the
most consistent one, there are other problems that follow from a hypothetical
understanding of the state of nature. These difficulties arise mainly from the normative
consequences that Hobbes derives from the contract developing out of the state of nature.
For instance, Ronald Dworkin shows that though hypothetical contracts offer good
reasons for political obligation, they still cannot bind individuals, as they do not entail
actual consent.131 This applies to Hobbes as well, for if we maintain Hobbes’s position
that obligations can only arise out of one’s own acts, the contract itself cannot be merely
hypothetical. As Jonathan Wolff argues, a “hypothetical contract is not strong enough to
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show that every citizen has created his or her obligations by individual acts.”132
In other words, for Hobbes’s view to entail a binding contract, the laws of nature
must arise out of agreement, and cannot be justified either on strictly rational grounds or
through utilitarian considerations.133 As Hume noted, a utilitarian justification of the laws
of nature would render agreement superfluous, and thus a contract would no longer be
necessary. The problem is even more complicated since Hobbes recognizes that if
individuals do not agree to the contract, they may need to be forced to consent, rendering
consent unnecessary. (L 162-63)
A similar problem arises if we justify the laws of nature rationally, for that would
commit Hobbes to an ideal political theory that may not be practically pertinent. A
proponent of this position might claim that though the contract has never actually
occurred, its dictates should be binding because they are rational, for those are the
conditions that would stave off the condition of war and ensure self-preservation. In other
words, individuals would agree to them if they found themselves in the state of nature.
The parallel between such a view and the one Rawls introduces in A Theory of Justice
should be clear, where rational and reasonable individuals would agree to the principles
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of justice under the hypothetical veil of ignorance. This argument shifts the focus away
from how binding an agreement is, given that such an agreement is only hypothetical.
The relevant question becomes to what extent would individuals be committed to rational
dictates. Though this is a compelling line of argument, the problem is that Hobbes
himself would not have approved of it, as he realized how often people behave
irrationally. Hobbes, therefore, could not have adopted this argument for accepting
natural laws. As Strauss notes, the account of the passions Hobbes introduced was for the
purpose of presenting a political doctrine that would be applicable, beginning from a
feature we all share, acting in accordance with passions.134 In fact, Skinner convincingly
argues that Hobbes recognized the need to include rhetorical force in his later works, due
to his conviction that most individuals will not behave rationally.
Accordingly, Wolff argues that maintaining some degree of consistency requires
that Hobbes retains elements of both the historical and hypothetical readings. Whereas
the historical reading guarantees that we actually do consent, and thus are bound to the
natural laws, the hypothetical view acquires the advantage of convincing us of the
rationality of accepting the contract.135 This view of the state of nature, however,
conflates the question of legitimacy with that of the conditions of the formation of the
state. For Wolff, Hobbes appears to give one answer to both questions, but the distinction
requires questioning the validity of social contract theories in general to derive political
conclusions.136
Pettit offers a third alternative to both positions, arguing that the social contract
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serves the role of demonstrating what kind of characteristics we find in a commonwealth.
In other words, Hobbes’s account shows us the nature of a commonwealth.
Consequently, the main point is not to put forward an ethical imperative, which is what
we get on the hypothetical reading, for the ethical claim follows as a result of putting our
understanding of commonwealths into practice.137
Pettit is certainly correct about accepting this interpretation, for Hobbes explicitly
intends to put forward an account that clarifies the nature of a commonwealth through
resolving it into its basic components. (DC xiv) However, under Pettit's reading, Hobbes
is no longer concerned with whether his political theory can be applied or not, but rather
is introducing an ideal account of the state. Thus, Petit is unable to incorporate the type of
political realism I have argued we find in Hobbes. Moreover, if Hobbes's view is to be
reduced to a definition of the commonwealth, it becomes difficult to derive normative
force from it. Pettit's view, moreover, does not clarify why it is that Hobbes uses the
language of consent, or how we should understand agreement to the contract.
Pettit, however, is correct in shedding light on the analytic components of the
commonwealth in Hobbes's account. If we are to take Hobbes's commitment to both the
geometric method and nominalism seriously, we would have to recognize that the "state
of nature" first, is a universal term that plays a role in Hobbes's view, and second, that it
derives its meaning, not from the mental images to which it refers, but rather from the
universal components that comprise it. As I argued, Hobbes takes his method to be
necessary for introducing any science, for without starting with causal definitions, we
cannot move towards rational knowledge. Consequently, the state of nature, as a
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universal, is a term used by reason for the purpose of advancing Hobbes's science of
politics.
How, then, can we maintain simultaneously the two conditions that consent be
actual and that it be rationally compelling? I suggest that we can understand Hobbes's
position as both historical and hypothetical. To say that the state of nature is instantiated
historically is to contend that approximations of the condition of war Hobbes described
have been present. Given Hobbes's definition of war in Leviathan as an "inclination" to
violence rather than an actual condition of battle, it is easy to find historical analogues for
it. In fact, Behemoth offers a clear illustration of a particular case of the state of nature in
England. Hobbes offers an analysis of how the civil war came to be as a result of the
passions of ambition, pride, and glory. (B 192-93, 230, 275) This state finally developed
into a condition of war similar to the one Hobbes had already characterized in Leviathan,
where “though it were a war before, yet there was no blood shed; they shot at one another
nothing but paper.” (B 298) The historical reading can then be complemented, following
Pettit, with reading Hobbes as offering an account of what a (hypothetical)
commonwealth entails. This involves putting forward the rational requirements for
moving beyond the state of war.138
Of course, arguing that the state of nature is historically instantiated raises the
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question of how we should understand agreement in relation to historical events.
Hobbes’s use of the language of consent remains puzzling as he does not seem to
consider actual consent to be of much value given that he has a very broad conception of
what it entails. For example, in addition to sovereignty by institution and the obvious role
consent plays in its formation, Hobbes claims that sovereignty by acquisition or conquest
is also a legitimate form of government and, more crucially, that it follows from consent
as well. Just as fear of death does not render consent void in the case of sovereignty by
institution, consent arising out of fear of death arising from conquest is likewise
legitimate. (L 126-27, 185) Hobbes justifies this broad conception of consent by deriving
it from a more basic mechanistic view of how we act voluntarily. Voluntary action for
Hobbes is “that which proceedeth from the will, and no other,” where the will is simply
considered to be the “last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to
the omission thereof.” (L 48) Hobbes concludes that actions resulting from pride and
ambition as well as those that arise from fear are all voluntary. (L 49) These voluntary
acts, which are the product of appetite or aversion, are the precondition for renouncing or
transferring right in sovereignty by institution. (L 119-20) Similarly, in the case of
acquisition, voluntary acts motivated by fear also leads to transferring right to the
sovereign. Ultimately, the notion of consent with which Dworkin and Wolff are
concerned is indistinguishable for Hobbes from the act of transferring one’s rights due to
conquest.139 Consequently, Hobbes argues that “it is not therefore the victory, that giveth
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the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.” (L 189)
There are several reasons why Hobbes may resort to agreement as a precondition
for the appearance of political power. It is, first, important to recognize that Hobbes took
himself to be resolving a metaphysical problem of deriving political power from the
power of citizens. Hobbes attempted to bridge the gap between physical power (potentia)
and juridical power (potestas) and thus to reduce one to the other.140 Hobbes’s answer as
to how the power of the multitude could be transferred to the sovereign was to invoke
consent as the condition for the transfer of power and relinquishing freedom. As Skinner
notes, Hobbes was concerned with putting forward an account of sovereignty that does
not reduce subjects to slaves. Accordingly, we can only give away our liberty by an act of
our own, or by consent, though this only requires a conception of freedom as the absence
of physical impediments.141 This significantly weakens Hobbes’s view of what agreement
entails, as is most clearly exemplified by sovereignty that is the product of conquest.
Whether we truly consent to abide by the laws of the state out of reflection, or because
we have been conquered, our consent is equally binding. For Hobbes, it is ultimately due
to the fear of death that we consent in both cases. Yet, whether our consent is obtained
under conditions of conquest or within the state of war in a state of nature, the outcome is
the same.
But there are also other rhetorical purposes for being committed to the entire
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contractual discourse. As Joanne Wright argues, Hobbes engaged the discourse of origins
that was present around his time. In its many forms, whether that of the original contract
of the Levellers, those tracing back legitimacy to an ancient constitution, or identifying
the legitimacy of monarchy in its divine origin, the discourse of origins identified
legitimacy with a Golden Age that either must be retrieved, or gives us the conditions for
what counts as legitimate power. In another instance of transforming common notions,
Hobbes adopts this discourse of origins, without endorsing the elevated status it gives to
the origin. In fact, the historical origin in Hobbes’s story is that of war, one that must be
overcome if we are to attain a commodious living.142 This position allows us to draw a
link with the argument Foucault presents in Society Must be Defended. In chapter two, I
maintained that Foucault’s notion of power modeled on war responds to attempts to
locate the origin of the state in contract. Foucault, therefore, sets aside the question of
origins and develops instead an analysis of how political power functions. But under this
reading, Hobbes’s use of consent does not attempt to identify legitimacy with the origin
of the state in the state of nature, but rather moves away from such destructive origins
towards a more constructive understanding of how political power can be conceived
within the confines of a state. This political origin, for Hobbes then, does not introduce a
normative ideal which we should aspire to reach.
Finally, this broad understanding of consent as legitimizing rule is not unique to
Hobbes. In fact, we already see it early on with the French Jurist Étienne de La Boétie. La
Boétie had argued that oppression can only succeed due to the inactivity of citizens. The
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fact that citizens do not resist, which for La Boétie should take a nonviolent form,
explains how the ruler maintains power. Consequently, being actively involved in
opposing the dictatorship is a requirement for throwing off the shackles of voluntary
servitude.143 We find a similar argument in Hobbes, but one that is incorporated into his
view of legitimacy. Whereas La Boétie aimed at shedding light on a precondition for
moving beyond totalitarianism, Hobbes argues that the lack of opposition not only allows
the persistence of the current rule, but also bestows legitimacy upon it. The absence of
consent, therefore, can only be identified with an active rejection of the terms of the
agreement.
Conclusions
I have argued in this chapter that Hobbes’s politics is best understood as one that
emerges out of his metaphysical materialism. Following my argument in chapter two, this
material understanding of politics, renders his position compatible with the one Foucault
puts forward. Whereas Foucault introduces a political analysis that begins by recognizing
the inequality inherent in political relations, Hobbes’s starting point is the condition of
equality he finds in the state of nature from which he derives an argument for a state of
war. Under this reading, whereas Foucault can provide an analysis of how subjectivity is
constituted as a result of the material operation of power coupled with claims to
knowledge, Hobbes is able to offer promising normative conclusions that follow from the
desire to avoid death.
I’ve maintained that understanding Hobbes’s politics materially requires that we
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recognize the centrality of the method he uses. I have argued that Hobbes can maintain
the superiority of his position over others only if we emphasize his version of the
geometric method. This would first allow us to reject all skeptical readings of Hobbes
and shed light on his commitment to metaphysical realism. More importantly, it shows
that his political view is not only grounded in his materialism, but also in the method he
employs to develop his conclusions. The implications of this reading is that we can now
understand what Hobbes took the state of nature to be, namely a universal construct that
is subjected to the operations of reason to introduce a science of politics. Yet, this allows
Hobbes to maintain a consistent reading throughout all different works, for nothing
precludes the historical existence of the state of nature as a state of war, while providing
force through offering a rational justification for moving beyond it. Hobbes
simultaneously can maintain that agreement itself can be historical, for contract arises
from a minimalist sense of freedom, that of the absence of physical impediments.
The material compatibility between the views of Foucault and Hobbes raises two
further questions. First, as I’ve argued in chapter two, Foucault emphasizes the positivity
of his conception of power by contrasting it to the juridical function of prohibition he
argues we find in Hobbes. This requires that I offer a coherent view of how power
functions in Hobbes in order to clearly determine the limits of the compatibility of the
two views. Second, as I’ve maintained in the previous chapter, Foucault does not offer a
metaphysical position, but is rather more concerned with putting forward an empirical
account. This is primarily the product of his rejection of pre-Kantian dogmatism. If
Hobbes, in contrast, gives us a political account that is derived from metaphysics, then
rendering the two positions consistent requires that we reconcile, at least partly, these
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conflicting conclusions. The next chapter, therefore, will focus on these two problems.
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Chapter Four
Reconciling Power in Foucault and Hobbes
In chapter two I argued that the reversals Foucault introduces against
contractarianism with respect to justifying natural rights aim primarily at specifying
underlying material conditions and identifying their political effects. Chapter three
intended to show that such a materialist ground for politics is already present in Hobbes.
Yet, the question of the role of political power in Hobbes, whether it can be understood as
merely prohibitory or productive of subjects, remains unsettled. This chapter, therefore,
will be concerned, first, with looking at the role of political power in Hobbes and arguing
that such power cannot be limited to the negative function of prohibition. I argue that
Hobbes introduces various “techniques,” to use Foucault’s terms, to shape subjects, and
thus recognizes a more positive role for power that is not limited to prohibition. Though
this mitigates Foucault’s objections against Hobbes, I argue that Foucault offers the
means to transform the Hobbesian project from one that is grounded in metaphysics to a
view that rejects metaphysical dependencies in a post-Kantian sense. Following Kant,
disposing metaphysical dependencies will follow from defining conditions that make
knowledge possible. This reading of Foucault emerges primarily from focusing on his
empirical method coupled with the justifications that can be offered for his historical
nominalism. I thus argue that by taking Kant’s critique of metaphysics as a basis, we can
justify Foucault’s historical method on Kantian grounds by recognizing that it deals with
the question of conditions of possibility. Though this raises the issue of whether we can
incorporate the notion of the historical a priori Foucault employs in his archaeological
work into a Kantian framework, I will be setting aside Foucault’s early work and will
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focus mainly on his genealogical method. Foucault, consequently, offers a post-Kantian
account of politics that does not rely on a metaphysical basis. Finally, I argue that the
operation of political power in Hobbes and Foucault is compatible. This is why we can
retain Hobbes’s analysis of the passions, especially when it comes to cultivating virtues
in individuals, while justifying it historically rather than metaphysically.
Hobbes and Positive Power
In chapter two, I argued that Foucault’s reversals can be seen as compatible with
Hobbes’s view on the condition that we read Hobbes’s politics as materially grounded.
Foucault had argued that Hobbes offers a conception of legitimacy that is derived from
transforming capacities into unified power possessed by a sovereign, which produces a
political relation between ruler and subjects who retain certain natural rights. By
reversing these assumptions, Foucault offers a conception of power that rests on a
material analysis of unequal relations. I argued that, ultimately, the key difference
between the view Hobbes endorses and the conception of power that Foucault analyzes
rests on whether we take equality as our starting point. Hobbes’s analysis results from
beginning from a condition of equality in the state of nature, whereas Foucault recognizes
that a political relation arises out of situations of inequality, which inherently entail
power relations. Yet, even if we accept a material reading of Hobbes as I’ve argued, it is
crucial to consider Hobbes’s conception of power in order to render the two views
compatible. Foucault had argued that the mode of operation of power he locates starting
with Discipline and Punish is one that is not juridical in nature, is not possessed by a
sovereign, and does not invoke a strictly prohibitory function. The question that follows
is whether we find in Hobbes a view that is amenable to such power operations. I shall
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argue in this section that we do, by shedding light on how power functions under
Hobbes’s view while focusing on the cultivation of virtues and the role of education, both
of which target the passions.
Grounding Hobbes’s politics materially leads to two consequences. On the one hand,
this renders his view compatible with that of Foucault. On the other hand, this allows us
to understand the operation of political power in Hobbes’s account as one that is not
simply embodied in law, but also targets the bodies of individuals for the sake of
achieving political effects. Yet, offering a material ground for Hobbes’s politics does not
automatically render Foucault’s argument for the juridical mode of power in Hobbes
superfluous. In fact, on the surface, Foucault appears justified in his reading given that
Hobbes’s works are replete with passages identifying political power with the operation
of prohibitory law.
The negative functioning of power comes to the foreground forcefully with the role
Hobbes ascribes to the sovereign to ensure that civil laws are followed. Throughout
Leviathan, Hobbes repeatedly emphasizes that the primary function of the sovereign in
relation to citizens is “to keep them all in awe.” (L 113) Ultimately, one cannot rely on
individuals taking pride in abiding by the laws, and thus the “passion to be reckoned
upon, is fear.”(L 129) This fear must be the result of “so much power … that by terror
thereof, he is enabled to conform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid
against their enemies abroad.”(L 158) Striking fear in the citizens of the commonwealth
in order to ensure that they abide by the laws of the contract appears to further
corroborate the view that Hobbes’s conception of power can be limited to negative
operation. If fear is to guarantee that laws continue to function in society, it is only under
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the threat of the exercise of violence that citizens come to abide by the laws of the
commonwealth.
But if the commonwealth will be governed by invoking fear and threatening violence,
perhaps the operation of positive power can be located within the subjects themselves.
Yet Hobbes does not introduce a positive notion of freedom that results from binding
oneself to the contract. Though in Leviathan, Hobbes maintains that submission to a
sovereign through authorization results in both obligation and liberty, such submission
should only be recognized as an expression of voluntary action and not a precondition for
it. (L 203) In effect, liberty for Hobbes is defined merely in terms of what “proceed[s]
from [the] will,” a view that is consistent with necessity. (L 197-98) As Skinner notes,
Hobbes’s definition of liberty in Leviathan serves the purpose of exposing the strictly
rhetorical force of the Republican demand for liberty. Through defining liberty
negatively, Hobbes is able to maintain his commitment to a materially deterministic view,
while arguing for the presence of liberty all along. Monarchies, just as democracies, arise
out of a contract that is freely accepted by individuals.144 Moreover, citizens under the
rule of a sovereign are just as free as ones that take part in democratic rule.145
I argue that the key, however, to identifying positive power effects in the Hobbesian
framework can be located in Hobbes’s view of the passions. Ultimately, this will relate to
Hobbes’s recognition that the political problem is not simply about accounting for the

144

There are several references in Leviathan identifying the justification of monarchy
with that of democracy, one of which appears during Hobbes’s discussion of the rights of
the sovereign. Hobbes states, “[t]hat men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy,
and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to
the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy,
which they despair to enjoy.” (L 162)
145
Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 208-10.
115

right of the sovereign, but also must recognize the presence of political allegiances. For
strategic purpose, this requires that political power be expressed through means that do
not only strike fear, but invoke a broader array of passions. Sandra Field argues that
Hobbes’s project undergoes a shift between his earlier political works and Leviathan. In
De Cive and the Elements of Law, Hobbes primarily attempts to theoretically account for
the absolute power of the sovereign, yet, this view does not clearly carry over to
Leviathan. As Field argues, we find in Leviathan a different account of power that
focuses on an intersubjective element absent in De Cive and The Elements of Law. Field
maintains that Hobbes’s concern in Leviathan is not simply the question of how we can
account for the entitlement of the sovereign, but also how the sovereign can bring it about
that obedience will ensue. Field maintains that, whereas in Hobbes’s earlier work we find
an identification of potentia and potestas, or the effective power of the sovereign and that
to which the sovereign is entitled, the two are divorced in Leviathan. Instead, Leviathan
is concerned with offering not only an account of entitlement (potestas), but also of how
to effectively materialize such an entitlement.146
Ultimately, for Field, accounting for how it is that sovereign power can be effective
must begin by reconceiving power as something that arises essentially from social
interaction, rather than reducing it to capacity. According to Field, we find in Hobbes’s
earlier work a view of power that reduces it to natural faculties, where power is identified
with the excess resulting from opposing one’s capacities to another’s.147 In contrast, in
Leviathan, power is linked to how one is perceived by others, especially when it comes to
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honor and allegiance.148 Field maintains that emphasizing the intersubjective aspect of
power allows Hobbes to consider how it is that political allegiance may be derived in the
absence of actual capacities once social recognition is bestowed. Rather than merely
explaining from a theoretical point of view why it is that the sovereign is entitled to
absolute power, Hobbes attempts to respond to the question of how such power can be
materialized when allegiance often follows from social recognition that does not
accurately represent the capacities of individuals. In Leviathan, however, this social
representation is itself a source of power, which cannot be simply dismissed on the basis
of its inaccuracy.
Field argues that Hobbes, therefore, replaces the individualistic understanding he had
put forward in De Cive with one that recognizes the prevalence of associations that have
short-term or mid-range aims. These fall short of the stability to which Hobbes aspires in
his view of sovereignty, but they also constitute a problem for the sovereign, which must
be constantly negotiated even in a commonwealth.
I maintain that Field’s analysis of the transformation of the role of power in Hobbes is
correct, though, as I will show, it overemphasizes the role of inequality. Nonetheless,
accepting the conclusions Field draws has to follow from clarifying the role Hobbes
ascribes to vanity in Leviathan. When distinguishing between glory and vainglory,
Hobbes defines vainglory as glory that is “grounded on the flattery of others; or only
supposed by himself.” Hobbes continues to add that whereas glory which is based on
“well grounded confidence begetteth attempt, … the supposing of power does not, and is
therefore rightly called vain.” (L 45) Maintaining that vainglory qualifies as only
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imagined power can be supplemented with Hobbes’s assertion that glory and not
vainglory, along with competition and diffidence, leads to conflict. This raises a problem
for interpreting power as intersubjective. If Field is right, then one’s imagined power
resulting from the “flattery of others” should count as power, and therefore should be
linked to conflict. Yet, while accounting for the seventh law of nature concerning
revenge, Hobbes maintains that punishment should be forward-looking given that
revenge without considering consequences is “triumph, or glorying, in the hurt of
another, tend[s] to no end … and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to
reason, and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of war.” (L 140) When is it
then that vainglory indeed counts as power and leads to conflict? Julie Cooper introduces
a distinction between vainglory that results from one’s own inflated image of self, which
does not “begetteth attempt” and thus does not lead to conflict, and vainglory that results
from the flattery of others. The latter appears to result in conflict, given that it may lead
one to act in accordance with the inflated power that others have conferred.149 When
vanity, then, results from one’s view of self, it does not lead to conflict and cannot be
regarded as power. However, when it is the outcome of the views of others, especially
when it is coupled with allegiance, then vainglory should be regarded as a source of
power.
But if we accept Field’s argument, this leads to another problem arising with the
precondition of equality Hobbes specifies. Field argues that the social ontology Hobbes
introduces in Leviathan emphasizes inequality given that conflict arises between
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associations linked together through the allegiance arising from wrongly attributing glory
to individuals. Though equality may reside at the level of individuals, associations are
bound to lead to inequalities.150 To maintain, as Field does, that this leads to the salience
of inequality, however, is mistaken. Just as any natural inequalities between individuals
can be remedied by forming associations, inequalities between associations can be
remedied by expanding weaker associations further. The condition of equality in the
analysis of sovereignty by acquisition is essential for maintaining the condition of war.
After all, Hobbes recognizes that a condition of inequality will lead to the end of the state
of war, since if one side is superior to others, this will lead to conquest and establishing
sovereignty by acquisition.151
Field’s analysis of the intersubjective role of power along with the problem of
obedience that arises in Leviathan brings to the forefront the question of the strategic
means by which Hobbes thought obedience could be brought about. Hobbes recognizes
that resolving this problem will involve a role for political power that is not simply
juridical but takes as its object the passions of individuals. This requires first, however,
that a meticulous view of the passions be developed. For Hobbes, the operation of the

150

Field, “Hobbes and the Question of Power,” 77-78.
Kinch Hoekstra shows Hobbes’s recognition of natural inequality in the state of nature
by shedding light on Hobbes’s commitment to significant differences in the passions,
experience, and bodily strength of individuals. For Hoekstra, Hobbes insists on equality
primarily because recognizing oneself as naturally superior may be a cause of conflict,
given our tendency to vainglory and pride. This is consistent with my argument in
chapter three, as I’ve maintained that the condition of equality arises out of our equal
beliefs in our capacities rather than as a result of actual equality of capacities. Kinch
Hoekstra, “Hobbesian Equality,” in Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S.
A. Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 81–82, 104-06.
151

119

passions is ultimately grounded in self-preservation.152 It is because we have a drive to
preserve ourselves that we constitute the commonwealth. The drive for self-preservation,
however, is justified by appealing to a strictly mechanical principle that of conatus or
endeavor.153 Juhani Pietarinen argues that understanding the link between conatus and
self-preservation must follow from recognizing the role of conatus in matter generally.
Pietarinen maintains that Hobbes subscribes to what he terms the “conatus-principle,”
which mainly indicates that “every thing endeavors to preserve its own existence as far as
it can by its own power.”154 For Pietarinen, Hobbes uses this principle to explain
pressure, or tendency to motion, by maintaining that such tendency is in fact the very
beginning of motion or conatus. This explains why objects preserve their state. Pietarinen
argues that Hobbes’s view with respect to self-preservation in human beings is similar.
Given that we are merely material entities reacting to motion, we also endeavor to
preserve our existence. Identifying our existence with specific motions is justified by
appealing to individuation for Hobbes. As Pietarinen maintains, given that Hobbes
recognizes only matter as real, then individuation is best understood by our inclination to
specific motions. Consequently, conatus not only specifies a principle by which we
preserve a specific state, but also individuates entities by the particular inclinations to
motion they possess – which for Hobbes is itself the beginnings of motion. Once this
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conatus is transformed, objects cease to be what they are.155
Understanding conatus as linked to preserving one’s state emphasizes the role of
Hobbes’s rich analysis of the passions in Leviathan, which was missing from De Cive.
Following Field’s argument, Hobbes was more concerned with developing an account of
how we can apply his view of sovereignty in Leviathan, and he recognizes that
cultivating specific virtues by modifying the passions will result in obedience and in
behavior conducive for peace. Brian Stoffel shows how Hobbes invokes conatus to
explain character dispositions as well. According to Stoffel, the distinction between
animate and inanimate dispositions is irrelevant for Hobbes. In both cases, Hobbes
appeals to conatus in order to explain how a material entity can be disposed to a specific
action. This applies to internal motions in the body, motions in the brain, and finally
character dispositions.156 It follows that acting on the passions of individuals will take the
form of instilling specific virtues, modeled on a conative understanding, which is one
positive effect of political power.
The account of the passions, therefore, does not simply play a role in explaining how
it is that the commonwealth is instituted but is useful to uncover the means by which we
can maintain stability in society. To illustrate this, we can turn to the role Hobbes assigns
to education as a requirement to arrive at the “safety of the people,” which in a
commonwealth goes beyond mere preservation to also include a commodious living. (L
322) The role of education in maintaining stability is arguably one instance of the
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positive expression of power, as it serves to produce efficient rule-abiding individuals.
But, even in his account of education, Hobbes appears to maintain that the dictates
cultivated in citizens are ones primarily aimed at limiting activity, and thus at prohibition.
For instance, Hobbes argues that making the justifications of rights available to the
people is required in order to subdue them and limit resistance against the sovereign. (L
323) Subjects are, therefore, instructed to limit their activities to the dictates of civil laws.
They are instructed, moreover, not to desire a different form of government, nor to
admire other citizens in the commonwealth for fear that it might overshadow the
sovereign, in addition to not disputing the sovereign’s decisions.157
Yet, the role Hobbes specifies for both the laws and education acquire further
significance if they are understood in relation to the passions and Hobbes’s conative view
of humans. Beginning with law, Hobbes maintains that the application of laws serves the
purpose not of “bind[ing] the people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep
them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness
or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in their way.” (L
335) The guiding feature of law is emphasized with Hobbes’s discussion of reward and
punishment, as the law functions as means to secure the subjects’ commitments to the
civil law. The positive operation of power is revealed in punishment, for instance, that is
not carried out for the purpose of revenge, or as a mere manifestation of strength (as
Foucault characterizes juridical power). Nor does it need to involve a spectacle of
violence that displays the sovereign’s authority. Punishment serves the purpose of
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correction, and though it may not correct the perpetrator’s behavior, it corrects and deters
the behavior of others. Similarly, rewards also aim at motivating citizens to follow the
civil laws. Only the sovereign, according to Hobbes, can offer rewards and punish
subjects, for such practices must issue from the highest position of power in the
commonwealth. (L 337-38)
How does Hobbes envisage the effect of these practices on the passions? Hobbes
aims at developing within citizens certain “disposition[s]” to replace those that incline
towards injustice. (L 136) As Johnston maintains, Hobbes’s project in Leviathan
recognizes that instituting the commonwealth will depend on the triumph of reason over
superstition and knowledge over ignorance. This necessitated introducing a “fundamental
change in the habits of thought and action,” leading Hobbes to engage in theological
argumentation in order to attack superstition in Christian theology. Leviathan, therefore,
in addition to following a scientific approach, also includes a rhetorical element that
attempts to compel individuals of the value of following such a scientific approach in
politics.158 Johnston, however, appears to somewhat overemphasize the role of reason in
Hobbes’s approach. Certainly, Hobbes is introducing a rational account in Leviathan, and
the rhetorical element present in the work does serve the purpose of compelling
individuals of his account. Nonetheless, Hobbes also seems to recognize that not all
human beings will recognize the value of rationality, even if it is embellished
rhetorically.
In fact, Hobbes maintains that the target of these tactics will primarily not be reason,
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but the passions. This becomes clear in Hobbes’s emphasis on education. In De Cive,
Hobbes had already recognized the role of education while contrasting his position with
that of Aristotle. We are not naturally social animals, but we become social beings by
training and discipline. Hobbes stresses that civil societies are not “mere gatherings” but
“alliances” which require “good faith.” (DC 2n ) This requires introducing
transformations in citizens in order to render them fit for society. Yet this transformation
cannot be simply through rendering individuals more rational, as Johnston argues, but lies
primarily in changing the objects of the passions. In Leviathan, Hobbes claims that
individuals have different passions due to two factors: material constitution and
education. (L 61) In the Introduction, Hobbes had already specified more clearly the role
of education. It is not to render people rational, but rather to change the objects of their
passions. Hobbes states, “I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men,
desire, fear, hope, &c; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the
things desired, feared, hoped, &c; for these the constitution individual, and particular
education, do so vary.” (L xi) Whereas the kinds of passions we possess are determined
by our material constitution, and more specifically by the motions that we are conatively
inclined to undergo, the ends of our desires is determined by the kinds of motions our
bodies undergo, which for Hobbes is primarily the product of our reactions to sensory
experience. Primarily, as Gordon Hull argues, passions for Hobbes depend on the kinds
of experiences we have, where our will is shaped by sensory input. Consequently,
shaping the desires of citizens requires primarily modifying their experiences.159
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Similar arguments are presented in the conclusion to Leviathan, where Hobbes
contends that settling the difficulties resulting from differences between individuals
requires proper education.160 Hobbes maintains that “education and discipline” allow for
moving away from these differences in order to arrive at amicable relations with others in
society. (L 702) Accordingly, the point is not to render people more rational so that they
act in accordance with natural laws strictly out of a rational commitment. Though that
might work with some individuals, it remains ineffective for others. Education, therefore,
allows for channeling passions so that they are more conducive for peace rather than war.
Interestingly, then, whereas the argument from the state of nature appeals to the fear
of violent death as an initial transition towards society, education plays a role in
sustaining that transition through cultivating the necessary dispositions, or virtues, that
allow us to become social beings. We find, therefore, two arguments in Hobbes. One that
leads to society, and another to suggest different means to ensure that such a society
becomes stable. Fear of the sovereign along with a negative view of power certainly play
a role here, perhaps the main role, but Hobbes also retains elements of positive effects of
power. On the one hand, education will require transforming the object of fear from that
of violent death in the state of nature to fear of the sovereign, further supporting the
negative role of power. Yet, stability in society according to Hobbes cannot be reducible
to fear. As Hobbes states in Leviathan, the other passion that could induce subjects to
keep their contracts, though unreliable, is glory. (L 128)
How then can education redirect our passions in order to render us beings more fit for
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society? One clear example can be found in the function allotted to glory in both war and
peace. As Peg Birmingham argues, a main source of conflict in the state of nature is our
natural and mutual desire for glory.161 Whereas this desire could clearly lead to conflict in
the state of nature, it also is a main source of rational fear, that of violent death. The
emphasis on the violent trait of death can only be justified by appealing to pride, for a
violent death will ultimately be degrading and humiliating.162 For Birmingham, whereas
security and self-preservation does play a role in the founding of the modern state, it is
the modification of the objects of glory in the state that justifies the presence of the desire
for self-sacrifice in the name of the nation in order to attain “glorious immortality.”163
Whether we identify glory as the prime factor in the development of fear in Hobbes,
as Birmingham argues, or as one major factor among many, it is clear that the passion of
glory requires channeling in order to render it more conducive to peaceful living. Cooper
argues that this is done in Hobbes primarily through stressing the virtues of modesty and
humility. Hobbes, therefore, advocates the establishment of honorary titles in order to
satiate the natural passion of glory present within us. In fact, laws of honor, rather than
downplaying vanity, appeal to vanity through using reward and punishment in order to
“redirect passions.”164 The values of modesty and humility, thus, serve the role of
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“disciplin[ing] vainglory” for the sake of cultivating civic dispositions.165
Cultivating certain dispositions in subjects in the commonwealth, then, appears to be
one main role power takes once society is established. The effects of this positive
exercise of power are twofold. On the one hand, subjects with civic virtues and a civic
education are produced, ones that recognize that abiding by the law is necessary for
sustaining society. Of course, not all citizens will be affected by this education, which is
why Hobbes takes fear to be the most reliable passion. Yet, Hobbes maintains that
individuals who will not benefit from education will look up to the educated ones in order
to receive guidance in terms of abiding by the laws. (L 331) The benefits conferred by
education will thus trickle down to all members of the commonwealth. Hobbes’s work
itself, which is intended to all audiences in general given its rhetorical element, would
thus be an instance of the trickling down of the dictates of reason.
On the other hand, given the metaphysical basis of his political account, Hobbes
contends that the exercise of power through education and through channeling the
passions in order to instill dispositions introduces a metaphysical entity. Hobbes
maintains that this unity is achieved only through a unified representer, where every
member of the multitude authorizes one sovereign to act on her behalf. (L 151) As
Skinner notes, there cannot be any “natural unity” outside the state, where we are merely
left with a multitude. The arrival at a unity, thus for Hobbes, must be artificial and is
realized with the selection of a single representative.166 Independently of such unity, we
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are left with a multitude, in the form of individuals or associations, which will easily slip
into the war we find in the state of nature. This metaphysically real, and yet artificial,
unity appears to be, in Hobbes’s work, one of the main expressions of positive power.
Arguing, as I have, that Hobbes makes room for positive power in his works does not
show Foucault to be entirely mistaken in his reading. Hobbes does, in fact, focus on the
negative functioning of power as essential for a society. Moreover, Foucault’s work,
especially in Discipline and Punish, shows how the role allotted to the sovereign in
Hobbes’s work becomes superfluous with the efficiency of power relations.167 Yet, I wish
to argue that we can read the two views as consistent if we focus on the positive role of
political power in Hobbes. Of course, one of the crucial differences between the two
views is Hobbes’s reliance on metaphysics. The next section, therefore, engages
Foucault’s Kantian aspect in the unpublished late seventies lectures in order to justify the
distance Foucault places between his work and metaphysics. This requires, primarily,
looking at the justification of method in Foucault.
Foucault’s Kantian Method
In 1984, Foucault began to characterize himself as a Kantian, which raised
interpretational problems for several commentators who have attempted to put forward a
coherent account of Foucault’s genealogical exposition in relation to Kant.168 Most
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prominently is Beatrice Han-Pile’s criticism, which has characterized Foucault’s work as
alternating between the transcendental and the empirical without being able to reconcile
the two. According to Han-Pile, Foucault introduces a “transcendental history” of
specific forms of knowledge, which is void of a proper transcendental grounding for the
historical empiricism to which he is committed.169 I argue in this section that we can
understand Foucault’s work as empirically concerned with determining conditions of
possibility that are historical and contingent rather than universal and necessary. This
makes Foucaultian critique immanent and allows for recognizing Foucault’s
methodological commitments as broadly Kantian.
Situating Foucault within the Kantian dichotomy of transcendental and empirical has
thus far proven to be challenging. For instance, in The Politics of Ourselves, Amy Allen
rightly argues that critique for Foucault must be understood as immanent. This is
primarily the product of recognizing that Foucault does not eliminate the notion of the
subject altogether, but merely eliminates the transcendental subject and thus institutes a
critique of critique. On Allen’s reading, Foucault both endorses the Kantian project and
seeks to develop it further by ridding it of the transcendental element. He thus transforms
rather than rejects Kant’s project, by exposing the role of the historical and social in the
constitution of subjectivity. This critique of critique is not only to be understood as a
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critique of Kant, but also a critique in the Kantian sense, namely, one that specifies the
“conditions and limits of possibility of that which Kant himself took as his own starting
point, namely the transcendental subject.”170 For Allen, however, Foucaultian critique
remains partly transcendental, as it is concerned with specifying necessary conditions of
possibility for the thinking subject. Though the conditions themselves are historical and
contingent, their actualization is necessary to render forms of subjectivity possible.
According to Allen, therefore, these are necessary though not sufficient conditions. Yet
this does not qualify to be a fully transcendental critique, as it is rooted in contingent
historical processes rather than in necessary conditions.171
I hold that labeling the conditions of possibility Foucault identifies as necessary is
problematic for two reasons. First, on textual grounds, Foucault repeatedly and explicitly
rejects the introduction of necessary conditions, and consequently transcendental
conditions.172 Moreover, conditions of possibility need not be thought of as necessary
conditions. For instance, the conditions for the emergence of sexuality as a field where
disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms intersect have made sexuality possible, but
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different historical conditions may have also produced the same form of subjectivity.
Allen recognizes the contingency of the appearance of these conditions, but takes them to
be necessary for the specific problematization at hand. Yet given Foucault’s continuous
attempt to recast necessity in terms of contingency, this ascribes to Foucault a position
from which he often distances himself. The appearance of a discursive framework can
make a domain possible, but by no means is it the only framework that could produce the
domain. Consequently, Foucault recognizes that though sexuality may arise out of
different historical conditions, it may still fulfill similar social roles. Thus, the conditions
of possibility to which Foucault is committed cannot be understood as necessary but
should be recognized as sufficient.173
Colin Koopman, alternatively, argues that whereas the phenomenological tradition
attempted to reconcile Kant’s transcendental philosophy with a historical inquiry,
Foucault disposes of the transcendental altogether.174 Foucault thus incorporates into his
work Kant’s notion of critique, where critique is not concerned with universal or
necessary conditions, but with historical conditions, rendering his critique immanent.175
Koopman accepts Johanna Oksala’s reading of Foucault as refusing to begin with a
cogito or subject and locates instead the core of Foucault’s critique in problematization.
Problematization becomes “a stable conceptual matrix” that allows for shedding light on
the “emergence of hybrid networks of problems we can come to recognize … as
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contingent complexes rather than necessary givens.”176 Thus, the contingent and local
analysis of problematization replaces the transcendental approach Kant had undertaken.
Koopman thus introduces a distinction between “critical conditions of possibility,” which
are neither universal nor necessary, and “transcendental conditions of possibility.” On
Koopman’s account, the former are what Foucault endorses through his local
genealogical analysis. These conditions define the “limits” of knowledge under a specific
historical period.177
Koopman presents an interesting link to Kant, yet as Colin McQuillan argues, this
reading of Foucault’s work casts doubt on the Kantian aspect of Foucault’s critique. To
begin with, McQuillan points out that Kant took all critique to be transcendental. This
raises the question of whether we can maintain any form of Kantian critique once we
dispose of the universal scope and necessary modality of the conditions Foucault
specifies. More importantly, McQuillan identifies a significant difference between the
Kantian and Foucaultian projects. Whereas Kant was interested in defining the limits of
reason and thus confining its legitimate use to ward off dogmatism, Foucault is explicitly
concerned with transgression, or with “crossing over.”178 Kant had argued that reason
must renounce exceeding its own limits, while Foucault’s main aim is to undo those
limits by unmasking them as neither universal nor necessary, but contingent and thus
subject to change.
We are, thus, left with the problem of reading Foucault as rejecting transcendental
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philosophy while maintaining a Kantian element to his critique. In order to account for
this position, Christina Hendricks offers an interesting interpretation of Foucault’s
reading of Kant in The Government of Self and Others. In those lectures, Foucault notes
that we find two threads that develop out of Kant. The first is concerned with the
“analytic of truth,” a transcendental approach that raises the question of the conditions of
possibility of true knowledge. The second pertains to what Foucault terms an “ontology
of the present” or an “ontology of ourselves” stemming from Kant’s commitments in his
two essays “What is Enlightenment?” and “What is Revolution?” For Hendricks, whereas
an analytics of truth is concerned with limits, an ontology of ourselves opens the space
for transgression. On this view, Foucault identifies in Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”
essay a legitimate move towards crossing limits through raising the question of the
present.179
Under Foucault’s reading, having determined the limits of reason in the first Critique,
Kant introduces a normative demand of daring to liberate oneself from the condition of
nonage.180 Hendricks reads in Foucault’s Kant the identification of contingent limits
pertaining to a contemporary problem.181 Kant, thus, was concerned with identifying the
status of the stifling of the free use of reason in Prussia, and as a result of recognizing it
as a contingent limit, urges for transforming it. Kant’s approach comes through critique
and argument, by primarily introducing the distinction between the public and private use
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of reason, and thus marking separate uses of reason, which renders obedience and
autonomous rational thinking compatible.
For Hendricks, this is a mark of the attitude of modernity that Foucault identifies in
his essay on the Enlightenment, where the critic locates something in the present and
attempts to transform it. The critic does not stand outside of it in a historically neutral
position. In a similar manner, through aligning himself with Kant’s project, Foucault does
not assume a metahistorical perspective that gives him access to an objective view of
history, but locates himself in a present moment, and initiates transformations from
within.182 This sheds light on the advantage that Foucault’s analysis provides with respect
to critique. Given the conclusions of Foucault’s methodological commitments in terms of
how we understand history, critique must follow from within a specific historical powerknowledge regime. It is in this sense that Foucault’s critique can be understood as
immanent rather than transcendental. Historical analysis becomes a tool for transgression
by locating historically contingent limits that have been considered to be self-evident,
universal, and necessary limits. But this could only follow from aligning oneself with a
historical tradition, one that allows for historicizing the present. Consequently, whereas
Foucault does not specify the direction which critique should take, he provides the
theoretical means to effect transformations on present conditions.
Foucault’s relation to Kant opens up the space for the broader question of the method
he endorses in his work pertaining to the genealogy of governmentality. Whether
Foucault has been consistent in method throughout his work is questionable, but it is
crucial to note that apparent inconsistencies can be traced to changes in his view that
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ultimately rest on empirical grounds. I will not be concerned here with putting forward a
coherent reading of method across all of Foucault’s work. Though the question of
“conditions of possibility” is abundant in Foucault’s archaeologies, rendering that work
consistent with a genealogical approach is not straightforward and raises problems that I
will set aside for my purposes. This includes, but is not limited to, Foucault’s early
commitment to the historical a priori in his archaeologies.183 It is crucial, however, to
note that Foucault retains the question of the conditions of possibility in his genealogical
work. This is most explicitly specified in his 1978-1979 lectures The Birth of Biopolitics,
where Foucault maintains that “critique would consist in determining under what
conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised.” Foucault continues to state,
“the problem is to bring to light the conditions that had to be met for it to be possible to
hold a discourse on madness … that can be true or false according to the rules of
medicine, say, or of confession, psychology, or psychoanalysis.” (BB 36 my emphasis)
To clarify the empirical aspect of Foucault’s work, Koopman emphasizes Foucault’s
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notion of a historical a priori that determines the limits of knowledge. These conditions
are sufficient for certain possibilities within a given power-knowledge regime. Rendering
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for the necessity of historical conditions from a Foucaultian point of view seems
doubtful, especially if we accept his position as developing empirically. More
importantly, for critique to be possible, we would have to recognize that an episteme is
not internally consistent and can be transformed using resources within it. Though I
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concern with conditions of possibility as opposed to Hume’s empiricism. According to
Koopman, Humean empiricism searches for conditions of actuality, understood in terms
of causal conditions.184 Locating conditions of possibility, alternatively, does not
introduce any kind of necessary causation.185 The shift to genealogy, then, should not be
seen as a complete break with the archaeological work. Instead, it offers a different
approach in order to deal with specific problems identified in archaeology. As Koopman
shows, Foucault maintains the question of conditions of possibility in his genealogical
work, which becomes crystallized in the focus on problematizations. While archaeology
specifies conditions that make discourses possible, it does not engage change and
mobility and cannot account for periods of transition between epistemes. This is why
conditions of possibility end up being inexplicably transient. These gaps, however,
remain inaccessible under an archaeological approach, and as Koopman argues, this
necessitates a shift to genealogy.186
Attributing an empiricism to Foucault can be justified by appealing to a strong form
of nominalism. In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault focuses on introducing his method
through beginning with the assumption that universals do not exist. (BB 3) This marks a
development of the nominalist approach Foucault had already endorsed in The Will to
Knowledge, where the scope of nominalism was limited to power. Alternatively, the
methodological nominalism introduced here confers an additional component to
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genealogical analysis by uncovering the content of universals as historically constituted.
Foucault’s genealogies, during this stage of his work, show that universals do not even
exist in the mind as coherent entities, but are rather products of a multiplicity of relations
that are discursively linked together. This does not merely commit him to the rejection of
a Platonic understanding of universals, but also to rejecting conceptualism. Moreover, not
only do universals not exist in the mind as concepts, they also are not reducible to verbal
associations as we find in Hobbes and Hume. Given Foucault’s starting point, namely the
analysis of practices rather than subjective experience, such universals are reduced to
discursive formations that constitute bodies of knowledge and produce forms of
subjectivity as power effects.
This aspect of Foucault’s work enables us to recognize an empirical role for
genealogies. Foucault, thus, begins with a nominalist presupposition that is supported by
the explanatory force his local analysis of concrete phenomena provides. Though
nonexistent, these universals come to be shaped or “mark[ed] … out as reality,” by a set
of practices that are interlinked with a regime of truth. (BB 19) This regime of truth, in
turn, primarily consists of a set of rules that determine the truth or falsity of statements
within a discourse. (BB 35)
Consequently, if universals do not have any explanatory force independently of
historical empirical content, Foucault is not concerned with mapping out a deductive
historical narrative grounded in necessity. In contrast to Hobbes, Foucault’s method is not
a scientific deduction based on universals. Instead, for Foucault, historical analysis will
shed light on the conditions of possibility of these universals, or on how it became
possible to speak of madness, sexuality, or even the state. If this analysis does not follow
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a deductive approach that deals with universals, and having disposed of the
transcendental, it must be empirical in nature. Understood in these terms, and while
recognizing that experience for Foucault is at least partly constituted by bodies of
knowledge, we find a modified form of the Kantian project of accounting for the
conditions that make experience possible. For Foucault, however, this experience is a
present one, and its conditions are determined through historical analysis.
Yet undertaking the analysis of experience historically requires its own
justification. Apart from referring to Nietzsche’s genealogy, Foucault never explicitly
provides a justification for the historical approach, which he presents as a strictly
methodological commitment. Whereas his nominalism justifies recourse to an empirical
analysis, the historical nature of such an analysis requires further warrant. The credit his
early genealogical work gives to Nietzsche provides a good justification for moving
towards a historical analysis that produces subjects through power relations. Yet, as I’ve
just shown, in his later work, Foucault insists that invoking a historical account in relation
to the ontology of ourselves also entails a debt to Kant. As Foucault maintains in “What
is Enlightenment?”, the positive aspect of critique will not be concerned with determining
universal limits but with “separat[ing] out, from the contingency that has made us what
we are [or from contingent conditions of possibility], the possibility of no longer being,
doing, or thinking what we are, do or think.”187 (WE 315-16) The Kantian aspect of
critique, then, is modified to identify what is contingent and arbitrary as opposed to what
is universal and necessary. As Hendricks argues, Foucault locates this in Kant’s reflection
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on a contemporary historical moment and his prescription for a political impetus to move
beyond the state of immaturity towards a free public use of reason. (WE 309) But
whereas Kant was concerned with marking out the legitimate use of reason within a
historical moment following his critique of pure reason, Foucault locates conditions of
possibility in terms of contingency. This opens up the space for moving beyond what has
been identified as contingent through a historical critique as opposed to a transcendental
one, an analysis that identifies the contingent elements thus offering the possibility for
transforming them.188 Foucault’s genealogies, therefore, should be understood as
empirical verifications of the historical conditions of possibility of what is said and
known, which also allows for constituting ourselves differently through critique.
It is important to recognize that Foucault’s historical nominalism does not attempt
to grasp the reality that lurks beneath our delusions of stability. Thomas Lemke, for
instance, argues that Foucault’s historical nominalism entails a “negative” and a
“positive” trait. The negative trait pertains to unpacking presupposed universal truths, or
as Foucault puts it “Questions of Method,” it is a “breach of self-evidence.” (QM 226)
The other function is a positive one that follows from introducing new links and relations,
which present a phenomenon as universal and necessary.189 For Lemke, what is primarily
at stake in Foucault’s view is whether the concept of the state we have is “identical to the
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“state” itself.”190 In other words, Lemke takes Foucault to give an accurate
characterization of the state through invoking an analysis of historical processes that
produce it as a dynamic entity. Though Lemke moves on to discuss the status of the state
as a “transactional reality”, to use the term Foucault introduces in The Birth of
Biopolitics, the advantage he ascribes to Foucault’s position suggests that there is a truly
accurate account of the state that must be discovered through genealogical analysis.
There is certainly a tendency in Foucault’s work to identify the state as a process, but
ultimately, for Foucault, understanding the state as a fixed entity or as a dynamic process
that is the product of multiple arts of government must be recognized as a strategic move
rather than attempting to discover the underlying reality of political relations.191
Furthermore, whereas Lemke is correct in highlighting the negative and positive
roles in Foucault’s genealogical work, these are not to be identified with historical
nominalism, but rather as results that follow from it. As I’ve maintained, Foucault’s
genealogical work on governmentality follows a method that is concerned with
identifying historical conditions of possibility, and at least partly develops out of his
reading of Kant. Consequently, in addition to justifying an empirical historical approach,
the nominalism to which Foucault is committed also explains his refusal to provide a
clear theory of power, while insisting on putting forward an analytics or mere
methodological commitments. This leads to the other implication of nominalism for
Foucault, namely the concrete nature of the analysis invoked. Foucault insists on
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providing local content for analysis that is not limited to speculative conclusions derived
from universals. Thus, even analyses that merely invoke power are insufficient, for
Foucault maintains such analyses do not have any explanatory value. Therefore, an
explanation will dispose of universals except as they appear to be “something” that is
marked out in reality, and thus it will return to historical conditions of possibility. But for
such an analysis to take place, one needs to invoke a concrete “analytical grid” for
relations of power. Power relations on their own do not have explanatory force but
require an empirical analytical grid as their principle of intelligibility. This grid is
determined through an archaeological account that is produced by determining the
historical limits of discourse, and a genealogical method that locates moments of
contingency.192
This approach helps explain why Foucault switches to a different characterization
of power in his later work. In “The Subject and Power,” Foucault specifies that a power
relation should be best understood in terms of government, or as the “conduct of
conduct.” (SP 341) Foucault contrasts this with the warlike understanding of power he
had identified in Society Must be Defended, and argues that a power relation is “neither
warlike nor juridical.” (SP 341) Recognizing a power relation in terms of
Governmentality enables us to offer content to a power relation. To understand a power
relation in terms of government, then, or in terms of the conduct of conduct, is to invoke
a grid of intelligibility that is not vacuous precisely because it depends on a historical
analysis. This is why Foucault argues that the notion of governmentality becomes useful
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to “tr[y] out” in order to provide a “point of view” to the shifting history of government.
(BB 186) It is a principle of intelligibility, but qualifies only as a “transactional reality” as
Foucault maintains. In other words, while abstract power relations, or abstract
government, cannot offer an explanation by themselves, an analysis of the set of practices
that are constituted by power relations provide the required “grid” in relation to a regime
of truth determining truth and falsity.193
Governmentality and Power – the New Conception of Power
Whereas Foucault initially situates his view of power in Society Must be Defended as
a counter-Hobbesian position, which promises to discover the rumbles of battle
underneath any political account and thus reduce political analysis to war, Foucault
relinquishes some of these elements as his work on governmentality crystallizes. This
leads to the introduction of a more developed conception of power, a shift that Foucault
does not clearly shed light on in his published work. But in his lectures The Birth of
Biopolitics, Foucault develops crucial empirical elements for his account. This can be
most clearly mapped out in the transformation he identifies in the form of government
between raison d'etat and the more recent modern form. The crucial shift occurring near

193

In “What is Critique,” Foucault offers the following insight with regards to the
connection between power and Governmentality, contending that governmentality links
together the exercise of power, the production of subjectivity, and the use of discourses of
truth: “The core of critique is basically made of the bundle of relationships that are tied to
one another … power, truth, and the subject. And if governmentalization is indeed this
movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice
through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that critique is
the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects
of power and question power on its discourses of truth… Critique would essentially
insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call…the politics
of truth.” Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections
from the Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose
(New York: The New Press, 2003), 266.
142

the middle of the eighteenth century for Foucault is that of the emergence of the
economic sphere as a space that is beyond the grasp of the sovereign. This produces a
crisis within juridical thought, for whereas the art of government under sovereignty is
exercised over juridical subjects, it appears to be inhabited by subjects of interest, or
subjects whose interest constitutes the core of economic analysis. Whereas juridical
subjects can give up their rights in order to institute a transfer in power to a sovereign,
economic subjects cannot relinquish their interests in favor of a ruler, for natural
economic laws dictate that the economic realm must be beyond intelligibility, functioning
according to laws that will ensure its own stability independently of interference, and thus
outside the control of the sovereign. (BB 282)
This new form of government that emerges out of the development of an independent
economic space finally develops into a dichotomy between the state and civil society. Yet
one significant implication of Foucault’s analysis is that civil society is not an obstacle to
the functioning of the state through its constant activity. It is, rather, a part of modern
governmentality: a correlate body that is the object of governance. Foucault argues that
whereas with early modern thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke, the social body was
reducible to a set of individuals that were linked together through a political bond, the
social bond within civil society appears to develop spontaneously as a result of
sentiments of benevolence within the social body that are constantly being challenged by
an egoistic drive belonging to the economic individuals that constitute society. (BB 297)
Foucault attributes this view to Adam Ferguson, whose Essays on the History of Civil
Society inaugurate a shift towards understanding social relations in terms of an inherent
inequality. Under these conditions, it is pointless to consider what a prior condition to

143

that of the state would be like, for such hypothetical claims have no bearing on history or
on normativity. Thus, not only is the notion of a contract challenged historically, an
argument which had already been articulated several times since Hobbes, but a contract is
also not required to produce a unified social body. The social body is constituted out of
social relations that are the product of sympathetic inclinations, a view that we also find
among sentimentalists such as Hume and Adam Smith. In other words, no exchange of
rights is necessary to produce a social body, for civil society already entails within it
sufficient conditions to produce a unified society. (BB 281-82, 302-03)
This notion of a civil society replaces contract in another sense, namely, that which
Foucault discusses under the rubric of subjection. Whereas for both Hobbes and Locke,
contract results from a condition of equality in the state of nature and leads to the
appearance of hierarchy within a community, subjection under Ferguson’s model of
government is a natural process that arises within social relations due to the distribution
of roles. Consequently, there is no need to transfer power from individuals in a state of
equality to a sovereign thus establishing social differences as Hobbes had argued. These
differences are spontaneous and give rise immediately to power relations. (BB 304)
Foucault suggests that under this model, “the fact of power precedes the right that
establishes, justifies, limits, or intensifies it; power already exists before it is regulated,
delegated or legally established.” (BB 304)
Ferguson’s conception of political power as prior to any agreement and coextensive
with social relations should strike us as quite similar to the view Foucault endorses in
“The Subject and Power.” In The Will to Knowledge Foucault had argued for
understanding power relations in terms of forces and maintained that such relations can
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only arise out of inequality. In his later work, Foucault retains the condition of inequality
but appears to minimize references to power relations as material forces that act on
bodies to constitute subjects. Hendricks’s reading of Foucault’s relation to Kant proves to
be useful here. If Foucault’s later project involves working on the present in order to
uncover limits as contingent, then the starting point of any analysis must be recent views
of power relations, and in this case partly that of Ferguson. The contemporary relevance
of political analysis requires endorsing current social formations, or a view of power that
arises out of unequal social relations.194
Two questions remain unanswered. First, how should we understand the different
conception of power that emerges throughout Foucault’s work on governmentality?
Second, under this conception of power, what would it mean to retain the Kantian aspect
of Foucault’s critique?
Reconciling the two conceptions of power we find in Foucault presupposes the need
to provide a coherent account for both. Yet one may argue that Foucault’s commitment to
nominalism rids us of such a necessity. Consequently, one way to understand the relation
between these conceptions is to recognize that universals are only constituted
discursively. In this case, there is no need to unify our account of power; instead, we can
recognize that the material activity of power relations is only one form power can take.
Similarly, power in terms of certain governmental practices is another form power can
assume, in which Foucault finds the possibility of a degree of autonomy or freedom.
This response, however, remains inadequate, as it renders the use of “power” vacuous
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social unity through benevolence, as in Ferguson. His very commitment to a historical
approach precludes that.
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in the sense that it can refer to a multiplicity of unrelated phenomena. The excessive
nominalism of this reading raises a problem for Foucault. Foucault sometimes appears to
reduce everything to practices, which would thus eliminate the need to use universals.
This would give further credence for his historical nominalism, which is itself based on
the rejection of universals as real or conceptual entities. Foucault, however, very clearly
does not reject the use of universals altogether. For instance, in “The Subject and Power,”
he introduces a general account of power relations. In Discipline and Punish, he had
already focused on discipline and characterized it with some generality. Foucault’s use of
universals can, thus, be allotted an explanatory role without being committed to their
metaphysical existence as real entities, nor to their conceptual existence in the mind.
This, however, requires identifying some unifying component.
In order to render coherent Foucault’s view, it may be useful to refer to his use of
dispositif or apparatus. In a 1977 interview, Foucault states
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral
and philanthropic propositions–in short, the said as much as the unsaid... The
apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these
elements. (CF 194)
Foucault continues to specify that an apparatus, in a specific historical moment, has a
“dominant strategic function.” (CF 195) The analysis of an apparatus, thus, must examine
the relation between these different elements in order to determine an overarching
strategy. This is why an apparatus is “essentially of a strategic nature,” determining how
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forces are modified, blocked, or developed in order to achieve specific goals. (CF 196)
The material activity of forces, then, should be understood as part of the more
encompassing apparatus Foucault identifies, or as means that allow for materializing the
strategic goal. These force relations are, moreover, often supported by knowledge claims.
Recognizing the heterogeneity of the elements involved in an apparatus, therefore,
requires that we distinguish between practices that take the body as their target, such as
disciplinary techniques, and the overall strategic functions they fulfill that are not
reducible to the minute force relations. To understand a power relation in terms of
governmentality, then, involves recognizing the sought-after strategic goal in any
confrontation. In “The Subject and Power,” Foucault maintains that a power relation
always involves a strategy of struggle, given that it ultimately aims at triumph. (SP 346)
This is why a power relation should be understood on the model of government, as it
involves modifying forces for the sake of attaining an end. Understanding a power
relation, therefore, involves recognizing the role of material forces, which as I argued in
chapter two must be understood relationally, but it also invokes a wide array of
mechanisms that regulate behavior, and identifies them in terms of an overarching, if
momentary, strategy. The strategic element, however, can only have explanatory force
when coupled with a historical analysis.
This view of power relations can also help us understand in what sense Foucault is a
Kantian. I have argued that Foucault’s view should be understood as entirely empirical
and specifically historical, while disposing of any transcendental aspect. As I have
maintained, since genealogy is concerned with uncovering contingency where necessity
is presupposed, a genealogy of governmentality will be concerned with identifying
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contingent elements that can be transformed within the history of governmental practices
which aim at the “conduct of conduct.” This is further corroborated by Foucault’s
insistence in The Birth of Biopolitics that politics is nothing but the “interplay of …
different arts of government.” (BB 313) The Kantian element in this approach, then,
appears in locating, through an empirical inquiry, conditions of possibility that remain
contingent and subject to transformation. Following Foucault’s reading of Kant, this
allows for identifying a moment in the present where critique can be effective.
Unlike Kant, Foucault’s commitments are methodological and not transcendental.
Consequently, Foucault is not concerned with metaphysics. Whereas universal and
necessary conditions leave us with a metaphysical noumenal dependency in Kant to
which we have no access, Foucault’s employment of contingent and historical conditions
does not lead to the introduction of the noumenal. Instead, we have conditions that can be
transformed historically, not ones that are fixed and determined as they constitute
preconditions for our experience. Foucault recognizes that the historical conditions
certainly do influence our experience. Through discursively defining limits of
intelligibility, our experience is constituted according to historical rules that can be
transformed beginning with a genealogical analysis.195 Changing discursive limits,
however, does not occur through appealing to an ahistorical position, but by using tools
that are already present within an existing discursive formation.196 Consequently,
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Even in his later ethical period, Foucault specifies that crafting oneself will depend on
the resources available in one’s culture. In “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a
Practice of Freedom,” Foucault states, “these practices are nevertheless not something
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Foucault’s view can be regarded as Kantian in another way. Whereas Hendricks had
emphasized Foucault’s concern with critiquing present limits, I suggest that Foucault’s
Kantian critique also has a bearing on the relation between politics and metaphysics.
Foucault argues that since Kant, the political task has been “watching over the excessive
use of rationality.” (SP 328) Kant takes up this task by arguing that there are limits
resulting from our active contribution to experience, a contribution that cannot be
subtracted. By revealing those limits as contingent, Foucault does not open up the space
to dogmatism by providing access to reality, but rather undermines to some degree the
authority of all knowledge through emphasizing that historical shifts do not entail coming
closer to a metaphysical ideal. These shifts are the products of power struggles, ones that
constitute the social body in terms of inherent relations of inequality, while being masked
by a “will to truth” that feigns progress towards reality.
This allows us to finally return to the divide that Foucault credits Kant with
instituting, namely, that between an analytic of truth and the ontology of ourselves. If we
recognize that Foucault is concerned with historicizing and undoing limits in order to
retain a skeptical element with respect to all knowledge, we also should recognize that
the question of the ontology will have a bearing on the question of the truth. The two are
certainly not identical, but it is significant to recognize that offering a history of our
constitution as subjects in relation to power and truth further credits the critique of
metaphysics Kant had instituted. Uncovering limits as historical fulfills the task of

that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and
which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his
social group.” Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of
Freedom,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984,
Vol. 1), ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1998), 291.
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destabilizing even the limits that Kant took as fixed.
To return to one of my earlier concerns, the implications of reading Foucault vis-à-vis
Kant this way bears in several ways on his interpretation of and arguments against
Hobbes. I argued earlier in this chapter that we should recognize a positive aspect of
political power in Hobbes that aims at constituting virtuous subjects who are inclined
towards peace. This positive element follows from a material analysis of the passions
which is ultimately grounded in conatus, and thus in a metaphysical material view. I then
argued that Foucault’s historical approach follows from endorsing Kant’s critique of
metaphysics and modifying the condition that make knowledge possible by identifying
contingent elements rather than necessary ones. If Kant had shown that the noumenal is
inaccessible, Foucault develops a political account that, first, radicalizes that critique by
promising to purge, on empirical grounds, all universal and necessary conditions, and,
second, develops a post-Kantian view of politics. The question then becomes: How can
we introduce a political account that does not presuppose metaphysical commitments and
is nonetheless grounded? Foucault’s answer is to return to a historical analysis. Given the
indebtedness to Kant’s rejection of the dependence on metaphysics, what then can we
retain from Hobbes’s view?
Earlier in this chapter, I showed that by replacing universal and necessary conditions
with local and contingent ones, Foucault effectively replaces the metaphysical basis of
explanation with a historical one. Though Hobbes does indeed base his view on a
metaphysics, I maintained in chapter three that there is a historical element in Hobbes in
the condition he locates in the state of nature given his commitment to a nominalism that
rejects the reality of universals. Accepting the Kantian move, however, requires that we
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abandon any metaphysical basis, which renders the relevance of Hobbes’s account from a
post-Kantian viewpoint questionable.
However, though less developed, the positive aspect of political power we find
already in Hobbes is consistent with the analytics of power Foucault endorses and can,
for the most part, be retained. It is true that Hobbes takes this power to stem from the
sovereign, whereas Foucault maintains that power is exercised in an anonymous manner.
This difference, however, follows from replacing the role of the sovereign by disciplinary
and biopolitical practices. I see it as more important that, rather than basing the positive
account of power on a conative drive for self-preservation following from a geometric
analysis, a Hobbesian analysis of the passions can also be pursued historically following
the path paved by Rousseau and endorsed by Nietzsche. This allows us to conceive of
politics, in a strong Hobbesian sense, in terms of modifying the passions of individuals
for the sake of introducing virtues. A material analysis of the passions will no longer be
based on a substance metaphysics, but develops out of recognizing ourselves as historical
outcomes, that is, as processes that are constructed by a multiplicity of contingent factors.
Conclusions
The goal of this chapter has been twofold. First, I have argued that despite what
Foucault maintains, Hobbes’s view of power should not be reduced to prohibition.
Hobbes identifies the conditions for stabilizing society in transforming the objects of
passions in order to constitute law-abiding citizens. This transformation can operate
negatively, through the terror the sovereign spreads, or positively, by education, reward,
and punishment, along with encouraging virtues that instill peaceful dispositions. I have
also argued that Foucault’s genealogical approach should be seen as one that broadly
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follows from Kant, by directing critique towards contingent conditions of possibility that
are identified from a historical analysis. It follows that Foucault’s view disposes of
metaphysics and pursues a post-Kantian political account. Given Hobbes’s dependence
on materialist metaphysics, rendering this conception of politics consistent with that of
Hobbes requires that we emphasize the positive operation of political power in Hobbes.
The overlap between the characterization of political power we find in both Hobbes and
Foucault serves as a basis for developing a political view that begins from identifying
actual political practices through a historical analysis. The next chapter, therefore, argues
for a non-ideal view by engaging Rawls’s account. By referring to both Foucault and
Hobbes, I seek to justify beginning from actual political practices by arguing that Rawls
cannot adequately account for the role of truth in politics.
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Chapter Five
Normativity in a Nonideal Approach to Politics
In chapter two, I have argued that Foucault’s rejection of the view of power he
ascribes to Hobbes ultimately results in a materialist account of the activity of power
relations. I have suggested that the extent to which Foucault can successfully claim that
his view entails an overturning of the conception of power we find in Hobbes will depend
on whether Hobbes can offer a materialistic account that recognizes the effects of power
on individuals. Consequently, relying on the notion of contract in a Hobbesian sense to
provide normative dictates need not be rejected following a Foucaultian analysis. Chapter
three offered a reading of Hobbes that renders the two views consistent, as I have rejected
an understanding of Hobbes as a metaphysical skeptic. Instead, I maintained that
Hobbes’s politics is best understood as developing out of his commitment to
metaphysical materialism. I have argued that Hobbes methodologically bridges the gap
between the materialism he endorses and his politics. It is ultimately by pursuing a
correct method that we can arrive at a coherent understanding of the physical world, a
method that we also find applied in Hobbes’s political work. Given the material basis for
Hobbes’s contractual view, Foucault’s rethinking of power should not be understood as a
complete reversal of the Hobbesian account, but must be recognized as complementary.
Yet arguing that Foucault’s view is complementary to that of Hobbes requires that I
account for two additional components. This is why chapter four turns first to examine
the understanding of power we find in Hobbes, while arguing that political power in
Hobbes’s work is not strictly prohibitory. Like Foucault, Hobbes recognizes that power
has ‘positive’ effects by producing forms of subjectivity. This is most clearly presented in
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Hobbes’s work in terms of the effects of state practices on the passions of individuals.
Hobbes offers a positive conception of power following the meticulous analysis of the
passions he endorses. Rendering the two views compatible, however, requires accounting
for another component pertaining to the metaphysical commitments both introduce.
Whereas Hobbes puts forward a metaphysical account to ground his politics, I have
offered a reading of Foucault’s view as primarily post-Kantian, and thus as grounding
politics in a historical analysis that recognizes the historicity of knowledge, subjects, and
power relations. This results from recasting the Kantian question in terms of historical
and contingent conditions of possibility instead of universal and necessary ones. In the
absence of a metaphysical basis for his political analysis, Foucault’s account can be best
viewed as a post-Kantian continuation of the Hobbesian project. If the metaphysical
world remains closed off to us, then the descriptive account of politics will rely on a
historical analysis of practices.
Bridging the gap between Foucault and Hobbes, however, leaves unanswered the
question of what implications we can draw with respect to the more recent
contractarianism of Rawls. To maintain that Foucault’s view is compatible with Hobbes’s
does not mean that it will be compatible with all forms of social contract theory. As I
have shown in chapter one, Rawls’s freestanding politics fails to offer justifications for its
normative commitments once it disposes of a nonpolitical basis. This chapter, moreover,
aims at deriving further problems that arise with Rawls’s view from the FoucaultianHobbesian position I have outlined. I first argue that a Foucaultian account on its own can
only justify a very limited number of normative commitments. I then argue for the
priority of beginning with a nonideal approach, and derive from this a critique of Rawls’s
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commitment to both equality and stability. I maintain that we can arrive from Foucault’s
view at two main normative claims, equality arising from a negative argument, and
skepticism of one’s own beliefs as a result of engaging the commitments of others. This
leads to recognizing the need to critically engage the beliefs of others, which undoes the
distinction between the public and private uses of reason Rawls introduces. The last
section of the chapter, therefore, focuses on accounting for historical truth claims in
politics, while arguing that a more engaged politics is required, one that does not insulate
claims to truth by limiting them to a private sphere.
Equality and Inequality: From Analysis to Normativity
In chapter one, I argued that Rawls cannot offer justifications for his normative
commitments due to the absence of an underlying nonpolitical ground. Though Rawls
maintains that his political conception is inherently moral, the absence of a
comprehensive doctrine upon which his prescriptions stand render the normativity he
introduces unjustified or reveals that his political conception itself amounts to a
comprehensive doctrine. Primarily, Rawls is normatively committed to at least two
features of liberalism; equality in terms of reducing unequal distribution resulting from
historical contingencies, as derived from Rousseau; and freedom understood in the
Lockean sense of liberty of conscience.197 (KCMT 307) Both commitments, of course,
cannot be straightforwardly Rousseauian or Lockean, as that would entail justification in
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There’s a question as to how we should understand equality to feature in Rawls’s
work, as it clearly does not involve a simple equality that dictates equal distribution. As
Norman Daniels argues, the form of equality we find in Rawls is best understood as a
complex egalitarianism as exemplified by his difference principle. Norman Daniels,
“Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism,” in The Cambridge Companion
to Rawls, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
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terms of appealing to comprehensive doctrines, which would violate the freestanding
status of politics. As a result, Rawls considers the original position under the veil of
ignorance to offer a means to derive a conception of justice as fairness with an egalitarian
commitment.
Taking equality to be a normative ideal offers a link with the discussions of
Foucault and Hobbes in chapters two and three respectively. Whereas Rawls begins with
the ideal of equality, both Hobbes and Foucault introduce a conception of politics that is
grounded materially while choosing different starting points. Hobbes puts forward an
analysis of the state of nature as a state of war, one that rests primarily on conceiving
human beings as influenced by their passions. For Hobbes, this state of war ensues as a
result of the condition of equality we identify in the state of nature. Central to the
political problem for Hobbes, then, is how to arrive at unified power out of equal natural
persons who mistrust one another, compete with one another, and at times seek glory.
Alternatively, as I have argued in chapter two, Foucault maintains that unequal
relations in society result from the inherent instability in force relations. Foucault
maintains that we find a power relation in every social relation that involves inequality.
His analysis of power in society, therefore, follows from identifying moments of
inequality which have produced these power relations and continue to be perpetuated
through power mechanisms that invest the body. Foucault, therefore, can offer a
historical analysis of how such mechanisms have led to exacerbating the condition of
inequality and maintaining it. Consequently, this leads him to an analysis of the clinic,
madness, sexuality, and delinquency among other fields of study. Though Foucault
recognized the need to advocate for transforming the way inquiry into these fields is
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undertaken in order to improve the conditions of excluded members of the community,
and in fact was actively involved in pushing for such an improvement, his analysis cannot
justify why such improvement is needed. Indeed, Foucault’s largely descriptive position
sheds light on inequalities and exclusion in society, rendering problematic the assumption
of equality as a starting point we find in Hobbes and Rawls given that there are certain
groups that are excluded from the starting point. Foucault, however, lacks a positive
project to justify bettering such conditions.
In fact, one could argue that this allows Foucault to maintain consistency given
his insistence that any positive account could transform into normalizing mechanisms.
Attrubuting a positive normative project to Foucault becomes even more problematic if
we assume that a positive account must be universal in scope. Such a universal view
renders a local historical analysis obsolete, especially one that is concerned with
identifying historical contingent conditions of possibility as I have argued in chapter four.
Foucault, therefore, can only offer conclusions based on local analyses and cannot
endorse any view that seeks to put forward a universal political conception. This would
entail a rejection of Rawlsian liberalism, a Hobbesian conception of the state, and more
generally any attempt to introduce a positive normative conception given its inability to
recognize its own historicity.
Yet there are limitations to this argument against having a normative account.
Normative commitments can still be tentative and offer a more or less flexible generality
even if we are cautious from characterizing them as universal. As I have argued in
chapter four, historical analysis identifies sufficient conditions for knowledge and not
necessary ones. It follows that different historical conditions could generate similar
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power-knowledge complexes that result from different historical conditions, which could
also require similar normative moves. For example, the recent resurfacing of white
supremacy in Europe and the United States can be explained by referring to significantly
different historical circumstances, but the phenomena generated are partly similar, and
confronting them will often, though not always, involve making use of similar tactics.
Relying on tentative normative dictates, therefore, requires that we are involved in
experimental tactics to determine what is most effective. Such experimental approaches,
however, need not develop into all-encompassing hegemonic mechanisms that infiltrate
bodies of individuals. For instance, Foucault shows in his analysis of Governmentality
that there is no essence for the state, but rather a changing conception of government.
Perhaps Foucault is, therefore, correct in maintaining that a theory of the state is not
needed. (BB 77) This, however, should not preclude offering a prescriptive view that
prefers one form of government to another. A Rawlsian approach can offer an answer in
terms of preferring the government that safeguards the equality and freedom of citizens.
We may reject Rawls’s position, but Foucault’s view does not render putting forward
such claims superfluous. We could still recognize that our criteria for preferring one
government to another are transient and limited to specific historically instantiated
problems rather than universal but revisable as Rawls contends. This allows for
incorporating historical transformations into our notion of government, and consequently,
as long as we have a fluid enough understanding of its role, we need not fall into
contradiction. As I argue, this may involve recognizing some generality to normative
conclusions while disposing of the universality we find in Rawls. This general scope of
normativity could often lean on what we take to be necessary conditions, which opens the
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space for the continuous function of critique. If we take seriously Foucault’s argument
that historical critique should be recognized in terms of recasting what we take to be
necessary in terms of contingency, then there’s a sense in which we cannot completely
dispose of invoking necessity as a basis for normativity. This requires that historical
critique is regularly undertaken which results in regularly revising our normative dictates.
Given the dependence of political problems on historical conditions, and given Rawls’s
explicit exclusion of unreasonable citizens, advancing the normative dictate of
safeguarding the freedom and equality of citizens may not always be desired under
different circumstances, especially when these demands are coupled with the discourse of
defending society.
One could maintain in a Foucaultian vein that the normative implications of his
work entail minimizing being governed as much as possible. As I have maintained in
chapter two, if there is no outside to power, and if freedom is not to be conceived on the
model of liberation from power, then the question becomes one of how we can reduce as
much as possible such government by decentering concentrations of force. In fact, in his
essay “What is Critique?” Foucault argues that the critical attitude primarily rests in “not
being governed quite so much.”(WC 265) However, two problems follow from this
argument. First, it is clear that this dictate is still an entirely negative one that specifies
the target of critique but offers no alternative. The fact that critique should target
government certainly does not mean that the absence of government is an ideal state to
pursue. We still need to offer alternatives that would be amenable to Foucault’s insistence
that freedom should not be conceived on the model of complete liberation of power.
Second, accepting that critique should aim at decentering power relations and thus
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establish some kind of equilibrium in such relations rests on assuming a normative ideal
of equality that we ought to work towards. Foucault’s work cannot straightforwardly
justify this ideal or any positive ideal given its strictly analytical character.
Consequently, maintaining a critique of practices that entails a strictly negative
evaluation without offering alternatives remains inadequate. Such a position could easily
collapse into conservatism and lead to a kind of political paralysis. Foucault rebuffs this
claim by maintaining that if “everything is dangerous, then we always have something to
do.” (GE 256) Maintaining that everything is dangerous entails recognizing that current
phenomena could transform into insidious power-knowledge complexes that operate
through exclusionary classifications. Consequently, long-term normative commitments
become problematic as they often unwittingly risk replacing already existing relations of
domination with new ones. Foucault clarifies that the political work involves repeatedly
identifying the main danger and directing our efforts to transform it. He therefore argues
that his position leads to a “hyper- and pessimistic activism.” (GE 256) Foucault insists
that to say everything is dangerous is not to say everything is bad. But determining the
direction of this hyper and pessimistic activism requires offering a normative account. In
its absence, this activism is left blind and unable to justify the kind of change it seeks to
invoke. In other words, if everything is indeed dangerous, then the alternatives may be
just as bad as current practices, if not worse.198
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Mark Olssen argues that we find in Foucault a “right to resistance” that is justified by
appealing to the Hobbesian idea of avoiding the state of war in order to guarantee
survival. Olssen argues that Foucault’s reading of Hobbes entails a legitimate move from
actual war to the language of rights, one that shifts from actual battle to a discursive war
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This objection to Foucault, however, assumes that we should take his view to be
comprehensive and complete. As I have shown in chapter two, the view Foucault
introduces could be complemented by an analysis having a different starting point, that of
equality. Unlike Rawls, Hobbes does not start with the assumption of the ideal of
equality, but rather offers an analysis of the natural condition in the absence of a
sovereign under a condition of equality. Equality, for Hobbes, develops into a normative
commitment once the state is instituted as a result of rationally binding laws of nature. (L
1.16.24) As I showed in chapter four, for Hobbes, all prescriptive content is justified by
appealing to self-preservation, understood in terms of a material endeavor that instigates
the passions of aversion or appetite, leading eventually to the derivation of a complex
network of passions that are grounded in conatus. Hobbes, therefore, does not fall into
the problem of deriving normative claims from descriptive claims, for he does not offer a
view of natural law as binding categorically. Instead, as Hampton maintains, Hobbes’s
laws of nature are best understood as hypothetical imperatives; if we wish to preserve

generally in agreement with the view that we can derive some normative conclusions by
appealing to the Hobbesian argument for avoiding the state of nature, I consider Olssen’s
view to be problematic in a number of respects. As I have argued in chapter two,
Foucault attacks the view Hobbes introduces as he takes it to overlook the underlying war
beneath politics. Foucault, therefore, cannot straightforwardly endorse the Hobbesian
argument without reworking his critique. Moreover, deriving a right to resistance also
cannot be clearly justified on Foucaultian grounds as it is far from clear that everyone
should have a right to resist, including groups that seek to subjugate others. Finally, the
emphasis on security as the primary concern of democratic politics also raises problems,
as the concern for security could easily develop into exclusionary practices. Mark Olssen,
“Chapter 14: Invoking Democracy: Foucault’s Conception (With Insights from Hobbes),”
Counterpoints 292 (2007): 205-06.
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ourselves, which we often do given our material condition, we should abide by the laws
of nature.199
A similar move from the descriptive view to the normative is lacking in Foucault.
To conceive of critique in terms of not being governed so much is to determine the
conditions that make change possible. On its own, it does not provide us with a direction
as to what change we should aim towards or why change is desirable. Nonetheless, even
if we follow Foucault’s view, we could still derive minimal negative conclusions. As I
will argue in the next section, this primarily concerns developing a skeptical approach
with regards to one’s own dogmatic beliefs by considering the contingency of historical
conditions that made such views possible while introducing a commitment to a negative
form of equality. Understanding Foucault’s project as partly aiming at warding off
dogmatism sheds light on his insistence that he is taking up the Kantian project under
different conditions. Any breach in self-evidence that results from unmasking the
historical nature of what is taken to be necessary should have the outcome of recognizing
that one’s own views are far more tenuous and less convincing than at first sight.
I propose, therefore, to couple this negative approach with a positive one we
derive from Hobbes. This will be the focus of the last two sections along with drawing
the implications with respect to Rawls’s view. But before that, the question of how to
offer a direction to normativity raises the problem of the priority of ideal theory over the
nonideal. The next section, therefore, will argue for the logical priority of nonideal theory
over ideal theory.
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Ideal Versus Nonideal Theory
The question of what direction our normative endeavors should follow has a
bearing on Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. In Political
Liberalism, Rawls maintains that nonideal theory is concerned with questions of
transitioning towards the overarching ends determined by ideal theory. (PL 17-18, 285)
Moreover, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls uses this distinction in reference to cases in
which compliance can be expected – ideal conditions – as opposed to conditions where
the initial situation shows that compliance cannot be expected. Nonideal theory,
therefore, refers either to cases where “regimes refuse to comply with a reasonable Law
of Peoples,” or in cases where circumstances make it impossible to attain stability, cases
to which Rawls refers as “burdened societies.” (LP 5) Rawls, accordingly, chooses to
begin with ideal theory and then put forward the conditions that would make it possible
to come close to such ideals in situations where compliance cannot be expected.
The question that arises is whether, as Rawls maintains, an ideal account is
required in order to put forward prescriptive claims. I initially pointed to this problem
with reference to Sen’s work in chapter one. Sen argued that an ideal conception of
justice is redundant since it does not allow us to choose between real possibilities. Thus,
choosing between possible conceptions of justice in contrast to ideal ones requires an
independent inquiry.200 As I argued in the previous section, the problem Rawls presents
can also be extended to the view I introduce, especially with deriving normative content.
One chief difference between the Foucaultian-Hobbesian view I offer, on the one hand,
and the Rawlsian system, on the other, is whether we begin with specifying ideal
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conditions and move towards arguing for feasibility, or whether we take as our starting
point an analysis of actual political conditions and from there develop a normative
account.
Yet articulating clearly the problem that follows from beginning with ideal
conditions seems difficult. The inadequacy of ideal theory has been stated in different
ways. For instance, Colin Farrelly argues that ideal theory fails to offer guidance as to
how we should act. This results from two problems that afflict ideal theories.201 On the
one hand, such theories are “cost-blind,” or do not adequately consider the cost of
establishing basic rights for instance. Often, societies will fail to develop into liberal
democracies not simply because of a lack of political will, but due to the lack of
technological and economic development. It follows, then, that the basic liberties Rawls
argues should be provided to everyone fails to take into consideration what would be
required for those liberties to be provided in such communities.202 On the other hand,
Farrelly contends that ideal theory only takes into consideration a “narrow view” of
misfortunes that could affect societies. Rawls’s view fails to take seriously health care
concerns, unemployment rates, in addition to the accumulating pressure that results from
taking part in a global economy. Rawls, alternatively, presupposes a closed society,
resulting in an idealization that fails to consider the real conditions we find in societies
and the trade-offs that need to be accepted.203 Farrelly maintains, therefore, that only fact-
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sensitive nonideal theories will be able to guide us as to how we must act while making
decisions as to “how best we can use our resources.”204
Farrelly, however, does not offer an adequate answer to the problem I raised in
the previous section. Even if we accept that nonideal theory is more capable of
addressing problems based on real situations and actual facts, the question remains as to
how we choose to address these problems. In other words, even if we accept that ideal
theory is not action guiding because it cannot inform us when it comes to making
decisions in nonideal circumstances, nonideal theory is also unable to provide a
normative direction for our actions. Moreover, as Eva Erman and Niklas Möller argue,
the nonideal part of ideal theory usually aims at addressing the question of how to act
given that we are always making decisions under nonideal conditions.205 If we take
Rawls’s view as an example, his view on nonideal theory addresses the question of what
approach we should follow in situations where noncompliance obtains and the ideal
appears to be far-fetched.
One could also appeal to the argument John Simmons presents in defense of ideal
theory, one that I will argue against shortly. Simmons defends the priority Rawls allots to
ideal theory by maintaining that Rawls’s appeal to nonideal theory appears in situations
where the ideal is far from being achievable, and where intermediate measures must be
taken in order to arrive on the long run at the ideal objective. Given that Rawls’s use of
nonideal theory partly pertains to situations where unfortunate noncompliance is the
product of political crises in “burdened societies,” the concern Farrelly puts forward as a
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narrow view of misfortunes is already addressed. In both these cases, Simmons maintains
that not applying the ideal principles of justice fully is only justified when nonideal
practices are part of a process aiming at achieving the ideal conception of justice.206 For
Simmons, this primarily results from accepting that more serious injustices must be
resolved first before ideal conditions are implemented, which may often require adopting
nonideal measures.207
As Simmons argues, though determining what constitutes a graver injustice is a
moral matter to be resolved philosophically, and more precisely by appealing to
freestanding politics, nonideal approaches must make use of non-political justifications
by appealing to economics, social science, and other disciplines. Nonideal mechanisms,
therefore, require that we look into political possibility and effectiveness to reach the
purported outcome, not simply whether they are morally permissible or not. This
emphasizes the transitional role of nonideal theory.208
Simmons uses this argument to respond to Sen’s objection. By maintaining that
the value of a nonideal practice depends on how much it helps in achieving the ideal,
Simmons maintains that comparing nonideal practices will depend on the ideal we want
to attain.209 In other words, we can only choose between two nonideal conceptions of
justice once we have determined which one provides desired long-term effects and
strategic advantages which allow us to ultimately move closer to our ideal. Consequently,
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nonideal theory cannot be independently pursued without identifying beforehand an ideal
to guide it.
What follows from this conclusion is that ideal theory acquires logical priority
over nonideal theory. The practical implications of this, however, have been challenged.
For instance, while acknowledging that ideal theory has logical priority over nonideal
theory, Burke Hendrix maintains that logical priority does not entail temporal priority.
For Hendrix, nonideal theory provides limitations that ought to be taken into account
whenever considering a conception of justice. Hendrix considers Foucault’s view to offer
one set of limitations to the “realistic utopia” Rawls envisions.210 These challenges arise
once we recognize the “self-replication of systems of control” that arises out of the
exercise of power.211 By shaping individuals through directing behavior, strategic power
relations appear to determine what beliefs individuals hold. As a result, political criticism
is rendered part and parcel of the machinery of power relations. Critique, thus, cannot
simply operate in terms of offering an ideal conception of justice, but must develop out of
the conception of power we adopt.212 This casts doubt on the supposition of ideal theory,
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especially that of Rawls, that the main political question concerns the central institutions
of the state.213 This kind of commitment considers that effecting political change must
ultimately be in terms of setting laws and fails to recognize that the law is simply one
way power is expressed.214
Nonetheless, Hendrix’s use of the distinction between logical and temporal
priority is not convincing. Hendrix maintains that given the lack of an ideal conception to
pursue following the absence of a unified overall theory, we must begin with nonideal
changes that eventually may lead to building up towards an aspired for ideal. But if
Hendrix is correct, then nonideal theory would provide the means which allow us to
develop a coherent ideal theory, and by virtue of that is not only temporally prior, but
also attains logical priority. Ideal conclusions must follow from already determined
nonideal ends. Hendrix, however, accepts Simmons’s argument, which renders the
logical priority of nonideal theory a conclusion he is not willing to accept.215 In contrast, I
argue that if we recognize that the production of ideals often ends up propagating social
inequality, there is good reason to take nonideal theory to have logical priority. This will
become clearer with the argument Mills presents, which I will move to shortly.
But Hendrix also argues that this conception of power suggests an additional
limitation. First, if power is propagated through larger organized networks, then
dissipating concentrations of force requires fragmented work across various disciplines.
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The fragmented nature of this work aims at preventing its development into a unified
body of knowledge, which will serve a similar function to already existing networks of
power. Consequently, Hendrix recognizes that this should lead us to question our own
normative commitments. As Foucault maintains, if power is indeed everywhere, then
even critical attempts are submerged in the network of relations of power.
For Hendrix, this should lead to a “deep and systematic skepticism about human
cognitive capacities.”216 The fact that “everything is dangerous” suggests that we must
mistrust inclinations and beliefs that we take for granted. Indeed, as Hendrix maintains, a
“non-ideal strategy should be a modest one that proceeds only with a strong sense of
normative self-doubt.”217 Recognizing our shortcomings and our inevitable bias as a
result of being always situated within a network of force relations requires that we
mitigate confidence in our beliefs and instead adopt a skeptical attitude. But, for Hendrix,
this means that working for change cannot be systematized or coordinated.218
This argument for skepticism that focuses on cognitive hindrances in determining
ideals can be complemented by another serious objection to ideal theory raised by
Charles Mills. Mills maintains that any kind of ideal theory can serve at best an
ideological function. In a Marxist vein, ideal theory normatively conceals and perpetuates
the already existing divisions and group privileges present in society, while completely
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overlooking forms of oppression.219 Mills addresses the question of normative direction
by distinguishing between two approaches; “ideal-as normative” and “ideal-as-idealized.”
Whereas the former simply appeals to ideals in a normative sense that ought to be
pursued, the latter results from abstracting from specific circumstances, which involves
simplification. The problem, however, is that ideal-as-idealization often results in
representing “the actual as a simple deviation from ideal, not worth theorizing in its own
right.”220 This will often involve, among other things, silence over oppression and an
absence of a historical examination of its remnants in the present.221
Mills suggests that we alternatively resort to descriptive abstractions as opposed
to abstractions that result in idealizations, while making use of idealized norms. These
two features are compatible with nonideal theory, while at the same time not succumbing
to dominant generalizations that dissolve oppression through beginning with ideal
states.222 For Mills, one main problem that arises with ideal theory is disregarding the
cognitive obstacles that accompany any form of ideal theorizing. Given the ideological
presuppositions and biases we are prone to make, a “simple empiricism” will not be
adequate to avoid falling into idealized abstractions. Being sensitive to the employment
of norms that serve exclusionary functions requires including different perspectives, and
as Mills maintains, a nonideal perspective may be necessary to derive critical concepts. 223
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Mills’s reliance on abstraction as opposed to idealization encounters a problem
however. As Erman and Möller argue, Mills’s claim that ideals are inapplicable appears
to be empirically false as we often find that idealized norms are applied in local contexts.
For instance, there could certainly be spaces where gender equality has been attained,
despite still being at the universal level an issue that requires advancement. Idealized
notions can, therefore, often appeal to specific existing cases and extrapolate from them
rather than simply being derived from illusory ideals.224 Moreover, Mill’s argument
would have more force against an ideal view that is not complemented with a nonideal
counterpart. Silence over forms of oppression may result from a strictly ideal view, but
issues of oppression will be addressed if ideal theory is coupled with nonideal practices.
Yet I consider Mills to have successfully argued for two main claims. First, Mills shows
how it is that idealized conceptions can often overlook other perspectives, which
becomes more problematic as a result of our zeal to promote our ideal. He, thus, sheds
light on the many cognitive obstacles we face when we theorize independently from
actual political relations. This further corroborates Hendrix’s claim that advancing
normative content must be accompanied by a degree of skepticism. Second, Mills’s
argument entails a commitment to the claim that a positive view may emerge out of
taking into consideration various perspectives.225 The content of these perspectives may
provide the means to derive more inclusive political prescriptions.
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This notion of cognitive obstacles that we find in both Hendrix and Mills allows
for raising a major problem for ideal theory. Whereas Hendrix clearly appeals to
Foucault, Mills’s view can also be related to Foucault’s position. Foucault’s genealogical
work sheds light on practices that have employed “rational” discourses of knowledge in
order to refine strategies of domination and maintain exclusionary practices. For
Foucault, it is a historical analysis that allows us to recognize the role such practices play,
and to account for how rational justifications have been secondary and subservient to
practices that have constituted governable subjects. Ultimately, a historical analysis can
perform such a role as it serves to delegitimize positive values that have been taken to be
rationally true. Though Mills primarily appeals to Marx, his argument can be certainly
extended to Foucault, and even developed further. With a Focuaultian argument,
normative claims that arise out of such idealizations often serve the function of
propagating power relations.
It is crucial to note, however, that this does not involve a rejection of rational
accounts altogether. As I have argued in chapter four, Foucault’s historical approach
should be contrasted with a transcendental one and not with a rational one. A historical
method must also follow rational criteria for determining valid from invalid narratives. If
rational inquiry towards ideals may result in mistakenly identifying oppressive
prescriptions, it does not follow that a non-ideal view has to break way from rational
inquiry altogether. As Habermas notes, that would risk blurring the line between reason
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and myth.226 Foucault is clear, however, that a non-ideal approach must also be operating
within the confines of the rules of reason. In “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” Foucault
rejects the postmodernist tendency to “designate that which has just occurred as the
primary enemy, as if this were always the principal form of oppression from which one
had to liberate oneself.”227 (SKP 357) Instead, we should be always referring to reason as
a standard, while at the same time being wary of the “intrinsic dangers” that are involved
with allowing reason to determine necessary limits.228 (SKP 358)
Recognizing the many hindrances we face in arriving at an ideal can lead us to
develop one normative implication of the view Foucault holds. Foucault’s historical
approach provides us with ample empirical arguments for how we are often mistaken
when it comes to the ideals we develop. This requires, therefore, endorsing a form of
skepticism with regards to one’s own commitments, while recognizing that others may be
able to contribute positively by shedding light on the incompleteness of one’s political
view. From a Foucaultian point of view, though the views of others may offer different
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perspectives that need not be compatible with one’s own position, such engagement
allows for reducing confidence in one’s position, or at the very least for rethinking one’s
commitments by negotiating conflicting perspectives. However, pursuing this skepticism
in a non-systematic and fragmented manner as Hendrix argues seems to be unjustified.
The Foucaultian hope should not be to liberate ourselves from power by advancing
fragmented critique, but rather to use power mechanisms strategically for the sake of
ameliorating power effects. Foucault shows that making use of such strategies is a
precondition for effectively arriving at one’s end. Consequently, it is not the strategies
themselves that are pernicious, but the effects they leave behind in the kinds of subjects
they produce. Relating these strategies to the endorsement of a form of skepticism does
not serve the purpose of eliminating the possibility of action, but rather it aims at being
open to receiving the experiences of others. I will refer back to this in the last section of
the chapter after arguing for the role of truth in politics.
There is, moreover, one other normative implication we can derive from a
Foucaultian view. Foucault’s historical analysis often serves the purpose of undermining
networks of present power relations, ones that arise, as he maintains, from relations of
inequality. Though this does not imply that inequality is inherently bad, I maintain that
we can still derive a negative normative commitment to equality from his work. This
appears primarily in terms of delegitimizing differences and hierarchies that are taken to
be justified through appealing to truth. By uncovering the historical emergence of
discourses of knowledge and identifying the role they have played in perpetuating these
inequalities, I take a Focuaultian view to aim at denaturalizing such inequalities. Whereas
artificial inequalities may be sometimes justified, naturalizing such hierarchies by
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appealing to truth claims is what a genealogical analysis seeks to undo.229 Determining
which inequalities are justified, however, is a question Foucault does not tackle, one to
which we can offer Hobbesian answers.230
I have argued so far that there is good reason to consider nonideal theory as
logically prior to ideal theory. This raises the problem of how we can derive normative
content from an analysis of the political field. I have suggested two normative
implications, endorsing skepticism that results from recognizing the cognitive obstacles
that often limit our perspectives along with a negative commitment to equality. This form
of equality functions as a constraint on ideal norms that could generate unjustified
inequalities. Accepting these conclusions raises a problem for the argument Simmons had
introduced. Simmons maintains that we must begin with ideal theory and then consider
nonideal practices that have to do with feasibility. Ultimately, however, this argument
would work on the condition that we accept that we can arrive at universals ideals
through abstracting from particular conditions, a claim we have good reason to doubt due
to our limited perspectives. The next section will derive implications with respect to
Rawls’s view of stability from the priority of nonideal theory.
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Foucault and Rawls – Returning to Politics as War
In the previous section, I have maintained that Simmons’s defense of Rawls fails
since we cannot be confident of the reliability of long-term ideals we set, which renders
an evaluation of nonideal practices in terms of ideal ends problematic. By referring to
arguments presented by Mills and Hendrix, I have argued that certain cognitive obstacles
hinder developing ideals independently of practice. On the one hand, as Mills maintains,
such ideals will often reflect the experience of privileged groups while discounting those
of the underprivileged by considering them to pertain to a secondary sphere, that of the
nonideal. On the other hand, as Hendrix maintains, and as I have argued in chapter four,
critique can only arise from within power networks, which casts doubt on its long-term
justification. Ideals, which result from instances of critique, therefore, cannot fulfill the
long-term role both Rawls and Simmons allot to them. I therefore maintain that we can
derive a normative dictate of skepticism towards our own views and a negative
commitment to equality, one that does not arise out of bestowing equal rights but results
from delegitimizing hierarchies. This section will examine the Rawlsian commitment to
stability following these conclusions.
As I have argued in the previous section, beginning with ideal theory can only be
successful if we maintain that the ideals we set can be guaranteed to be long-term goals
that are not exclusionary. This, however, is a claim that cannot be easily defended unless
we assume some fixed notion of justice that we can rationally discern and to which we
can always appeal. This conclusion is significant when it comes to building bridges
between the views of Foucault and Rawls. For instance, Paul Patton argues that
Foucault’s account is best understood as compatible with the view Rawls puts forward by
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shedding light on the historical nature of normative content in Rawls. I argue that Patton
is correct in emphasizing the historical aspect in Rawls’s view, but this does not render
Foucault’s account compatible with that of Rawls. To begin with, Patton shows how
Rawls maintains that the conception of public reason is shifting and affected by historical
transformations. Patton rightly maintains that Rawls holds a conception of public reason
that changes according to the emergence of political conceptions. This may be the
outcome of changes in the overlapping consensus or in the appearance of new political
problems and new political groups. (LP 142) Primarily, Patton takes this change to be the
result of the “background culture” which is constantly active in terms of systematizing
public conceptions.231 In Political Liberalism, Rawls refers to background culture as
involving the social, or the culture of daily life, including comprehensive doctrines
whether religious, philosophical, or otherwise (PL 14). Patton maintains that for Rawls,
the boundary between background culture and public reason is “historically moveable,”
due to societal changes that render certain background justifications publicly acceptable
or determines that specific public justifications belong to comprehensive doctrines and
must slip into the background.232
Understanding public reason in terms of shifting historical content allows for
drawing a link between Foucault and Rawls. By arguing for this reading of Rawls, Patton
takes Foucault’s view to be consistent with the one that Rawls presents. Patton considers
that Rawls introduces historicity into his formal conception of reason. Moreover, Patton
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takes Foucault’s account to be congenial to the liberal approach Rawls endorses.233 For
Patton, a Rawlsian approach would constitute one answer to the question of the kind of
governmentality fit for socialism. Foucault had raised this question in The Birth of
Biopolitics without offering an adequate response. (BB 94) Patton maintains that Rawls’s
normative commitment to egalitarianism, and to Meade’s principle of redistributing
property, renders his view compatible with the requirements Foucault introduces.234
This reading of Rawls casts doubt on the problem Hendrix raises against Rawls.
Hendrix had overemphasized the stability of Rawls’s normative conclusions and seems to
give little credence to the argument that appears in Rawls’s later work pertaining to the
shifting content of the conception of justice. Yet by making his view amenable to
historical transformations that can incorporate the emergence of new problems and new
political subjects, Rawls renders his position less fixed than the conception of justice he
had already put forward in Theory.
This shift has significant implications with respect to the account of stability
Rawls holds. As I have argued in chapter one, Rawls attempts to introduce stability for
the right reasons in order to resolve the Hobbesian problem of depending on an absolute
sovereign. For Rawls, stability ensues as a result of appealing to political justifications
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for one’s public views. As Gerald Gauss argues, Rawls’s move towards a freestanding
political view that completely separates politics from comprehensive doctrines also leads
to a strict division between public and private reason. Rawls argues for a moral duty to
provide shared reasons for the political views one holds.235 In Political Liberalism, Rawls
invokes a proviso of having citizens “justifying their conclusions in due course by public
reasons.” (PL lii) This proviso guarantees for Rawls that stability would be attained once
we move away from reasons pertaining to comprehensive doctrines to ones that are solely
political, while being intrinsically moral. I will return to a more complete discussion of
the division between public and private reason in the next section, but for now, I argue
that this move sheds light on a tension between the commitment to equality and the
stability that Rawls seeks to achieve.
If we accept Rawls’s proviso with respect to the kinds of reasons we have a moral
duty to invoke, then we also would have to account for how transformative movements
affect the reasons that citizens hold when new political problems emerge. My contention
is that this often involves a reworking of the political reasons to which citizens appeal,
and these moments, therefore, affect the degree of stability of society. For instance,
continuous efforts to end violence and exclusionary practices that target individuals based
on their sexual orientation or gender identity requires reworking public justifications.
Though public acceptance of the inclusion of these groups may require reconsidering
one’s own comprehensive doctrines, it more importantly requires rethinking one’s public
reasons with regards to which members of society matter. In Rawlsian terms, this
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requires that the public boundaries of the group of reasonable and rational people to
whom reciprocity is owed should be reconsidered. Such a revision of one’s position is
bound to weaken the publicly available reasons that are a precondition for the stability
Rawls advocates. This tension arises primarily between a commitment to stability in
terms of shared public reasons on the one hand and the normative dictate of equality with
which Rawls begins. In fact, as I have argued earlier, if equality follows from
delegitimizing hierarchies that are considered to be givens, then a historical reading of
Rawls’s public reason involves recognizing that introducing new political groups and
shedding light on new political problems requires rethinking the kinds of reasons we
hold. Striving towards equality, therefore, will always come at the expense of the stability
of society.
My point is not that Rawls cannot incorporate multiple views on difficult political
matters in his political account, nor am I arguing that Rawls defends the continued
exclusion of political groups. Instead, I contend that rectifying political practices will
necessarily involve destabilizing the Rawlsian political scheme, by Rawls’s own lights,
which offers insight into the nature of politics. Under these terms, the conception of
stability Rawls employs is at odds with the dynamic of politics, even the one he defends
by recognizing the fluidity of the public space with his freestanding political view. If I am
correct, the implications of this argument are twofold. First, at the meta-political level,
this suggests that Foucault is correct in partly analyzing politics on the model of war. I
had argued in chapter four that understanding power relations in terms of
governmentality involves recognizing the material activity of forces that serve a broader
strategic goal. Often, periods of stability can be understood as moments where pragmatic
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considerations lead to successfully silencing political groups or excluding individuals
from being politically relevant, and thus only gives illusory stability. By recognizing that
public reason is constantly being revised and reconsidered, Rawls undermines key
presuppositions that he uses in order to guarantee stability.236
The second implication concerns the significance of stability in relation to the
meta-political conclusion I have presented above. Does this imply that we are always in a
Hobbesian state of nature when we are politically engaged? There’s a sense in which
Rawls is correct in thinking that we can have more or less stability. However, Rawls’s
ideal stability condition appears to preclude working towards equality, which is one of
the two normative commitments Rawls specifies for his project. By specifying
overlapping consensus among comprehensive doctrines as a condition for stability, Rawls
would have to recognize that the inclusion of new groups will undermine this overlapping
consensus and thus stability. I do not deny that we can have more or less stability in a
society, nor do I contend that periods of stability are always unwanted. The conclusion to
draw instead is that a nonideal political view must negotiate the demand for stability with
that of equality. This casts doubt on being able to derive an ideal that can entirely satisfy
both at the same time.
How, then, can we argue for stability? The Hobbesian argument for justifying
obligations proves to be useful here. Hobbes’s argument for political obligations towards
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others in our society remains sound even within a democratic context. Though we may
reject Hobbes’s appeal to the sovereign in order to guarantee stability, we may still justify
the need to arrive at some stable scheme by appealing to the argument from the state of
nature.237 Following the argument I offered earlier in the chapter, this need not involve a
universal normative dictate for stability. Stability may often be undesirable when it
comes at the expense of incorporating marginalized groups. The relevance of attaining
political stability will depend on the political problems we face, which become clearer
upon pursuing a historical analysis. If stability is indeed desired in order to ward off a
condition of war, Hobbes’s view offers insight. Given that, in the absence of a state that
is capable of channeling individual passions, we often slip into a state of war, obligation
towards other members of the community arises out of prudential considerations
pertaining to the fear of death and desiring a commodious living. This argument need not
develop in an a priori form as it does with Hobbes, and instead, could simply result from
an empirical claim about how we often behave in the absence of regulations given our
historical and material conditions. I therefore argue that we should begin with
recognizing how we are materially constituted and then move to justify strategies
conducive for stability. Under this reading, normative claims are justified as hypothetical
imperatives, but the hypothetical imperatives will themselves depend on the historical
conditions that constitute the political problems at hand. Specifying normative
obligations, then, would follow from adopting specific prescriptions that lead away from
a chaotic state toward a more stable society. These prescriptions, however, as I have
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argued above will be limited by a negative argument for equality derived from Foucault’s
work.
These normative commitments must also be kept in check in relation to the
skeptical attitude I have suggested above. On the one hand, this entails that all the
commitments we derive out of hypothetical imperatives must be revisable not merely in
principle but also in practice. On the other hand, endorsing the skeptical attitude also
involves recognizing that the target of political strategies will frequently be the beliefs of
individuals. As I will show in the next section, accepting that political action should aim
at transforming the beliefs of individuals by invoking skepticism will have certain
consequences on the divide between public and private reason to which Rawls
subscribes.
The Public/Private Divide
As I have argued in the previous section, invoking a conception of stability that is
based on historically determined shared public reasons conflicts with the dictate of
equality. Moreover, the question of normative justification can also lead to a second
problem that emerges with Rawls’s ideal theory, one that pertains to stability in relation
to truth claims. As I will show, the position Rawls endorses limits political intervention
and does not allow for critical engagement with citizens’ beliefs. This is most clearly
exemplified in differences with regards to historical truth claims, which Rawls does not
consider. I argue, therefore, that jettisoning the divide between public and private reason
is a more fruitful approach.
To clarify the role of truth claims in politics, I begin by borrowing a distinction that
Hannah Arendt introduces. In her 1967 essay “Truth and Politics,” Arendt distinguishes
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between the rational truth of philosophers and factual truth. The former is similar to
mathematical truth by its capacity to compel assent, whereas the latter is a more
vulnerable form of truth that has deep political implications. Rational truths, for Arendt,
are not at risk of disappearing once publicly rejected. On the one hand, Arendt accepts
the view she attributes to Hobbes that, like mathematical truths, philosophical truths that
do not have a bearing on the political life do not rouse the suspicion of the public.238 On
the other hand, though rational philosophical truths can be publicly denounced, they still
resurface at later moments, as we find with Galileo’s views for instance. Factual truths,
alternatively, are vulnerable to complete erasure if they are countered with lies.239
For Arendt, deliberate falsehoods and organized lying in politics primarily serve to
abolish such factual truths, which are basic truths of history. Unwelcome factual truths
are thus shifted to the realm of opinion, and can be simply disputed by deliberate
falsehoods when uttered publicly. For Arendt, these truths are of the utmost political
significance, as they have a direct bearing on the current political situation. Yet, unlike
rational truths which have a transcendent element, a safe haven that shields them from
public criticism, factual truths exist strictly publicly. The absence of such a transcendent
trait in factual truths implies that their public denial results in their disappearance. As a
result, political manipulation can operate simply through the systematic denial of such
truths in order to put together a different historical narrative.240
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Consequently, for Arendt, the historian’s task is to take these facts in their simplicity
and arrange them to constitute a narrative, while leaving the facts themselves unscathed.
Arendt expresses an optimism that identifies in truth a durability that we do not find in
deliberate falsehoods. Manipulative lies will always be inadequate upon proper scrutiny,
and will require replacement with new lies. It is up to independent scholars to guarantee
that the truth always surfaces, and that unwelcome truths prevail over deception. This is
where the historian intervenes and assumes a role that is “outside the political realm” in
its disinterestedness, but it is a role that simultaneously has the political function of
preserving facts.241
The role ascribed to the historian marks a significant divergence from the view
Foucault holds. Whereas Arendt considers that historians primarily should occupy an
impartial position that allows for transmitting objective truth claims to the public,
Foucault does not consider truth claims to transcend political strategies but are rather
embedded in them. Yet what is of interest for my argument here is not Arendt’s claim
that factual truths ought to be preserved, but rather her clear statement that factual truth
claims often serve a political function.242 This leads to two main issues in relation to
Rawls with regards to the role he allots to truth. First, as I have shown in chapter one,
Rawls accounts for political difference primarily in terms of commitment to
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comprehensive doctrines. In fact, in his later work, Rawls explicitly specifies that
political liberalism deals with one kind of disagreement only, that arising between
comprehensive doctrines. (LP 177) Comprehensive doctrines, for Rawls, include
Arendt’s rational truths, but they are not reducible to them. Rawls takes any doctrine,
whether philosophical or religious, to constitute a comprehensive view that cannot be
included in justifying agreement. As Arendt shows, however, political disagreement often
does not pertain to such metaphysical beliefs, but materializes instead in conflict with
respect to factual historical truths.
It should be clear that Arendt’s distinction can be used in tandem with the view
Foucault develops. As I have argued in chapter two, Foucault’s conception of politics
involves recognizing the function of agonistic material forces, ones that often function by
targeting historical narratives. Like Arendt, Foucault recognizes that the construction of
historical narratives has significant political implications. The exposition Foucault offers
in Society Must be Defended, with regards to the use of history as a weapon and the
appearance of the race war discourses most clearly shows how the different uses of
historical truths serve a political function. (SMD 59-60, 216-17) However, instead of
ascribing an objective role to the historian, Foucault recognizes that historical
constructions are often motivated and goal-oriented. By virtue of offering a historical
account, factual truths are transformed, and narratives of blame come to be put forward.
Whereas it is certainly the historian’s task to preserve factual truths, by engaging in the
act of constructing narratives, the historian does more than assume a disinterested role
and is involved in a strategic political game.
How amenable is this analysis of disagreement to the view Rawls endorses? As I have
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argued in the previous section, Patton rightly takes Rawls to maintain that nonpolitical
reasons, or reasons appealing to comprehensive doctrines, may play a role in influencing
citizens. (PL 60n13) Indeed, the moral power of reasonableness Rawls allots to citizens
as a requirement for being motivated and engaged in politics renders their commitment to
nonpolitical reasons necessary. Fleshing out the implications of accounting for historical
truths in politics requires that I first introduce the role Rawls allots to private and public
reason, especially in his later work.
As I have shown in chapter one, Rawls repeatedly emphasizes that the political
question is one that marginalizes truth in favor of reasonableness. Yet rather than simply
dismissing truth as irrelevant, Rawls’s “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” which was
published in 1997, introduces a more complex view of the role of comprehensive
doctrines. In this essay, Rawls clearly specifies that unless comprehensive doctrines are
unreasonable, their content is not subject to scrutiny or criticism by appealing to publicly
accepted justifications. (LP 132) Nevertheless, whereas in his earlier Kantian work Rawls
had completely separated the questions of truth and politics, in this later essay he is more
careful about excluding truth. Rawls maintains that “the zeal to embody the whole truth
in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic
citizenship.” (LP 133, my emphasis)
What demands does Rawls place on citizens then with respect to the justifications
they use? To begin with, Rawls argues that the proviso of public reason does not apply to
all political discussions, but only to the discourse of judges, government officials, or
candidates for government officials. (LP 133) This suggests that truth claims derived
from comprehensive doctrines are allowed to serve a function within political discourse,
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especially in the background culture where non-political reasons may be invoked. (LP
134) However, Rawls maintains that in relation to the idea of public reason, the ideal of
public reason also applies to citizens and is only fulfilled when they satisfy their duty of
civility. As in Political Liberalism, Rawls maintains that the duty of civility is not a legal
obligation, but morally requires that citizens view themselves as if they were legislators.
Accordingly, citizens must refrain from including reasons pertaining to comprehensive
doctrines in political matters. (LP 135) Consequently, justifying one's view must appeal
to political reasons strictly. (LP 153-55) The main justification Rawls offers for this
conclusion arises from his commitment to reciprocity. Rawls maintains that our moral
duty as reasonable citizens dictates that we offer public reasons that other citizens would
accept only if they are convinced, and not due to any pressure that results from occupying
an inferior social position. (LP 137)
To further clarify the justification requirement, Rawls maintains the proviso he
specifies in Political Liberalism, as he argues that comprehensive doctrines may
contribute to the public discussion on the condition that “in due course, we give properly
public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to
support.” (LP 144; PL lii) Moreover, as he did in his earlier work, Rawls contends that a
commitment to comprehensive doctrines is required to motivate citizens, and by virtue of
that, motivation is not simply shifted to political reasons. Consequently, though
justification must appeal to political reasons, citizens may still recognize that what
grounds their political views are comprehensive doctrines. Ultimately, we may be
motivated by comprehensive doctrines to pursue specific ends, but we are also motivated
by reasonableness to ensure that we provide reasons that can be accepted by others in the
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public space. For Rawls, though this may not lead to agreement, we still arrive at “a
shared public basis of justification.” (LP 172)
Whereas Rawls insists that the “whole truth” may not enter into the public sphere,
he still recognizes that citizens’ political opinions should be subject to change upon
discussion with others. (LP 138-39) However, given Rawls’s claim that motivation may
often refer to comprehensive doctrines and not political reasons, changing opinion is
likely to be very limited in scope. To clarify, it is unclear how my view on a certain
political matter can change as a result of conversing with others if I am primarily
motivated by a comprehensive doctrine. Any political reasons I am offered will not
challenge my philosophical or religious commitments.
Rawls, consequently, allows for truth claims to play a role in shaping political
views while excluding them from public criticism. If I can be motivated by
comprehensive reasons, then my beliefs contribute to the political views I come to hold.
Rawls’s view, however, by virtue of insulating comprehensive doctrines discounts the
need for critically engaging beliefs resulting from those doctrines. This leads to the first
problem that arises with excluding historical truths from political disagreement. Rawls
does not take into consideration the role such narratives play, but it would follow from
his argument that they hold the same status as comprehensive doctrines. Rawls excludes
comprehensive doctrines from public reasons given the unlikelihood of arriving at
agreement with respect to their dictates. It is arguably a similar case with historical
narratives, which often do not constitute a basis for agreement. Accordingly, Arendt’s
factual truths under a Rawlsian scheme would be relegated to the private sphere.
Nonetheless, given that, as both Arendt and Foucault show, historical truth claims play a
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significant role in shaping political affiliations, political intervention then must act on the
beliefs of citizens with regards to those truth claims. Rawls, however, does not allow for
critical engagement with such beliefs given that they are relocated to a private sphere
immune to criticism. In contrast, allowing these beliefs public expression will enable
critical scrutiny of claims to factual historical truths. As I have argued in the previous
section, recognizing that political motivation arises from beliefs implies that political
intervention should act on those specific beliefs. This is why inculcating skepticism
should lead to mitigating the antagonism arising from disagreement with regards to these
beliefs. This partly follows from engaging the truth commitments of others and, as Mills
argues, recognizing the value of including the perspectives of others.
But Rawls’s view with regards to truth generally has also been subject to a
Hobbesian criticism. As Gerald Gauss argues, liberalism fails to respond to a challenge
Hobbes raises, namely that disagreements arising out of private judgments will infect the
public sphere. This is why Hobbes resorts to the sovereign as the arbitrator in order to
avoid collapsing into the state of nature.243 Gauss attributes to Hobbes the view that
private reasons for disagreement will spill over to the public sphere since we are
passionate individuals who are bound to be biased. Accordingly, a Lockean distinction
between private and public becomes irrelevant.244 Whereas Locke’s response invoked
tolerance to all groups that recognize tolerance as a basic political tenet, Rawls’s appeal
to overlapping consensus in Political Liberalism originally aims at avoiding the

243

Gerald Gauss, “Hobbes’s Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism,” in Hobbes Today:
Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S. A. Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 166.
244
Gauss, “Hobbes’s Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism,” 169-70.
190

insulation of the private from public influence as we find in Locke. If overlapping
consensus on reasonableness and rationality is already actual, we can simply follow its
dictates without jeopardizing the private beliefs of citizens.245
Gauss argues, however, that Rawls retains several theses that render his account
inconsistent. On the one hand, Rawls argues that full justification must appeal to both
shared reasons as well as reasons arising from comprehensive doctrines.246 (PL 386) On
the other hand, in Political Liberalism, Rawls also accepts that the public reasons to
which we can appeal will include a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice.
This entails recognizing that disagreement will not be limited to the private but is already
present in the public sphere. For Gauss, Rawls’s appeal to overlapping consensus
attempts to limit the implications of disagreement by maintaining that reasonable
comprehensive doctrines already agree on basic principles and values. As long as private
judgments do not conflict with shared principles, the basic structure of society will be
stable due to overlapping consensus. However, given that Rawls endorses in his later
work the view that the fact of reasonable pluralism also applies to the shared reasons,
overlapping consensus fails to achieve the goal of identifying shared principles.247
Ultimately, Rawls returns to the insulation principle that we find in Locke, for though
private judgments do matter in justification, the strict separation between the private and
public is strongly reintroduced. Nevertheless, Rawls insists that full justification can only
follow from shared principles and comprehensive doctrines. However, since both spheres
involve disagreement, this precludes identifying legitimate reasons in terms of a shared
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basis. As Guass notes, it is ultimately unclear why the distinction between the two is
maintained if we accept overlapping consensus.248
As I have argued above, Rawls’s view in “The Idea of Public Revisited” no
longer consists of offering both kinds of justifications, political and comprehensive, but
primarily restricts justification to political reasons. Gauss’s argument is still sound,
however, given that the problem arises from accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism in
the public sphere, instead of limiting it to private reasons. Rawls accepts the
consequences of disagreement within political reasons, and consequently, argues for a
shared public basis for justification instead of shared reasons. But as Gauss notes, if we
accept Rawls’s overlapping consensus, then that shared basis is already present within
comprehensive doctrines, which is why the division between public and private becomes
redundant.249
Consequently, Gauss offers an alternative that seeks to dispose of the divide
between public and private altogether so that comprehensive doctrines in their diversity
can partake in arriving at public rules.250 The problem, however, is that Gauss strongly
relies on overlapping consensus in comprehensive doctrines. In the absence of this
assumption, Gauss’s solution will lead to problems for minority groups, especially since
it would allow for introducing religious justifications in legislation. Gauss, however,
appeals to the Hobbesian argument to which I have referred in the previous section. For
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Gauss, attempting to impose unjust constitutions or to reject policies based on private
interests will be precluded by an argument from the state of nature. Such practices can
only follow if one deems the alternative unjust to the extent that they would “rather forgo
the tremendous benefits of a morally ordered social life.”251
Gauss does not develop his argument fully, but as it stands his response is still
susceptible to criticisms with regards to avoiding discrimination in legislation. Arguing
that unjust legislations would not occur because parties will be aware of the risk of
slipping into the state of nature is problematic, since it also entails that a minority group’s
attempts to reject or veto discriminatory legislation will have to go through the same
argument. In other words, such a group would also have to consider that invoking a veto
to preserve equal treatment may lead to a state of nature, which may clearly result in
perpetuating injustices under the threat of societal collapse. Ultimately, therefore, Gauss
must appeal to distinctions that Rawls introduces, mainly that there is a reasonable
overlap between comprehensive doctrines that entails a commitment to reciprocity. In the
absence of this overlap, it is difficult to determine how this view can be sustained.
One advantage Gauss’s reading offers, however, is strongly allowing for
reintroducing truth into politics. The goal is not to overturn the Rawlsian insight by
recasting the political question as one that appeals to truth rather than being merely
procedural. Rather, allowing truth claims to operate in the political realm renders those
claims susceptible to critique. This view endorsed by Gauss can also be linked to
Foucault’s argument with regards to skepticism. Foucault shows us how political
intervention occurs by targeting the beliefs of members of the community and altering
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their commitments to truth. For Foucault, then, one way of effecting political critique is
by weakening the confidence individuals have in their beliefs. Rather than instilling
specific truths pertaining to historical narratives in individuals, critique serves the
purpose of weakening the rhetorical force of such narratives. This is where inculcating
skepticism in members of the community becomes useful. The emphasis on being
skeptical towards one’s own view leads to mitigating antagonism and replacing it with an
agnostic engaged politics that does not set aside truth, while simultaneously avoiding
transforming the political question into one of attaining truth. This skeptical outlook
should also serve the purpose of resolving the problem we find in Gauss. Rather than
relying on a reasonable overlap between comprehensive doctrines, instilling a disposition
to be skeptical with regards to one’s own beliefs, while retaining a basic commitment to
equality, serves the purpose of avoiding tendencies to exclude and oppress minority
groups.252 Ultimately, whether these practices will succeed in defending oppressed
groups will depend on how effective strategies are in targeting the beliefs of individuals. I
consider that a Hobbesian argument from avoiding the state of nature will often be
effective in justifying the appeal to strategies for alleviating antagonism through instilling
dispositions. Furthermore, instilling dispositions will have to involve channeling the
passions of individuals in order to constitute virtuous individuals that have a propensity
towards peacefully engaging with others.253
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Foucault had already articulated a rejection of the divide between public and
private reason on Kantian grounds. In his 1982-1983 lectures The Government of Self and
Others, Foucault states
You can see that Aufklärung, and Kant says this, is the exact opposite of
“tolerance.” What is tolerance in fact? Tolerance is precisely what excludes
reasoning, discussion, and freedom of thought in its public form, and only accepts
it—tolerates it—in a personal, private and hidden use. Aufklärung, on the
contrary, gives freedom the dimension of the greatest publicity in the form of the
universal, and it maintains obedience only in this private role, let’s say in this
particular, defined individual role within the social body. (GSO 36-37)
Whereas both the Lockean and the Rawlsian demands for tolerance lead to requiring
obedience in the public realm and restricts free thought to the private sphere, Foucault
points out that the dictates of Kant’s notion of the Enlightenment involve rendering
obedience merely private, whereas a free exchange of ideas is allowed in the public
sphere. Under this conception, one can justify a political position without appealing to a
shared basis. This conception of freedom in the public sphere, therefore, jettisons
agreement altogether, or at least renders it unnecessary.254

belief system. Instead, the aim is to mitigate the strength of beliefs generally. As I had
suggested earlier in this chapter, this also must recognize that rational conditions of
intelligibility ultimately must be authoritative. See page 185n228.
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In a 1983 interview, Foucault states, “[t]he farthest I would go is to say that perhaps
one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.” Foucault
asserts that one way to question power relations is in terms of the nonconsensuality
involved in that relation, while distancing himself from recognizing consensus as a
regulative ideal. Of course, Foucault has to provide an argument for why
nonconsensuality is problematic, which he does not do. Though agreement from an ideal
perspective is not necessarily problematic, it is far from clear that it is necessary for
195

The view I am proposing may be criticized for being more demanding than the
one Rawls puts forward. Sidelining truth, for Rawls, follows from the unlikelihood of
ever arriving at agreement with respect to comprehensive doctrines. This is why truth is
replaced with reasonableness and hypothetical agreement. I consider, however, that my
view is less demanding for two reasons. First, the primary problem with Rawls’s position
is his emphasis on agreement, whether it is on the content of the conception of justice as
we find in Theory, or on a public basis for justification as developed in “The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited.” Alternatively, I avoid presupposing actual agreement and
instead argue that agreement does not play a significant role in arriving at stability. One
can accept that political justifications should involve reciprocity without appealing to
agreement. The fact that reciprocity could be a basic presupposition for an ordered
community and for rendering political dictates intelligible does not necessarily mean that
everyone in fact does hold it to be valid. The political problem would then concern the
employment of strategic mechanisms that would inculcate virtues in these individuals
conducive for such reciprocity. This will primarily involve having them question their
unchallenged belief in the inherent rights or superiority of one group over another.
Therefore, questioning problematic underlying beliefs does not have to follow from
accepting reciprocity. These beliefs will be challenged publicly by rational argumentation
once they are allowed into the public sphere. Consequently, accepting reciprocity may be
a result of such agonistic interaction rather than a precondition.
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Rejecting agreement as a basis can be justified even on Hobbesian grounds. As I
have argued in chapter three, consent does not contribute significantly to Hobbes’s
argument given his commitment to a deterministic view that subscribes to a broad
conception of voluntary action and since he recognizes sovereignty by acquisition to
follow from consent. If this is the case then a political conception that arises out of
agreement, whether actual or hypothetical, becomes irrelevant. What is more relevant for
Hobbes is arriving at stability to end the state of war beginning from an analysis of the
passionate behavior of human beings. Under this view, even the normative dictates of
skepticism and equality need not be agreed upon, and instilling them does not have to
follow from everyone’s acceptance.255
Second, the position I advocate is also less demanding as it does not presuppose
any convergence on core liberal values in order to produce stability. Consequently, rather
than require, as Rawls does, that citizens meet the demands of publicity through altering
the kinds of justifications used to reflect only political reasons, I contend that we should
allow the free exchange of ideas publicly. As a result, rather than making stability depend
on meeting the demands of publicity, I consider that, when stability is indeed desired
under certain historical circumstances, a Hobbesian argument suffices, coupled with
developing the two normative dictates of skepticism and equality.256 Though, ultimately,
perpetuating these norms may result from the role of institutions, their justification can be
developed primarily from a Hobbesian-Foucaultian line of argument. In contrast, as I
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have shown in chapter one, justification of norms in Rawls’s view ends up being entirely
dependent on what values institutions inculcate.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued in favor of an engaged politics that allows for critically
scrutinizing the beliefs of individuals, whether religious, philosophical, or historical. By
pursuing a Foucaultian-Hobbesian nonideal approach, I have argued that nonideal theory
sets limitations on an ideal view by recognizing cognitive limitations, which render
arriving at long-term ideals far-fetched. I have argued that we can derive from Foucault’s
view a normative requirement of equality along with a skeptical attitude with regards to
one’s own beliefs.
I maintained that this leads to two implications. On the one hand, we can derive a
meta-political conclusion by highlighting a tension between the demands for equality and
stability to which Rawls subscribes. This leads to understanding politics partly on the
model of war as political discourses often involve underlying mechanisms that have
strategic goals, which aim at disrupting stability in order to allow for the inclusion of
political groups. As Foucault maintains in Society Must be Defended, politics is to be
understood as the continuation of war by other means. Recognizing that politics often
follows the war model, however, could be coupled with justifying the requirement of
stability based on a Hobbesian argument. The second implication pertains to the role
Rawls assigns to truth in politics. I have argued that Rawls, first, fails to recognize the
relevance of historical beliefs in politics, and second limits political intervention by not
allowing critique to target individual beliefs. By following a Foucaultian line of
argument, however, I have argued that political intervention is most effective when it
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focuses on truth claims. By maintaining that the divide between the public and the private
in Rawls is redundant, I argued for allowing truth claims to play a public role in order to
render them susceptible to public criticism. I have maintained that we can avoid the
complications that follow from eliminating the public-private divide by accepting a
number of normative commitments. On the one hand, we should accept a Foucaultian
approach that is open to receiving the views of others and that avoids dogmatic assertions
through pursuing skepticism and recognizing equality as a normative demand. On the
other hand, I have shown that a Hobbesian argument to avoid the state of nature
guarantees that we maintain some degree of stability by inculcating virtues in individuals.
The normative dictate for stability, however, need not be recognized as universal, and
will depend on historical circumstances in specific communities. Often, stability will
have to be undermined in order to rectify injustices and exclusionary practices.
Ultimately, this more engaged form of politics reduces antagonistic tendencies by
mitigating dogmatic commitments to truth.
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Conclusion
The extent to which the model of contract can offer insight with respect to
legitimacy and actual political relations depends on the degree to which we take actual,
rational, reflective agreement to contribute to determining political relations. I argued
throughout the dissertation that this conception of politics masks the underlying
apparatuses that have a significant bearing on determining the limits of such active and
rational reflection. Consequently, accounting for political justifications must be informed
by actual political practices that determine these limits and recognize the historicity of
political problems. As I argued, one way of accounting for such phenomena is by
introducing a view of power that acknowledges such limits through understanding how
we are influenced by material processes. Political goals would, therefore, be more
adequate if they are concerned with short-term solutions for problems rather than offering
an overarching normative goal that determines a general direction. This opens the space
for addressing a number of related concerns pertaining to what constitutes adequate
justification, how we are to conceive of criteria that demarcate objective knowledge from
irrational forms, and what role intersubjectivity plays in establishing the basis for
meaningful political analysis.
In chapter one, I argued that assigning normative weights to political dictates
independently of relying on a philosophical basis and by relying either on a hypothetical
contract or an actual overlapping consensus is unable to justify its normative conclusions.
Rawlsian political liberalism has to either commit to a nonpolitical basis to account for
why it is that certain conclusions are more compelling than others, or remain amenable to
a plurality of “reasonable” views, while lacking a sufficient grounding. Rawls’s
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commitment to the latter leaves him unable to respond to problems he identifies in
Hobbes pertaining to what constitutes an acceptable social role for politics, how we arrive
at a stable society, and what views should be included in a reasonable community.
Chapter two moves to introduce a critique of Hobbes that arises out of a
Foucaultian analysis. I argued that a common thread that ties the Foucaultian and
Hobbesian views of power can be located in their commitment to materialism. I argue
that the basis of Foucault’s critique of Hobbes can be primarily cast in terms of the
different starting point Foucault chooses for the analysis of social relations, that of
inequality. Foucault, therefore, offers a rich analysis of power relations that recognizes
that bodies are already imbued and affected by force relations that strategically constitute
the limits of possibility of action and thought. This allows for developing a robust
conception of power that arises out of a Foucaultian-Hobbesian identification of a
material basis for our social relations.
Chapter three argued for endorsing a material reading of Hobbes by bridging the
gap between his materialism and his politics. I have rejected a skeptical reading arguing
that Hobbes should be understood as a metaphysical skeptic, and which advocates for a
freestanding politics on that basis. Hobbes can only justify his political conclusions by
appealing to a metaphysically material basis that allows for an analysis of the passions,
which, in turn, allows us to understand how humans behave and to identify ways to
render such behavior obedient. For Hobbes, this analysis can only arise out of
recognizing ourselves as corporeal entities that deterministically respond to physical
stimuli. Accepting this line of argument leads to downplaying the language of consent we
find in Hobbes. Consequently, by emphasizing a drive for self-preservation coupled with
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fear of death along with the interaction with other passionate subjects concerned about
their own preservation, Hobbes’s argument for instituting the state does not lead to actual
or hypothetical consent, but emerges as a deductive argument that answers the question
of what political organization is conducive for our survival at the moment.
Following the reading of Hobbes as a materialist, chapter five argued that like
Foucault, Hobbes recognizes the productive effects of power that constitute subjects
capable of obeying sovereignty. For Hobbes, this is primarily justified by appealing to
conatus, which grounds the passions and offers the means by which political tactics can
be effective. The key difference between Hobbes’s view and that of Foucault is,
therefore, the latter’s rejection of a metaphysical basis for his political view. I argued that
Foucault effectively transforms the material analysis from a metaphysical one to one that
relies on history. I maintained that Foucault is concerned with answering the Kantian
question of what constitutes the conditions of possibility of knowledge. However, rather
than appealing to a transcendental subject, Foucault is committed to a form of empiricism
that takes historical analysis to allow for offering the sufficient conditions that make
knowledge possible while allowing for critique to occur by unmasking the contingency of
what we consider to be self-evident.
Finally, the implications with respect to Rawlsian contractarianism are numerous.
I argued that the Foucaultian-Hobbesian analysis leads to privileging a non-ideal
approach over an ideal approach. I argue that, given the cognitive obstacles that we
encounter while determining long-term ideals, we are more justified in working towards
more immediate change by encouraging an attitude of skepticism. By arguing for a basic
equality that arises out of denaturalizing social hierarchies along with recognizing that the
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basis upon which we lean is often more fluid and less necessary than we take it to be, we
ought to identify means that reduce dogmatism by mitigating confidence in our own
views. This introduces an agonistic understanding of politics that maintains the need to
critically engage the beliefs of citizens, and thus leads to undoing the divide between
public and private reason. In a Hobbesian sense, maintaining this attitude of skepticism
will have to involve cultivating virtues in citizens that are conducive for peaceful
inclinations that replace antagonistic tendencies. However, though some degree of
stability is generally desired, it falls short of being a universal dictate, as undermining
stability may often be required in order to render the social body more inclusive. The
sought-after goals will be determined primarily by appealing to the historical emergence
of political problems rather than abstract universal ideals.
As I have argued, undoing the distinction between the public and private sphere
makes possible an agonistic politics that goes beyond the mere expression of belief
systems in politics. If politics is to be recognized as involving tactical and strategic
moves that aim at perpetuating or reversing unequal social relations, then a free
engagement of ideas constitutes a more adequate position that renders possible such
transformations. Once we recognize that narratives, historical or otherwise, play a
significant role in determining political allegiances, the question that follows pertains to
the means by which we can weaken such convictions.
Ultimately, resolutions for political problems cannot be prescribed independently
of the historical conditions in which the problems emerge. Historical conditions not only
allow us to understand problems within their context, but more importantly enable us to
recognize that political problematizations are constituted by their context. These
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conditions make possible the emergence of specific questions, organizations, and
prescriptions, all of which have to be understood as circumscribed within apparatuses that
operate in relation to bodies of knowledge. Universal prescriptions, therefore, are bound
to be insufficient given that they exclude the role of history, and thus neither offer the
means by which they can be applied nor result from recognizing the deep-rooted nature
of historically cultivated inclinations and the contingent aspects that allow for forming
bodies of knowledge.
The alternative I put forward is committed to a non-ideal approach that recognizes
that political strategies primarily take as their targets the material constitution of
individuals, whether as mere bodies or as bodies imbued with a life that must be
governed. Governing individuals has among its effects inculcating dispositions and habits
by emphasizing efficiency, productivity, and rational classification that distinguishes the
normal from the abnormal. Often, this results in the development of the ‘modern’
passions along with their role in producing political conflict. Power effects, however, are
not limited to affecting our passions while leaving intact a disinterested faculty of
reasoning. Rational inquiry is itself limited by historical conditions, discursive or
otherwise.
Two consequences follow. First, given that the passions of individuals are effects
of the interplay of forces, then political normativity is bound to be understood in terms of
inculcating specific virtues that render an engaged politics possible. Rather than offering
a justificatory basis, consent can only play a retroactive role as it only arises as an
outcome of the cultivation of virtues. Consequently, I’ve suggested that consent be
abandoned as a basis for political normativity. This conclusion has a bearing on liberal
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views that endorse variations of contractarianism, all of which arguably rely on voluntary
agreement as a basis.
Second, though the idea of a science of politics has already been abandoned for
some time, my conclusion vindicates the Rawlsian view that political prescriptions must
not be based on commitments to truth. Instead, they must be primarily procedural.
Accounts of truth are bound to affect group commitments, which means political critique
must certainly engage truth claims. However, the ultimate goal of politics will not strive
to arrive at a final truth with regards to the political question, but must primarily aim at
negotiating demands of inclusion under the basic dictate of equality while striving to
avoid societal collapse. Inclusion must not follow the model of tolerance, where
religious, philosophical, or historical beliefs play an important motivational role while
being insulated from criticism in a private realm. Instead, given that consent cannot
constitute the basis for this proceduralism, a free critical engagement with the ‘private’
views of others must be allowed. The basic demand for equality implicitly entails that
groups that are committed to exclusionary discourses do not rise to power, though they be
allowed public expression of their views. Strategically, the best way to guarantee that
these groups do not attain power is by allowing them to be publicly expressed for
scrutiny. Merely allowing public expression, however, will not suffice for stripping the
rhetorical force of such discourses, which is why tactics that work on the passions of
individuals, possibly by shaming those who hold such belief systems have to also be
active.
Furthermore, acknowledging our materiality involves accepting a form of political
naturalism that reduces what we take to be an active transcendental ego to a mere
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organization of forces, an organism that a long time ago developed an ability to organize
and classify. This certainly has no bearing on the normative implications. To endorse a
naturalized understanding of ourselves ought not entail the prescription that we dispose of
our normative commitments, but instead to recognize that different conditions will
require that we resort to different solutions. This is the most straightforward conclusion
that results from rejecting the elevated status of historical origins. The ramifications of
this realization is that political notions that have acquired rhetorical force such as liberty
and equality do not possess any intrinsic value, but are often merely introduced
retroactively in order to structure and organize already existing unequal social relations.
They are often invoked by rendering intelligible political structures that are already active
and identifying normative goals in terms of aberrations that do not fit into our coherent
arrangement.
The alternative non-ideal approach must be at the same time more modest and
more ambitious. It is more modest in identifying minor targets that could slowly lead to
change rather than argue for overhauling our social organization while using a theoretical
model. It is also more modest in recognizing that the intelligible structures we invoke to
theorize about politics are the product of limited perspectives that are rooted in material
conditions. Not only do these conditions overdetermine our current state of affairs, but
also the degree to which we can constitute knowledge claims and ideals. Consequently,
the non-ideal attitude will also be more ambitious in attempting to move beyond
entrenched structures by shedding light on historical contingency. Rather than be satisfied
with a description of present social relations and idealizing them, a non-ideal view will
strive towards locating minimal conditions that could result in effecting political
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transformation. A non-ideal approach, therefore, will not simply cast doubt on the
realizability of long-term ideals, but will also show why they are in principle bound to be
mere reflections of already-existing social hierarchies. Ultimately, my view derives
normative dictates by appealing to procedural approaches to resolve problems that have a
historically specific character.
The view I developed allows for pursuing further lines of inquiry. Recognizing
the historicity of knowledge along with the problems they produce requires addressing
the question of objectivity. Accepting that truth claims often serve a political function
within a power-knowledge complex runs the risk of endorsing a self-defeating form of
relativism that cannot justify any normativity. From a political point of view, this would
lead to the problem of promoting inaction and collapses into defending the status quo in
the absence of any direction that could guide efforts for political change. As I have
argued, one way to circumvent this problem is by appealing to tentative normative
dictates that could have a general scope. Nonetheless, adequately accounting for this
problem requires developing a view that is able to incorporate objectivity into
historicism, or in other words, to offer criteria for objectivity that would simultaneously
be historically embedded. In parallel, the approach would also have to specify why it is
that rational arguments, despite being often strategically motivated, would still retain
their force while rejecting myth as legitimately compelling.
In chapter five, I suggested that one way to resolve the problem of objectivity is
by appealing to conditions of intelligibility as a basis. Conditions that render discourses
intelligible upon scrutiny involve those that adhere to forms of rational argumentation,
which would also include historical approaches. Referring to conditions of intelligibility
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ultimately privileges the social over other spheres of knowledge. If politics is not to be
grounded in metaphysics, then it must be rooted in actual transformable social relations.
It is in the social sphere that conditions of possibility of knowledge emerge. These
conditions could follow from a combination of factors, some of which may be necessary
conditions that pertain to our constitution, others could be related to sufficient historical
conditions. Whether we can arrive at a clear list of which conditions are necessary and
which are contingent is dubious. Nevertheless, our critical role requires that we
continuously seek to determine which conditions are changeable and what strategic
implications could follow from such changes. This allows us to direct critique in order to
address local problems that had been made possible by complex historical circumstances.
As I have suggested earlier, it is crucial to realize that theorizing about knowledge
independently of such historical and social conditions fails to account for our limitations.
There is a clear sense in which our knowledge claims are always situated within a
cultural context and within rules that determine the boundaries in which this knowledge
can develop. Therefore, independently of such rules, knowledge would be impossible.
But more importantly, it is historical transformations that determine these limits and
boundaries, without which knowledge cannot develop. And these historical
transformations do not arise out of necessity, nor do they obey the neat structure of
reason. Instead, they are always to be determined retroactively, by analyzing how, as
material beings, we are influenced by practices that make us what we are.
The insight that follows from assigning priority to the social, as a transforming
field that involves shifting power relations, is identifying a philosophical role for
historical contingency. This role is not only in the constitution of epistemic and political
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problems, but also in our constitution as subjects, a role that often results from what we
deem to be normatively binding classifications. If we accept this position, then historical
analysis is validated not by reference to an independent reality, but to basic rules that
determine what is intelligible and what is not. These rules can only be understood as
intersubjective and arising out of interaction with others.
In a similar manner, what legitimates rational inquiry is precisely that pursuing
sound argumentation is a precondition to render the world intelligible. These rules, then,
which themselves are to some degree subject to historical transformation, inform us more
about ourselves than they do about the world. The political implication of this realization
is that we recognize that we are responsible for constituting our condition and thus can
transform it, but also simultaneously that our intervention is bound to be limited given
that rational analysis, as a precondition for intelligibility, cannot do away with assuming
necessary conditions, ones that will continuously be revised. Rendering our condition
intelligible, therefore, will have to result from identifying coherent rules to use as our
starting point, rules that do not have validity independently of the social sphere in which
they are operative.
Finally, my view also raises another question concerning the kind of skepticism I
have endorsed. As I argued in chapter five, normative prescriptions are bound to be
transient rather than necessarily and universally compelling. I argued that one problem
we consistently find in politics arises out of a dogmatism with respect to beliefs that
motivate political convictions. Combatting this dogmatism can take different forms, but
as I propose, it must begin by inculcating a skeptical outlook in citizens. Given that my
view is grounded in rejecting access to the metaphysical world along with recognizing
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how knowledge often serves strategic roles, this normative conclusion goes beyond mere
intellectual humility that results from recognizing one could mistaken upon encountering
disagreement. Instead, I invoke a deeper skepticism that concerns knowledge in its
various forms. This raises a number of questions concerning the kind of skepticism that
ought to be adopted. As I have argued, this skepticism will have to be able to generate
normative content in order to avoid being aligned with conservatism. In its results, this
skepticism cannot be Pyrrhonian and must not lead to the suspension of all judgment. Nor
is it a Cartesian rejection of skepticism that aims at returning to an undisturbed
dogmatism. Instead, the goal is to develop a form of skepticism that is able to put forward
accounts of knowledge while being cautious of their use in order to avoid legitimating
hegemonic practices. Of course, the dictate of skepticism may itself be revised as well in
accordance with historical circumstances.
David Hume concludes his essay “Of the Original Contract” by referring to
Socrates in Crito, who “builds a tory consequence of passive obedience on a whigh
foundation of the original contract.”257 Though a Tory consequence may not have been
undesirable for Hume, this statement offers insight as to how a view based on agreement
unfolds. Identifying consent as central to the question of political philosophy may often
serve the purpose of reinforcing conservative politics. Rethinking justifications in terms
of contract, whether original or hypothetical, often functions in an ideological manner
that solidifies existing social arrangements. As I argued, Rawls’s view, as one that arises
out of commonsense morality, is a clear example of offering reasons to legitimate an
existing social order as it fails to give adequate justifications apart from an existing
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David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," 201.
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overlapping consensus. Rethinking political normativity, therefore, must not develop out
of considering an ideal that arises out of a present order, but must begin with identifying
where change is possible and then move towards practically realizing it.

211

Bibliography
Allen, Amy. The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary
Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Arendt, Hannah. “Truth and Politics.” The New Yorker, February 25, 1967.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1967/02/25/truth-and-politics.
Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in
Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Biebricher, Thomas. “Foucault and the Politics of Rights.” Journal of Political Power 5, no. 2
(August 1, 2012): 301–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2012.698904.
Birmingham, Peg. “Arendt and Hobbes: Glory, Sacrificial Violence, and the Political
Imagination.” Research in Phenomenology 41, no. 1 (2011): 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1163/156916411X558864.
Boétie, Étienne de la. The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude.
Translated by Harry Kurz. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975.
Bottici, Chiara. A Philosophy of Political Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Butler, Judith. “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions.” The Journal of Philosophy
86, no. 11 (1989): 601–7.
Callaghan, G. K. “Nominalism, Abstraction, and Generality in Hobbes.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 18, no. 1 (2001): 37–55.
Connolly, William E. “Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault.”
Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993): 365–89.
Cooper, Julie E. “Vainglory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the Political Theory of Thomas
Hobbes.” The Review of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 241–69.
Curley, Edwin. “The State of Nature and Its Law in Hobbes and Spinoza.” Philosophical
Topics 19, no. 1 (1991): 97–117.
Daniels, Norman. “Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism.” In The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, edited by Samuel Richard Freeman, 241–76.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Descartes, René. “Third Set of Objections with Replies.” In The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes: Volume 2, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald
Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
212

Dillon, M., and A. Neal, eds. Foucault on Politics, Security and War. 2008 edition.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Dungey, Nicholas. “Thomas Hobbes’s Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics.”
The Review of Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): 190–220.
Dworkin, Ronald. “The Original Position.” University of Chicago Law Review 40, no. 3
(1973).
Erman, Eva, and Niklas Möller. “Three Failed Charges Against Ideal Theory.” Social Theory
and Practice 39, no. 1 (2013): 19–44.
Evans, Fred. The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/evan14500.
Farrelly, Colin. “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation.” Political Studies 55, no. 4 (2007):
844–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00656.x.
Field, Sandra. “Hobbes and the Question of Power.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52,
no. 1 (January 2018): 61–85. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2014.0010.
Florence, Maurice. “Foucault, Michel, 1926 –.” In The Cambridge Companion to Foucault,
edited by Gary Gutting, translated by Catherine Porter, 314–19. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
Flynn, Thomas R. “Foucault and Historical Nominalism.” In Phenomenology and Beyond:
The Self and Its Language, 134–47. Contributions to Phenomenology. Dordrecht:
Springer, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1055-3_10.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan.
New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
———. Dits et Ecrits, 1954-1988. Tome III : 1976-1979. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994.
———. Dits et Ecrits, tome ii : 1976 - 1988. Gallimard, 2001.
———. “Governmentality.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume III,
edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 201–22. New York: The New
Press, 2001.
———. Histoire de la sexualité, tome 1 : La Volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1994.
———. “Il faut défendre la société”. Cours au Collège de France.1976. Paris: Seuil, 1997.

213

———. “Interview with Michel Foucault.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 19541984, Volume III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 239–97. New
York: The New Press, 2001.
———. La Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France. Paris: Le Seuil, 2004.
———. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume II, edited by James D. Faubion, 369–92. New
York: The New Press, 1999.
———. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 16, no. 1 (1986).
———. “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress.” In Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1), edited by Paul
Rabinow, 253–80. New York: The New Press, 1998.
———. “Politics and Ethics: An Interview.” In The Foucault Reader, 373–80. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1984.
———. “Questions of Method.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume
III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 223–38. New York: The
New Press, 2001.
———. Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Paris: Le Seuil, 2004.
———. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--1978.
Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2009.
———. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976. Edited
by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. Translated by David Macey. Reprint edition.
New York: Picador, 2003.
———. “Space, Knowledge, and Power.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984,
Volume III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 349–64. New
York: The New Press, 2001.
———. Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
———. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979. Edited by
Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008.
———. “The Confession of the Flesh.” In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977, translated by Colin Gordon, 194–228. New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1980.

214

———. “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” In Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1), edited by Paul Rabinow,
281–301. New York: The New Press, 1998.
———. The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983.
Edited by Frédéric Gros, Alessandro Fontana, and François Ewald. Translated by Graham
Burchell. New York: Picador, 2011.
———. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley.
Reissue edition. New York: Vintage, 1990.
———. The Order of Things. London: Routledge, 2005.
———. “The Subject and Power.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984,
Volume III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 326–48. New
York: The New Press, 2001.
———. “Truth and Juridical Forms.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984,
Volume III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 1–89. New York:
The New Press, 2001.
———. “Useless to Revolt?” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume III,
edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 449–53. New York: The New
Press, 2001.
———. “What Is Critique?” In The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works
of Foucault, 1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, 263–78. New York:
The New Press, 2003.
———. “What Is Enlightenment?” In Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of
Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1), edited by Paul Rabinow, 303–20. New York: The New
Press, 1998.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory. 2nd edition. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2008.
Gauss, Gerald. “Hobbes’s Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism.” In Hobbes Today: Insights
for the 21st Century, edited by S. A. Lloyd, 155–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014.
———. “Public Reason Liberalism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism, edited by
Steven Wall, 163–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Gauthier. Logic of Leviathan. Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Gauthier, David. Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
215

———. “Political Contractarianism.” Journal of Political Philosophy 5, no. 2 (1997): 132–
148.
Gert, Bernard. “Hobbes on Reason.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82, no. 3–4 (September
1, 2001): 243–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00127.
Gordon, Colin. “Introduction.” In Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume
III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, xi–xli. New York: The
New Press, 2001.
Grcic, Joseph. “Hobbes and Rawls on Political Power.” Etica E Politica 9, no. 2 (2007): 371–
392.
Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: Moral Conciousness
and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt. Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 2001.
———. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Edited by Ciaran P. Cronin
and Pablo De Greiff. Reprint edition. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000.
———. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Translated by Frederick
G. Lawrence. Reprint edition. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1990.
Hampton, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986.
Han, Beatrice. Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical.
Translated by Edward Pile. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Hartz, Emily, and Carsten Fogh Nielsen. “From Conditions of Equality to Demands of Justice:
Equal Freedom, Motivation and Justification in Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls.” Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 7–
25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2014.995498.
Hass, Lawrence. “Beheading the King: Foucault on the Limits of Juridical Thought.” In
Reinterpreting the Political: Continental Philosophy and Political Theory, edited by
Lenore Langsdorf, Stephen H. Watson, and Karen Anne Smith, 233–48. Albany: SUNY
Press, 1998.
Hedrick, Todd. Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political
Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
Hendricks, Christina. “Foucault’s Kantian Critique: Philosophy and the Present.” Philosophy
& Social Criticism 34, no. 4 (2008): 357–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453708088509.

216

Hendrix, Burke A. “Where Should We Expect Social Change in Non-Ideal Theory?” Political
Theory 41, no. 1 (2013): 116–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591712463201.
Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Edited by Sir
William Molesworth. Vol. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. 11 vols. London: J. Bohn, 1839.
Hobbes, Thomas, and Sir William Molesworth. Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera
Philosophica Quae Latine Scripsit Omnia. apud Joannem Bohn, 1839.
Hoekstra, Kinch. “Hobbesian Equality.” In Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century,
edited by S. A. Lloyd, 76–112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Hull, Gordon. “Building Better Citizens: Hobbes against the Ontological Illusion.” Epoché 20,
no. 1 (Fall 2015): 105–29.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
———. “Of the Original Contract.” In Hume: Political Essays, edited by Knud Haakonssen,
186–201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Hunt, Alan, and Gary Wickham. Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as
Governance. London: Pluto Press, 1994.
Jesseph, Douglas M. “The Decline and Fall of Hobbesian Geometry.” Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 30, no. 3 (1999): 425–453.
Johnston, David. The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural
Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Kant, Immanuel. “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” In Kant: Political
Writings, edited by H. S. Reiss, 2nd edition., 54–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Kaufman, Alexander. “Rawls and Kantian Constructivism.” Kantian Review 17, no. 2 (June
2012): 227–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000040.
Kavka, Gregory S. “Hobbes’s War of All Against All.” Ethics 93, no. 2 (1983): 291–310.
Koopman, Colin. “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian
Lineages.” Foucault Studies, no. 8 (February 2010): 100–121.
https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i8.2934.
Koukouzelis, Kostas. “Rawls and Kant on the Public Use of Reason.” Philosophy & Social
Criticism 35, no. 7 (September 1, 2009): 841–68.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453709106244.
217

Krasnoff, Larry. “How Kantian Is Constructivism?” Kant-Studien 90, no. 4 (1999): 385–409.
Krom, Michael P. The Limits of Reason in Hobbes’s Commonwealth. New York: Continuum,
2013.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. “Preface to an Edition of Nizolius.” In Philosophical Papers and
Letters: A Selection, edited by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd edition., 121–30. Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1969.
Lemke, Thomas. “An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory.”
Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 2 (2007): 43–64.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2007.9672946.
———. Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Major-Poetzl, Pamela. “The Disorder of Things in Foucault.” Revue Internationale de
Philosophie 44, no. 173 (1990): 198–208.
Malcolm, Noel. Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.
Martinich, A. P. Hobbes: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
McCarthy, Thomas. Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in
Contemporary Critical Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993.
McQuillan, Colin. “Transcendental Philosophy and Critical Philosophy in Kant and Foucault:
Response to Colin Koopman.” Foucault Studies, no. 9 (September 2010): 145–55.
Mills, Charles W. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 165–83.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2005.tb00493.x.
———. “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47, no. S1
(March 1, 2009): 161–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00147.x.
Missner, Marshall. “Skepticism and Hobbes’s Political Philosophy.” Journal of the History of
Ideas 44, no. 3 (1983): 407–27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2709174.
Neal, Andrew W. “Cutting Off the King’s Head: Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and
the Problem of Sovereignty.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 4 (2004):
373–98.
Nerney, Gayne. “Hobbes: The Twofold Grounding of Civil Philosophy.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1985): 395–409.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Edited by Walter
Kaufmann. Reissue edition. New York: Vintage, 1989.
218

Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Reprint edition. New York: Basic Books, 2013.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership.
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007.
Oakeshott, Michael. Hobbes on Civil Association. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975.
Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books, 1991.
Oksala, Johanna. “Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience.”
Hypatia 19, no. 4 (2004): 99–121.
———. “Lines of Fragility: A Foucaultian Critique of Violence.” In Philosophy and the
Return of Violence: Studies from This Widening Gyre, edited by Christopher S. Yates and
Nathan Eckstrand, 154–70. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011.
Olssen, Mark. “Chapter 14: Invoking Democracy: Foucault’s Conception (With Insights from
Hobbes).” Counterpoints 292 (2007): 205–26.
O’Neill, Onora. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant.” In The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,
edited by Samuel Freeman, 347–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
———. “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political
Liberalism.” The Philosophical Review 106, no. 3 (1997): 411–28.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2998399.
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Patton, Paul. “Foucault and Normative Political Philosophy: Liberal and Neo-Liberal
Governmentality and Public Reason.” In Foucault and Philosophy, edited by Timothy
O’Leary and Christopher Falzon, 204–21. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
———. “Foucault and Rawls: Government and Public Reason.” In The Government of Life:
Foucault, Biopolitics, and Neoliberalism, edited by Vanessa Lemm and Miguel Vatter,
141–62. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x00mw.
———. “Foucault’s ‘Critique’ of Neoliberalism: Rawls and the Genealogy of Public Reason.”
New Formations: A Journal of Culture, Theory, & Politics 80–81 (2013): 39–51.
———. “Foucault’s Subject of Power.” Political Theory Newsletter 6, no. 1 (May 1994): 60–
71.
Pettit, Philip. Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008.

219

Pietarinen, Juhani. “Conatus as Active Power in Hobbes.” Hobbes Studies 14, no. 1 (2001):
71–82. https://doi.org/10.1163/187502501X00056.
Prado, C. G. “Two Uses of Genealogy: Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams.” In Foucault’s
Legacy, 90–108. A&C Black, 2009.
Rancière, Jacques, Davide Panagia, and Rachel Bowlby. “Ten Theses on Politics.” Theory &
Event 5, no. 3 (January 1, 2001). https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2001.0028.
Rawls, John. “A Kantian Conception of Equality.” In Collected Papers, edited by Samuel
Freeman, Revised edition., 254–66. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
———. A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Reissue edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2005.
———. “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14,
no. 3 (1985): 223–251.
———. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” In Collected Papers, edited by Samuel
Freeman, Revised edition., 303–58. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
———. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Edited by Samuel Freeman.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008.
———. Political Liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
———. “The Independence of Moral Theory.” In Collected Papers, edited by Samuel
Freeman, Revised edition., 286–302. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
———. The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Revised edition.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Rogers, G. A. John, and Thomas Sorell, eds. “Hobbes’s Uses of the History of Philosophy.” In
Hobbes and History, 82–95. London: Routledge, 2000.
Sadler, Gregory B. “Reason as Danger and Remedy for the Modern Subject in Hobbes’
Leviathan.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 9 (November 1, 2009): 1099–1118.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453709340638.
Sayer, Andrew. “Power, Causality and Normativity: A Critical Realist Critique of Foucault.”
Journal of Political Power 5, no. 2 (August 1, 2012): 179–94.
https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2012.698898.
Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011.

220

Simmons, A. John. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 1
(2010): 5–36.
———. “Locke’s State of Nature.” Political Theory 17, no. 3 (1989): 449–70.
Skinner, Q. “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State.” Journal of Political
Philosophy 7, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00063.
Skinner, Quentin. Hobbes and Republican Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008.
———. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
Spieker, Jörg. “Foucault and Hobbes on Politics, Security, and War.” Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political 36, no. 3 (2011): 187–99.
Stoffel, Brian. “Hobbes’s Conatus and the Roots of Character.” In Hobbes’s ‘Science of
Natural Justice’’,’ edited by C. Walton and P.J. Johnson, 123–38. Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987.
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
———. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis. Translated by Elsa M.
Sinclair. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1963.
Tadros, Victor. “Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault.” Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 75–103.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/18.1.75.
Taylor, Robert S. Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness.
University Park, Pa: Penn State University Press, 2011.
Thornton, Helen. “Cain, Abel and Thomas Hobbes.” History of Political Thought 23, no. 4
(2002): 611–33.
Valverde, Mariana. “Law versus History: Foucault’s Genealogy of Modern Sovereignty.” In
Foucault on Politics, Security and War, edited by M. Dillon and A. Neal, 135–50.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Veyne, Paul. Foucault: His Thought, His Character. Cambridge: Polity, 2010.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality. New York: Basic
Books, 1984.

221

Weithman, Paul. “John Rawls and the Task of Political Philosophy.” The Review of Politics
71, no. 1 (ed 2009): 113–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670509000096.
Wolff, Jonathan. “Hobbes and the Motivations of Social Contract Theory.” International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. 2 (1994): 271–86.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570795.
Wright, Joanne H. Origin Stories in Political Thought: Discourses on Gender, Power, and
Citizenship. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.
Zamora, Daniel, and Michael C. Behrent, eds. Foucault and Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2015.
Zarka, Yves Charles. “ON LAW.” In Hobbes and Modern Political Thought, translated by
James Griffith, 123–45. Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh2j4z.11.

222

